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ABSTRACTS 
The question of whether the rural land registration and certification has an impact on tenure 
security, investment and land productivity or not, remains an important policy question. It is also 
a deeply sensitive political issue in present day of Ethiopia. Using household level data collected 
from 279 households of Raya Azebo district of Tigrai, north Ethiopia this paper investigates the 
impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificates on tenure security, investment and 
land productivity. Results of both probit model and IV-probit model consistently indicate that 
certificate positively and significantly associated with both specification of tenure security. in 
case of the investment impacts of certificate, The double hurdle model (probit specification for 
adoption decision and alternative truncated regressions on the actual zeros and predicted zeros 
from probit regression) and alternative Tobit specification are run. But the likelihood ratio test 
of model appropriates rejects the Tobit model in favour of the double hurdle model. This 
encourages the research to separately estimate adoption decision and intensity of adoption. 
Results from the double hurdle model shows certificate have positively and significantly 
correlated with decision to invest stone terrace and soil bound but negatively correlated with 
intensity of investment. While, there is no significant relationship between tree planting and 
second level land holding certificate but the parametric result confirms that certified households 
have significant gains from certification in terms of productivity. In sum, a result indicates that 
certificate has positive and significant benefits on both perceived tenure security investment 
decision and land productivity. 
 
Key-words: Tenure Security, Investment, Land Productivity Double Hurdle, Land 
Certification, Tigrai 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Back Ground of the Study 
Land is often described as the base of all wealth (Williamson et al, 2006a). Land is everything 
we need: food, shelter, fuel, metal etc. Our mere existence is closely related to land (Binns, 
1953). Therefore it is often assumed that clearness regarding land tenure will strengthen an 
efficient and environmentally sound exploitation of this wealth. Land registration can provide 
important answer with regard to the question who ‘holds’ which unit of land. It is an important 
asset for any country, especially when the state of development demands an intensive use of 
relative scarce areas of land. (Otto, 2000) 
 
A central argument put forward by many economists in defense of full-fledged private property 
rights is that better property rights institutions lead to improved economic outcomes (Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; North and Thomas, 1973; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Feder et al., 1988; Feder and 
Nishio, 1998). Economists such as De Soto (2000) and Braselle et al. (2002) have argued that the 
major barrier to prosperity in developing countries is the inability to convert property into usable 
assets, because of a lack of clearly stated legally recognized rights. However, the past empirical 
evidence on the importance of formalization of property rights in land are inconclusive, both on 
the overall effect of having property titles and on which dimensions of land rights are crucial.  
 
Indigenous property right, in its various forms, by providing a set of well-understood and 
respected rules governing land use and transfer within the community, imparts a certain degree 
of tenure security. In this context, establishing a modern property rights system, without legally 
recognizing informal rights, may expand the scope for rent-seeking by land grangers (Atwood 
1990).1 
                                                             
1  (Atwood 1990) 1summarizes the argument as follows. 
“Members of a local community may face far fewer risks of loss of land under the existing informal system than an outsider would face. In 
addition, while land registration might reduce the risks faced by an outsider, it may increase the risks and insecurity faces by local people as 
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Land tenure and property rights has been the most controversial and politicized issue in 
Ethiopian history. The tenant to land lord relationship that was generally prevailing in the 
southern part of the country was a major problem that triggered not only instability but also 
severely undermined agricultural productivity during the Imperial era. The then government had 
made certain attempts to address the problem of land tenure in the country. 
 
Land registration was organized in Tigrai by Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) already 
during the civil war from 1988 as a basis for land redistributions. At that time they provided a 
white paper to the owner with information about the name of the holder, family size, soil fertility 
status, parcel size in local units, boundary information on the parcel and neighbors of the parcels. 
This information was, however, not included in a central registry. The land registration and 
certification was started in 1998 and focused only on cultivated land in Tigrai. From the very 
beginning the aim was to minimize conflicts, increase tenure security and to upgrade the 
certificates and create registries (Nega and Atakilt, 2006). Organizational committees were 
established at woreda2 and tabia3 levels.  
 
Since the low cost registration and certification begun in the region in the absence of a clear 
purpose and guideline, it has faced many shortcomings (Deininger et al., 2011). The first round 
of registration was not supported by maps of the registered holdings; and now regional states 
have found it necessary to undertake second level certification that is supported by maps. The 
updating procedure was in pilot in selected woredas (Raya azebo and Tahtay Adyabo); and that 
has also to be corrected. Current reports of the regions show that 99.5 % of all the holdings in 
Tigray have been registered at first level. The second level certification begun in the region with 
the help of foreign donors. The program departs from traditional titling interventions(the first 
phase)  in a number of ways, in particular by 1) issuing non-alienable use-right certificates, 
rather than full titles; 2) promoting gender equity with joint land ownership by; 3) using a 
participatory and highly decentralized process of field adjudication; 4)how the holding was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
family members or peripheral land claimants jockey to see in whose name a parcel will be registered…For many local people, therefore, 
registration can create rather than reduce uncertainty and conflict over land rights.” (pp. 663)1 
 
2 A wereda (or woreda) is an administrative district of local government in Ethiopia. Which are made up of tibias(kebeles) are typically collected 
together(usually contiguous woredas) in to zones. 
3 Tabia is the lower administrative unit accountable to woreda administration. 
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acquired and file number of the book 5) it is based on cadastral system4 (detail information about 
from whom, the period for which holding is granted, the “ use pattern,” the type of holding (i.e 
individual, organization, joint, communal, or state) ) 6)  it is parcel-based (each parcel have its 
own map rather than all parcel registration in one document ) 7) it uses modern technologies 
including GIS and air photos, and major properties attached to the holding, and the rights and 
duties of the holder. The parcel based second level landholding certificates, on which the 
analysis is based, was officially launched in august 2011 and is viewed as parcel based second 
level land holding certificates.          
The second stage certification was based on cadastral system which describes the land tenure in 
the country and must be able to keep pace with and support land-based development. A cadastre 
is defined in the Fédération Internationale des Géomètres (FIG) statement as:  
    “… normally a parcel based and up-to-date land information system containing a record of 
interests in land. It usually includes a geometric description of land parcels linked to other records 
describing the nature of the interests, and ownership or control of those interests, and often the 
value of the parcel and its improvements....” (FIG, 1995)  
 
Verifying empirically the impacts of modern land holding certificates on land tenure security, 
investment behavior and land productivity is a more relevant issue in the present day of Ethiopia. 
It is with this back ground that this study is initiated to fill the existing literature gap on this 
critical issue by examining the Ethiopia’s experience and possible lessons for other similar areas 
on the impact of the parcel-based second level landholding certificates in Tigrai region, northern 
Ethiopia on perceived tenure security, land-related investment, and agricultural productivity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 The cadastral system is that combination of tenure records and the related description of the smallest individually definable land units over 
which rights can be held in a jurisdiction. Cadastral reform denotes the process of making the cadastral system better able to acquire, store, 
manage or disseminate the relevant information. 
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     1.2 Statement of the Problem  
 Although the impacts of land certificate on tenure security, investment and land productivity has 
been emphasized by number of scholars (De Soto, 2000; Deininger et al., 2011 and Holden et al., 
2008), surprisingly little seems to have happened on the ground. This may even have led 
respected scholars to view interventions to register land as classic examples of a long discredited 
top-down approach to development rather than ways to empower land users (Easterly, 2008). 
Although it is recognized that the ‘title-no title’ dichotomy may be ‘the wrong answer to the 
wrong question’ (Bromley, 2008 and cited in Deininger et al., 2011), it tends to continue in the 
empirical debate in the literature. 
 
With mixed outcomes of early attempts at land titling in Africa and considerable evidence 
linking the failure of the reforms to design and implement fresh and innovative methods that 
overcome the shortcomings of previous programs has generated renewed interest (Deininger et 
al., 2008). The Tigrai new parcel-based second level land holding certification program departs 
from the approach of traditional land titling interventions as it places larger emphasis, among 
other things, on promoting gender equity through issuing certificates with joint land ownership 
by spouses. Analyzing such pro-gender features the program in terms of the actual productivity 
benefits to women is, therefore highly relevant in this context.  
 
A number of empirical Studies such as Deininger et al., (2011); Ghebru et al., (2008) and Place, 
(2009) indicate that the rural land registration and certification exercise in Ethiopia has shown 
important effects in building the sense of security in farmers that will in turn encourage farmers 
to invest more on their land holdings that positively affect natural resource conservation and 
sustainable land management. The studies such as Holden et al., (2008) and Place, (2009) also 
show that as a consequence of the registration and certification women are more empowered; and 
land holders who were reluctant or not willing to rent out their land holdings for fear of losing 
them are now confident to rent out because they can claim their lands back easily since their 
claims are supported by the holding of certificates. This research was tried to examine the ability 
of the parcel-based modern land holding certificates to achieve their desired effects. Whereas 
several of the previous studies focuses on first phase traditional land registration or the full land 
titling including right to mortgaging and land selling which is prohibited  by law in Ethiopia.  
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Economists disagree on the impacts of land certification on the level of a country’s investment. 
Several studies found that land titles enhance investment (Do and Iyer 2003; Field 2005; Feder 
and Nishio 1998). For instance, Ghebru et al. 2008; Deininger et al. 2007; Deininger et al. 2011; 
argued that land registration and certification increase the ability to use land and increase land 
level investments. However, other studies conclude that land titles do not significantly increase 
capital formation and investment (Kimuyu 1994; Place and Migot-Adholla 1998; Sellers 1999).  
 
The relationship between land tenure security and investment is more complex than it appears. 
This is because of the nature of causality. Generally, many studies such as Feder and Feeny, 
(1991) and Jacoby et al., (2002) indicate that secure tenure increases incentives to undertake 
productivity enhancing land-related investments.  
 
Several studies, for example (Bruce, 1988) have also questioned the direction of causality 
between tenure security and investment, arguing that tenure security may not stimulates  
investment to increase but rather investment may enhance  tenure security. Thus, there still needs 
for proper understanding of the evolution of tenure security along with a careful empirical 
investigation of the links between tenure security and investment. 
 
 The novel aspect of this paper lies in the new approach it uses to address the impacts of the 
certificate on investment. Here the impacts of certificate for farmers decision to invest and how 
much to invest may not be the same. The decision to adopt may precede the decision on the 
intensity of use, and the factors affecting each decision may be different (Gebremehin et al., 
2003). According to Holden et al., 1998; Pagiola and Holden, 2001; Holden and Yohannes, 
2002; Holden and Shiferaw, 2002, Poverty and income related variables rather than certificate 
have impact on intensity of investment but tuner security that probably affect by certificate may 
affect household decision to invest. So estimating separately the impacts of the certificate on 
decision to invest and intensity of invest is highly relevant in this context.  
  
Many studies showed that productivity of land directly related with degree of land improvements 
activites made by land lords. Another justification is in reference to the theory noted in the 
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literature that land right security is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for land 
improvement and farm productivity (Roth and Haase, 1998; Brasselle, Graspart et al., 2001). 
This means other factors are more influential to increase farm productivity such as supply of 
input, water, credit provision and other infrastructures should be given equal consideration so as 
to increase productivity of farm land. This raises a number of issues with potentially far-reaching 
consequences for policy, especially in predominantly agrarian economies in Ethiopia where rural 
productivity will need to improve significantly to overcome the wellbeing of the people.  
 
In general, the question of whether the parcel-based second level land holding certificates has an 
impact on tenure security, investment and productivity or not remains an important policy 
question. It is also a deeply sensitive political issue in present day Ethiopia. To the best of my 
knowledge  it has not be possible to locate any study that has systematically investigated the 
impacts of this new modern parcel-based second level land holding certificates on tenure 
security, investment and productivity in Ethiopia. It is with this back ground that this study is 
initiated to fill the existing literature gap on this critical issue by examining the impacts of 
parcel-based second level land certification on tenure security, investment and productivity in 
Raya Azebo district of Tigrai regional state.  
1.3 Objective of the Study  
The paper in general aims to investigate the impacts of parcel based second level modern land 
holding certification on farmer’s tenure security, farm level investment and productivity. 
  1.3.1 Specific objectives 
Furthermore, the paper incorporates the following specific objectives   
  To analysis the link between land certification and perceived tenure security. 
 To investigate the impacts of parcel-based second level rural land holding certificates on 
decision to investment and intensity of investment.  
 To examine the impact of parcel-based second level land holding certification on land 
productivity. 
 To point out important areas and modes of interventions for further policy development. 
7 
 
1.4 Hypothesis of the Study  
H1: Having parcel-based second level land holding certificate enhance perceived tenure security. 
H2: Having a certificate for a farm plot enhances decision to investments on the plot in terms of 
decision to build soil conservation structures and stone terrace. 
H3: Land certificate is relevant for adoption decision, but not relevant for intensity of       
adoption, conditioned decision is made. 
H4: Causality may run the other way, That is, investment (visible investment such as planting of 
tree) may be undertaken to enhance tenure security rather than as a response to higher levels 
of tenure security.  
H5: having parcel based second level land holding certification enhances land productivity  
 1.5 Significance of the Study  
This study contributes to the literature in several distinctive ways. First, this study focuses on 
new cadastre system land holding program rather than one restricted to the first phase traditional 
land registration program. So the empirical finding of this study will provide information for the 
government, policy makers and international donors to observe the measures that should be taken 
to make the land administration work improve land-related investment.  
 
Second, this paper focuses on the impact of granting new Parcel-based modern rural land 
registration and certification program. The program departs from traditional titling in different 
ways, in particular promoting gender equity with joint land ownership with spouse, using 
modern technology such as map, cadastre information system and support with GIS and air 
photos. So verifying empirically the theoretical relationship between modern rural land 
certification and investment behavior will have a far-reaching importance to take early 
appropriate policy measures since the scheme is a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. 
 
 Furthermore, the land problem in the contemporary neoliberal globalization period requires a 
broader understanding than the past. Moreover, it is believed that the study can be considered as 
basis for further research and the output of the paper is used as an input (feedback) to policy 
makers in related domains for any other development agents. 
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1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study  
There are many study areas that the paper could deal with. But due to time and budget this 
research is limited only on the evaluation of the impacts of this program on household’s 
perceived tenure security, decision to invest, intensity of investment and land productivity. The 
main target of the paper is estimating the impacts of Parcel-based modern rural land registration 
and certification on tuner -security, farm level investment and land productivity. 
 
One limitation of the study is that it is based on cross-sectional data sets. With this it is difficult 
to control individual household and plot heterogeneity and time effects of idiosyncratic 
disturbances. Such problems can be addressed by using rich data set (panel). In addition, 
Baseline data before the implementation of the program was not readily available. So, important 
data before the intervention of the program were collected from households through recall which 
might be subjected to recall biases and inexact answers was the main challenge confronted by the 
research.  
1.7 Organization of Study 
The study is organized in to five chapters each with different characteristics.  The first chapter 
deals with introduction part that includes back ground, statements of the problem, objective of 
the study, hypothesis, methodology, scope and limitation significance and organization of the 
study. The review of relevant literatures including theoretical review, conceptual frame works 
and empirical reviews has been discussed in chapter two. Chapter three dealt with site selection, 
data source methodology and econometric model specification and estimation strategies. 
Descriptive analysis, Estimation of the models and econometric results has been described in 
chapter four. The last chapter concludes the finding of the study and tries to suggest some policy 
recommendations. Supplementary information has also been appended at the end of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter briefly discusses the theoretical perspectives, conceptual frameworks of the models 
and empirical investigations related to the main themes of the investigations were reviewed to 
grasp some idea about what factors determining different country’s tenure security investment 
and productivity. The emphasis of this chapter is to give a general impression on the link 
between certificate and tenure security, investment and land productivity.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Review 
2.1.1 Terminology and Definitions 
Land:-Land is often described as the base of all wealth (Williamson 1997). Land gives us all we 
need: food, shelter, fuel and metal etc. Our mere existence is closely related to land (Binns 1953: 
1). Therefore it is often assumed that clearness regarding land tenure will strengthen an efficient 
and environmentally sound exploitation of this wealth (Jaap Zevenbergen, 2002).  
Land Registration:-  The International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) defines and cited by Jaap 
Zevenbergen (2002) “Land registration is the official recording of legally recognized interests in 
land and is usually part of a cadastral system.”
Land Parcel: - It refers to a single area of land, or more particularly a volume of space, under 
homogeneous real property rights and unique ownership.   
Tenure: - The Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nation (FAO) defined Tenure as 
“the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people as individuals or groups, 
with respect to land and associated natural resources. Rules of tenure define how property rights 
in land are to be allocated within societies. Land tenure systems determine who can use what 
resources for how long, and under what conditions” (FAO, 2003). 
Tenure security: - FAO also defined secure tenure as related to the degree of recognition and 
guarantee of land use rights.   
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Title (registration): - According to the food and agriculture organization (FAO) Title registration 
is a system for improving the quality of ownership and proof of title. There are broadly speaking 
two parts of the register. The first is a map on which each parcel is demarcated and identified by a 
unique parcel identifier. The second is a text which records details about the title, the owner and 
any rights or restrictions associated with the parcel’s ownership such as restrictive covenants or 
mortgages. Under a title registration system a transfer of the property simply results in a change in 
the name registered. A division of the land or alteration of the boundaries requires amendment to 
the plan and the issue of new documents or certificates. The official title registration record is 
definitive (UNECE 1996). 
2.1.2 Land Rights: Delineation  
For many people, land rights and their protection are central to life. But what are 'land rights'? 
More particularly, in the setting of this study, what human rights are recognized to land, or related 
to land?  
In Ethiopia, both by incorporation of international agreements (Article 9.4) and inclusion of 
specific provisions (often identical in language to the international instruments), the current 
Constitution includes both general human rights related to land, i.e., to due process, equal 
protection and nondiscrimination (Article 25), and specific rights for women (Article 35.5) and 
other groups (Article 40). 
 But, quite unusually among the nations of the world, Ethiopia's Constitution also grants actual 
rights to rural land (Article 40). Of course, as soon as that is said, it is necessary to ask what such 
a right entails. And, more generally, in order to provide the most elementary basis for this paper, 
we must distinguish between different 'rights' in land. For the bizarre and diverse nature of land 
rights, and the ability to fragment them in novel ways, appears to be limited only by failure of 
human imagination. In addition, each of these rights may be held by one or more different parties. 
For example, the right to use the surface may be owned by one party, granted conditionally to 
another, leased on to several others, future interests assigned to yet others, and taken at any time 
in whole or part by the State. Thus, what is sometimes called the 'bundle' of land rights is, in 
almost all cases, fragmented and distributed over many holders so that an individual's rights in a 
particular parcel of land are actually quite restricted and limited by the rights of the State and 
other parties. Conflicts between all those holders of rights are, of course, common.  
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The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively 
vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. But then reserves to three classes of people 
specific rights to land: 40.4. Ethiopian peasants have the right to obtain land without payment and 
the protection against eviction from their possession. The implementation of this provision shall 
be specified by law; 40.5. Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and 
cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands. The implementation shall 
be specified by law; 40.6. Without prejudice to the right of Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples to the ownership of land, government shall ensure the right of private investors to the use 
of land on the basis of payment arrangements established by law. Particulars shall be determined 
by law.  
It is important to note that each of these rights is hedged by the last provision in each paragraph, 
that the particulars of each right are to be determined by law. To date, these Constitutional 
provisions have been further delineated by two Federal laws and the different laws and 
regulations of each of the Federal States. 
By the Federal land laws, the Federal government's Constitutional authority to proclaim laws 
related to land (Article 51.5) has been partially delegated, within specific though broad 
guidelines, to the States. This has allowed significant differences in State laws. The Constitution 
also allocates the authority to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with 
Federal laws directly to the States (Article 52.6).  
Acknowledged in the successive Federal land laws and subject to limitations in State laws, as a 
specific example, the laws of Tigray State both assure and limit inheritance of land. The State's 
goal is clearly to balance increased certainty of an adequate payback period and, thus, the holder's 
investment in land (Gebremehin, 2003; Atwood, 1990; Barrows and Roth, 1990, Ghebru et al. 
2008, deininger et al 2011), with the social welfare principle that the neediest descendants obtain 
the parents' very limited land. The need to balance such competing policy principles is prevalent 
in land rights legislation, but when eventually challenged the basic right may be determined by 
the courts to limit policy choices. 
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2.1.3 Land Tuner in Ethiopia History  
Land tenure and property rights has been the most controversial and politicized issue in Ethiopian 
history. The tenant land lord relationship that was generally prevailing in the Southern part of the 
country was a major problem that triggered not only instability but also severely undermined 
agricultural productivity during the Imperial era. The then government had made certain attempts 
to address the problem of land tenure in the country (Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate 
Change (ECSNCC), 2011)  
 
In 1961 a Special land Reform Committee was constituted to study the different land tenures in 
Ethiopia by the Order of His Imperial Majesty. After conducting its study, the Committee 
recommended that ceilings or a maximum limit on individual ownership be fixed; a tenancy 
legislation that governs the relationship of the tenant and the landlord be enacted; antiquated 
tenure systems like the gult (a tenure system that was prevalent in the rist or communal system in 
the northern part of the country) be abolished; and the land tax system be improved. In 1964 Land 
Reform Authority was instituted to implement these reform measures recommended by the 
Special Land Reform Committee. However, the Land Reform Authority could not even 
implement the reforms recommended by the Special Land Reform Committee. The 1974 mass 
uprising and revolution broke out and the government was deposed in 1974 by a military coup. 
Several causes have been cited as causes of the 1974 revolution but many writers agree that the 
land issue was the most significant cause (J.cohen and D.weintraub,Van Gorkum,Assen (1975), 
J.Hobenand Dessalegn Rahmato,1993) 
 
The military government, called the dergue, declared socialism as its guiding principle and took a 
radical step in land reform. In 1975 it proclaimed the Public Ownership of Rural Lands 
Proclamation No.31/1975. Under the Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation all forms of 
traditional land tenure except pastoralist land tenure were abolished. All rural lands came under 
state ownership. All rural lands that were owned by landlords were distributed to tenants. 
Previous land owners were also given a right to retain the maximum amount of land allowed 
under the proclamation where they prefer to engage in farming. The maximum size of land 
holding a person could hold was limited to 10 hectares. All rural lands in the rist/communal land 
tenure system areas also became under private holdings except some communal lands used 
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communally by the community for grazing, forest, and other purposes. The government gave land 
administration and redistribution powers to peasant associations that were formed in every kebele. 
Furthermore, the redistribution was not systematic and there was no regulation that guided the 
actors. Fragmentation of land holdings and natural resource degradation, loss of productivity and 
other related issues emerged as new land reform issues (Ethiopian Civil Society Network on 
Climate Change (ECSNCC), 2011) 
 
The military government was overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Forces (EPRDF). The EPRDF declared that it will adopt a free market economic 
policy. The land reform question was again on the agenda. The debate at this time was whether 
land should be public or private. Government and its supporters were in favor of state ownership 
while opposition and academics were in favor of privatizing land. (Ibid) 
 
In 1995 the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution was promulgated. Under the 
constitution land remained under state ownership. The EPRDF continued the policy of the 
previous government concerning rural lands and it conducted a comprehensive redistribution in 
the country. In 1997 it enacted the Federal Rural Lands Administration Proclamation No.89/1997 
that gave power to regional states to make their own land administration laws within the 
framework of the federal land administration law. Under Proclamation 89/1997, land holders 
were given some transfer right such as renting, gifting to a family member, and bequeathing to a 
family member. The land legislation also reaffirmed that regional states could conduct specific or 
comprehensive redistribution of land. Tenure insecurity that hovers over farmers continued to be 
the source cause for low productivity and hunger, damage to land and natural resources. The land 
reform debate continued focusing on the security of tenure of farmers and relating issues of 
productivity, fragmentation, poverty, natural resource degradation, etc.4 On the basis of the 
federal Land Administration Proclamation No.89/1997, all the four regional states enacted their 
land administration laws and the Tigray Rural Lands Administration Proclamation No.23/1997 is 
held. In order to ensuring tenure security, the tigray regional states started registration and 
certification of rural land holders. (Ibid) 
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The Federal Government then issued the Federal Rural Lands Administration and Use 
Proclamation 456/2005; and the four regional states also harmonized their land Administration 
laws with the federal land law. This legislation is not fundamentally different from the previous 
one but it provides for the registration and certification of land holders, and also it informs the 
regions to prepare land use plans. It still did not prohibit redistribution of rural land holdings as 
the regional states do. The registration and certification exercise has been seen as a factor that 
insures tenure security and different donors, like Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) cooperation and USAID assisted the rural lands registration and certification process in 
the Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and SNNP Regional State. (Ibid) 
 
Expropriation of lands has also become one of the major source of insecurity as a result of the 
government’s free market policy and encouragement of investors. Government agencies were 
expropriating land without paying compensation since land is said to be the property of the state. 
 
To address this problem, the federal government issued Expropriation of Land Holdings for 
Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation No.455/2005. Under this 
proclamation land holders whose lands are expropriated are entitled to get compensation for the 
property they lose and displacement compensation for the land they lose. In practice, however, 
many expanding towns and regional government agencies are still taking lands without payment 
of displacement compensation or making substitute land available to the farmers whose lands are 
taken. (Ibid) 
2.1.4 Land Tuner in Tigrai  
Land registration was organized by Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) already during the 
civil war from 1988 as a basis for land redistributions. At that time they provided a white paper to 
the owner with information about the name of the holder, family size, soil fertility status, parcel 
size in local units, boundary information on the parcel and neighbors of the parcels. This 
information was, however, not included in a central registry. The land registration and 
certification was started in 1998 and focused only on cultivated land in Tigray. The aim was to 
minimize conflicts, increase tenure security and to upgrade the certificates and create registries 
(Nega and Atakilt, 2006). Four different forms were used in the process. Form 1 was used for 
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collection of data in the field, Form 2 was the registry book where the information was recorded 
at community (tabia) level (a copy of this book was also kept at woreda level), Form 3 was the 
land certificates given to the landholders, and Form 4 was to be used for land transactions.  
 
It was the Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resources that was responsible for the 
implementation. Organizational committees were established at woreda and tabia levels. At tabia 
level they typically consisted of the local agricultural development agent, the tabia leader and 
elders from the community who had experience from participation in earlier land redistributions. 
In addition technical support was provided by youth that had been trained for six months (Haile et 
al., 2005). For more detailed description of the process we refer to Haile et al. (2005) and Nega 
and Atakilt (2006). 
 
 By 1999 more than 80% of the landholders in Tigray had received land certificates. Ideally plot 
borders were identified and more clearly demarcated where this was needed under the presence of 
all relevant neighbors. No maps of the plots were made. Households were then given the land 
certificates (Form 3) that were a one-page sheet with the name of the household head, the list of 
plots that the household owned, the size of the plot, the land quality, the name of the location of 
the plot and the names of the neighbors of each plot. But this certificate was not yet achieved its 
prior objectives as expected and the regional government in collaboration with federal 
government diced to implement the new parcel base d second level land holding certificate in the 
region. The updating procedure was in pilot in to selected woredas of tigray. 
2.1.5 Conducting Second Level Rural Land Registration and Issuance of Certificates  
Tigray Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Agency (TEPLAUA) have been 
implementing Ethiopia Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) with financial 
support of USAID and technical assistance of TETRA TECH ARD in Raya_Azebo and Tahtay 
Adyabo wereda of Tigray Regional State since January 2009. 
ELAP is successor project of Ethiopia Strengthening Land Tenure and Administration program 
(ELTAP) that was implemented in the region. The objective of ELAP is to assist the government 
of Ethiopia strengthen and enhance rural land tenure security and administration through 
improving the legal framework; advancing public awareness in land rights and obligations and 
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the major provisions of land administration and land use laws; and promoting domestic and 
foreign investment in land through improved land administration legislation and registration and 
certification process.  
Parcel based rural land registration and cadastral surveying as well as issuance of user’s certificate 
in the two focus wereda of ELAP were the key task of the projected implemented by TEPLAUA. 
In the implementation plan of ELAP, it was target to survey and registered 35,000 parcels in each 
of the two focus woredas but the accomplishment was found to be 24,020 and 5,628 in Raya 
Azebo and Tahtay Adyabo wereda respectively. From the total 29,648 parcel surveyed about 21 
544 certificate were issued to the land holders in Raya Azebo and 3,870 in Tahtay Adyabo 
wereda.  
In addition, contract workers surveyed and registered the existing and potential investment lands 
in the two focus woredas. In Tahtay Adyabo wereda 1,481 ha of landholdings of 15 investors 
growing oil crops and 3,932.8 ha of land potential for oil crops/cereals production and 1,331.14 
ha of land with potential for fattening and dairy production were surveyed. In Raya Azebo 
wereda, 814 ha of land allocated for 8 investors and 330 ha of land with potential for 
vegetable/cereal crops is surveyed and registered. The indicated low performance of Tahtay 
Adyabo wereda is due to land administration problem and early start of rainfall. 
 
To complete some of the unfinished certification program initiated in ELTAP woredas within the 
allocated limited budget, training was given to the permanent surveyor and registration staffs of 
the six ELTAP focus wereda land administration desk and for one contract crew assigning to 
conduct the task in each of the woredas.  
Moreover, an assessment was conducted by the regional staffs in the six woredas of ELTAP and 
the result of the assessment indicated that almost all the data are available. Using the result of the 
assessment one kebele was selected from each of the woredas to start initiate second level 
certification. But the field work of collecting necessary information for the preparation of base 
map and processing of the data was started only in four woredas (Enderta, Hawizen, Adwa, and 
Tahtay Koraro). 
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2.2 The Conceptual Framework   
The empirical literature on land tenure begins with a simultaneous equation model based on an 
underlying household optimization problem where households perception of security, investment 
and agricultural productivity (Feder and Onchan, 1987; Feder and Feeney, 1993; Foltz et al., 
2000; Zikhali, 2008). In this model tenure security indicator (T), investment (I), productivity (Y) 
are endogenous variables that depends on a set of exogenous variable (X and W) associated with 
household and plot characteristic respectively.  
Depending upon the empirical situation, having the certificate (C) may be exogenous or 
endogenous in the model. We assumed household specific unobserved characteristics will not 
affect impact of certification as this intervention is exogenous to individual households and all 
households within a village are well aware that they will receive the certificate since it is 
compulsory program. 
 
With considered to be exogenous, the hypothesized general structural model for this study is 
adopted from Foltz et al., 2000 and Zikhali, 2008 with modifications as follow: 
    T = T(C, I, W, X)                             (1) 
    I = I(T(C), X , ܹ, ܫ௉)                 (2) 
    Y = Y (I (C), W, X)                       (3) 
Where C =1 if the household have the second level land holding certificate for the plot, 0 
otherwise. I is the type of investments, measured length of soil conservation structures, stone 
terrace constructed and number of tree planted, in the last 18 months. T is an indicator of 
perceived tenure security. Perceived tenure security is expected to be affected by C, the dummy 
indicating whether the household got the parcel based landholding certificate or not. We 
maximize on the information we have by having dummies that capture the different types of 
tenure security indicators. We also include an interaction of a dummy that captures whether the 
household believes investing on land enhances tenure security with investment levels to 
investigate whether believing investing on land enhances security and actually undertaking 
investments affects perceived tenure security. 
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 X is a vector of the household’s socioeconomic characteristics, which include for example, 
gender, age and education of household head, household composition, social capital indicators, 
agro-ecological difference control variables such as village dummy, involvement in off-farm 
activities and  W is  parcel characteristics such as size and steepness of parcel, different input use 
statues and initial endowment (intensity) of soil conservation, stone terrace structures and number 
of tree planted in plots socio-institutional and market access factors  are control. The public 
investment variable (ܫ௉) should both control for its direct impact at plot level and its indirect 
crowding in or crowding out effects on private investment (Ghebru et., Al., 2008).  
 
In light to the above concept, one can hypothesis that having parcel-based second level 
landholding certificates enhance tenure security, which is designated as: 
                                     	డ்೔
డ஼
> 0  
And that for house hold who believe investing on land enhances tenure security, that is 
investment (visible investment such as planting of tree) may be undertaken to enhance tenure 
security rather than as a response to higher levels of tenure security. This hypothesis can be 
designate as:  
߲ܶ
߲ܫ
> 0 
The empirical study made by (Holden and Yohannes, 2002) on tenure security and investment 
supports this argument:   
 
Consistent with the theoretical postulation it is possible to hypothesis that  
߲ܫ
߲ܶ
	> 	0 
ܣ݊݀	ܽݏݏݑ݉݅݊݃	ݐℎܽݐ	ܿ݁ݎݐ݂݅݅ܿܽݐ݁	݁݊ℎܽ݊ܿ݁	ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁	ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ	ݓ݁	ℎܽݒ݁	 
߲ܫ
߲ܶ
߲ܶ
߲ܥ
> 	0 
Tenure security is more important when we consider medium to long term investments (Holden 
and Yohannes, 2002). This has been the justification for most researchers’ approach of looking at 
the impact of tenure security on more long term investments such as tree planting and 
construction of conservation structures (Besley, 1995; Hayes et al., 1997, Holden et al 2007) 
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Where Y in equation 3 is the value of yields in Ethiopian birr per ha/tsimdi. In line to the 
theoretical postulates, one can hypothesize that investment on land enhance land productivity.      
பଢ଼
ப୍
	> 	0 
In the other way it is possible to hypothesize that land certification have positive   impact on land 
productivity indirectly through the investment variables that possibly is affected by certification. 
∂Y
∂I ∂I∂C 	> 0 
2.3 Empirical Findings 
This paper builds off of the existing literature to further examine the effects of parcel-based 
second level land holding certificates programs and their impact on investment and productivity.   
 
Studies that have examine the link between land certification and its impact on tenure security, 
investment and productivity have done so with solid theoretical reasons why we should expect 
this relationship to exit, but have found an even result in practice. Pender and Kerr (1994) in  
India, found, that any differences in credit use between titled land and assigned state land were 
due to the difference in quality of the land and not to increased security of tenure as a result of the 
land titling.   Similarly, Carter and Olinto (2003) in Paraguay found that land titling increased the 
incidence of credit but that this credit access was affected by the size of the farm because the 
transaction costs were a larger percentage of the value of the land for small farmers. A study by 
Alston et al. (1996) in Brazil also found that the distance from the market center and the duration 
of occupation were significantly determined to be related to the incidence of title. Title was 
required in Brazil to provide security in the contested regions close to the market center.  At the 
same time López (1996) found that 8% more titled farmers than the untitled ones received credit 
and the titled farmers received almost 4 times likely what the untitled farmers received in credit. 
Gebremehin et al (2003) propose that Perceived tenure security is important for making land 
investments and use of improved farming practices. However, an investment in land does not 
appear to have significant effect on perceived tenure security of farmer’s results. This implies 
that, there is a need to improve tenure security of farmers in order to encourage land investment. 
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Burnod et al (2012) which examines the Malagasy land reform ongoing since 2005 belongs to this 
new generation of land reform and its impacts on tenure security through the concept of legal 
empowerment. Holding a certificate has the advantages, compared to petite papers, to reduce the 
diffuse sense of tenure security and, compared to land title, to be more accessible. In addition, the 
land reform and notably the decentralization of land management has also contributed to reduce 
the sense of tenure insecurity through a legal empowerment process.  
 
Similarly, Holden and Yohannes (2002) did not found evidence of tenure insecurity having a 
negative effect on investment in tree in south Ethiopia but found that,  poverty have negative 
impact on investment.  Tenure security may there for neither be necessary nor sufficient condition 
for investment. On the other hand, Deininger and Jin (2006) found that transfer rights to land as 
well as tenure security were investment-enhancing based on a survey in 2001 of the four major 
regions in Ethiopia. In their study they distinguished between highly visible (trees) and less 
visible (conservation structures) investments. Recent evidence from a broad cross-sectional 
survey in Ethiopia also indicates that the recent land certification may have enhanced investment 
(Deininger et al. 2007).  As the same time Foltz et al. (2000) in Nicaragua found that, There is no 
significant relationship in the data between investment (defined as either total investment or just 
agricultural investment) and land rights and household characteristics, tenure status is 
significantly related to the number of trees on the property (a form of long-term land investment). 
 
Deininger and Ali (2007) also analysis this using  information on parcels under ownership and 
usufruct by the same household from a nationally representative survey in Uganda, this paper 
quantifies the investment impact of property rights insecurity arising from overlapping land rights 
rather than comparing titled and untitled land.  The case of Uganda, a country where overlapping 
property rights, many of them established a long time ago, are very common.  The authors found 
that tenure insecurity has statistically very significant effect on investment and thus the 
productivity of land use. The fact that both the sample and the point estimates obtained are several 
times larger than what is reported in the few comparable studies suggests that, in the case of 
Uganda, higher tenure security could considerably affect agricultural performance.  The effects of 
tenure security and investment on tenure security is mixed for example with no significant effects 
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in Somalia (Roth et al., 1994b) and Senegal (Golan; 1994), but Positive effects in Uganda (Roth 
et al., 1994a) and Rwanda (Blarel, 1994) on certain types of investment.  
 
Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) try to compared titled areas in Kenya with untitled areas in 
Tanzania and found that there was no difference in the number of transactions, formal or 
informal, between the two locations. Platteau (1996) questioned the applicability of the 
evolutionary theory of land rights in the Sub-Saharan African context despite the fact that other 
researchers such as Feder and Nishio (1999) presented empirical evidence from several other 
countries in other regions, of titled farmers receiving more credit and investing more on their land 
than untitled farmers.  Platteau (1996) based his critique on empirical research done by Land 
Tenure Center (LTC) (1990), Roth et al. (1994a; 1994b), Migot-Adholla et al. (1994a; 1994b) and 
others in the Sub Saharan African context.  These studies were focused on access to credit and the 
corresponding impact on agricultural productivity. Place et al. 1998   In Kenya found that, titled 
farms had higher net returns per hectare, but when the effects of size and market access are 
separated out, it becomes clear that it is these factors, rather than title, that are responsible for the 
correlation. Place and Migot-Adholla (1998), re-examining data from a study performed in 1988 
in Kenya, found insufficient evidence to support any significant effect of registration and land 
titling on the perception of security of tenure, on the use of credit by landowners, on agricultural 
productivity and the reallocation of land.  
Deininger et al. (2006) also found that insecure tenure (as measured by past redistribution) 
encourages planting of trees but discourages terracing in Ethiopia. At the same time, both the 
perception of future risk of redistribution and lower levels of transferability clearly reduce the 
propensity to invest, especially in non-visible activities that can enhance future productivity. The 
effects found are not only highly significant statistically but also of considerable magnitude. An 
IDB study (1986), performed in Jamaica, found similar result that farmers on titled land had 
planted almost twice as many permanent and semi-permanent crops as those on untitled land in a 
voluntary sporadic titling process. 
De Soto (1989) presented his study on the case of Peru and found that, Tenure security was 
deduced from the fact that 13% of the lots on informal untitled land were involved in litigation.  
The titled land was also valued nine times higher than that of the untitled land.  Bellemare (2012) 
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in Madagascar found that formal land rights (i.e., land titles) have no impact on productivity, but 
that informal land rights (i.e., landowners’ subjective perceptions of what they can and cannot do 
with their plots) have heterogeneous impacts on productivity. 
 
In theory, there is a general consensus that making land rights more secure and transferable would 
promote investment incentives and efficient use of resources. This conventional view has three 
major justifications.  First, it is believed that secure rights provide a guarantee to farmers that the 
fruits of their investments will not be appropriated by government or other agents. This 
encourages them to make long-term investments on their land (Atwood, 1990; Feder and Feeny, 
1991; Besley, 1995). The second effect works through the credit market. As pointed out by Feder 
and Onchan (1987), security of ownership improves chances of obtaining loans to finance 
agricultural investments. This is because ownership rights facilitate the development of an 
efficient land market. This reduces information costs for the lender and provides the basis for 
using land as a collateral asset.  
 
On the other hand several studies also argue that causality may also run the other way round. 
Long term investments on land, particularly planting trees enhance tenure security (Atwood, 
1990; Besley, 1995; Otsuka et al., 1997; Brasselle et al., 2002).  Brasselle et al. (2002) allowed 
for endogeneity between land tenure security and investment incentives in Burkina Faso point to 
flaws in the design and concept of empirical tests that both support and question the positive link 
between individualized tenure and security of tenure and then to investment on land.  They opine 
that there is always some form of endogenous tenure underlying the titling and this must be 
accounted for and controlled before statements about the correlation between security of tenure 
and investments can be made.  The researchers attempt to control for this effect by choosing for 
analysis newly settled communities where no endogenous tenure and therefore no tenure security 
would have existed prior to the titling. Then the researcher found that investments increased 
security of tenure and not the other way around.  The study was performed in a community of 
Burkina Faso in Africa where there was no land market so that the impact on transactions could 
not be investigated. Even the tenure security indicators that are used my not appropriate indicators 
for tenures security. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
3.1 Description of the Study Area 
 Tigrai national regional state is located in northern part of Ethiopia the region is boarder by 
Eritrea to the north, Sudan to the west, afar regional state to the east Amhara region to the south. 
It covers an area of approximately 54,572 square km. the altitude of the region varies from about 
500 meters above sea level (masl) in the north-east to almost 4000 masl in the south-west. The 
agro-ecology of the region is broadly categorized in to lowland (kola- less than 1500 masl), 
midland (woina-degua-1500 to 2300 masl), and upper highland (degua- above 2300). About 53% 
of the region is lowland, 39% medium highland, 8% upper highland (BoFED, 2008). 
 
Figure 1 location map of the study area 
 
 
 
Source: Tigray Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Agency (TEPLAUA), 2013 
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The research site was in Raya Azebo wereda which is located in southern Tigray region of 
northern Ethiopia. Based on the 2007 national census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency 
of Ethiopia (CSA), Raya Azebo woreda has a total population of 135,870, an increase of 55.04% 
over the 1994 census, of whom 67,687 are men and 68,183 women; 16,056 or 11.82% are urban 
inhabitants. With an area of 2,132.83 square kilometers, Raya Azebo has a population density of 
63.70, which is greater than the Zone average of 53.91 persons per square kilometer. A total of 
32,360 households were counted in this woreda, resulting in an average of 4.20 persons to a 
household, and 31,468 housing units. 
 
Raya azebo is characterized by kola agro-ecology with relatively hot temperature and high 
evaporation-transpiration that results in high level of moisture stress. As elsewhere in the rural 
highlands of Ethiopia, small scale mixed agriculture is the primary source of livelihood to the 
population. 
3.2 Data Sources and Sampling Procedure  
Both primary and secondary sources of information were collected for successful accomplishment 
of the study objectives. With regard to primary data the target of the study population are the 
small holder farm households of Tigrai region. Primary data were collected from sample 
households using structured questionnaire dispersing to different households and by leading face 
to face interview with different personality who is in charging of some responsibilities.  
 
Checklist and structured questionnaire was used to collect the primary data. The questionnaire 
was pre-tested before the actual conduct of the interview using households identified for the 
Purpose. Experienced enumerators were recruited based on their proficiency in the local language 
and then trained on data collection techniques and on the content of the questionnaire. 
 
A multistage sampling technique was used to determine the sample households. First, out of the 
two pilot woredas, we selected Raya azebo woreda purposely for the fact that majority of the 
households in the program are found in this woreda. Out of the total of 13,815 households having 
the modern certificates in the region 12,299 (89%) households are from this woreda. Raya azebo 
woreda is our particular interest because it was a place where the first modern certification was 
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started and officially launched in august 2011 and was appropriate to test the link between 
certificate tenure security, investment and productivity. Out of the total 18 tabias of Raya Azebo 
woreda, 8 tabias are under the program and the remaining 10 tabias (village) are not in the 
program. Further, 3 tabias from Raya azebo wereda which is in the program (treated) and another 
3 tabias from non certified tabias was randomly selected. Third, parcel-based second level land 
holding certificate participant and non participant households were identified from the households 
list available at each tabias. Finally, representative samples were selected from six tabias based on 
probability proportional to sample size.  
 
Systematic random sampling was used to select a specific household in each tabias. Following 
this procedure, 279 (116 household have parcel-based land holding certificates (treated) and 163 
haven’t certificates (control)) sample households were selected from both woredas. The treatment 
respondents are those who own land and received a certificate for that land under the program.  
The control group consists of landholders who may have been eligible to obtain a certificate but 
could not do so because the program was not carried out in their area. The control group was 
drawn from a neighboring area which, based on the assessment of the interviewers, has 
demographic, economic and land use characteristics similar to those of the treatment group. The 
purpose of the control group enables us to investigate the changes resulting from the program to 
be pinpointed. 
3.3Method of Data Analysis  
Concerning the methodology to be utilized this paper have been used both descriptive analysis 
and econometric models. In descriptive analysis data from rural household survey were analyzed 
through tables, means, standard deviation, percentages and frequencies to analysis the socio-
economic characteristics of farmers input and output variables and plot level characteristics of the 
study area. 
 
In the case econometrics analysis both parametric and non-parametric approaches was used to 
assess tenure security, investment and productivity impacts of landholding certificates. First, we 
compare non-parametrically tenure security perception, investment and land productivity on plots 
with and without land holding certificates. Here propensity score matching method was used to do 
this comparison. Propensity score matching was constructed on the base of observed household 
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and plot level characteristics and the common support requirement was imposed using appropriate 
matching estimator. Second, the researcher tried to assess impacts of parcel-based second level 
landholding certificates parametrically. 
 
 In case of the investment variable, the decisions whether to adopt soil conservation bound and 
stone terrace investment in plot, and how much to invest (intensity of investment), can be made 
jointly or separately. It can be argued that adoption and intensity of use decisions are not 
necessarily made jointly (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). It is also possible to argue that the 
impacts of the second stage certificate on decision to invest and amount of investment may not be 
the same. In the case where the decision whether to adopt the land conservation investment and 
the decision about how much of it to adopt are not jointly made, it is more suitable to apply a 
“double-hurdle” model, in which a probit regression on adoption is followed by a truncated 
regression on the non-zero observations (Cragg, 1971).  
Similar formulation as for the conservation investment models described above was used but the 
dependent variable “number of trees planted” is not strictly linear. It takes on the value of zero 
with a positive probability density at zero but is a continuous random variable over strictly 
positive values. For some households heads, an optimal choice is the corner solution of I =0. 
Therefore, the variable trees planted have a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. The 
prior interest of this study was in the probability of a household planting tree given the ownership 
rights that he possesses Investment on tree. We therefore specified Tobit models. 
3.4 Econometric Frame Work and Estimation Strategy 
Based on the conceptual framework summarized in Equation (1) (2) and (3) above and various 
related empirical works (bekele mekonen, 2012; Ghebru et al., 2008; Gebremedhin, 2002; Foltz et 
al., 2000 and Zikhali, 2008 and Deininger, 2009) general reduced form equations can be written 
as: 
       T= ଴+ ଵC  +ଶW +ଷX + v                              (4) Tenure security equation 
       I = 		 β଴ + 	βଵC	 + 	βଶW		+βଷX	 + 	u						     	    (5) Investment equation 
       Y= ଴ + ଵC + ଶW +ଷX + ε                          (6) Farm productivity equation 
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Where,’s ’s and β’s are parameters of be estimated while u, v	and	ε are error terms. We assume 
that the error terms are independently, identically and normally distributed with zero means 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
The strong argument that this study has pronounced is having second level land holding 
certificate is outside the decision of the household and household and parcel characteristics does 
not matter. Since the programmes are introduced in a few pilot ( Raya azebo and Tahtay Adyabo) 
areas it is reasonable to use the eligible population from non-pilot area and propensity score 
modeling adequately captures area difference in participation and outcomes so that between area 
effects are controlled for. However, the decision to adopt tree planting and investment may be 
influenced by the gain from adoption. Estimation without controlling for this problem may lead to 
biased results. A Heckman self-selection correction approach is also tried to address this problem 
but the inverse Mills ratio was not significant.  Thus, we report results only for probit and Tobit 
models since there is no problem of self-selection observed. 
To deal with the challenge posed by the fact that beneficiaries of the certificate might not form a 
randomly selected sub-group of all farmers in the sample, this study were used the propensity 
score matching method to estimate the average treatment effect of the certificate on the intensity 
investments as well as on productivity. This study where retained the observations within 
common support from the matching process which will then used a double-hurdle model (to 
estimate equation 5) both IV-probit and probit model to estimate perceived tenure security and 
direct OLS and different specification of IV estimation (to estimate equation 6). Thus the analysis 
complements nonparametric methods with parametric methods and by using observations that lay 
within common support from the matching process we ensure that we have a comparable sample 
in estimating the parametric models. A detailed discussion of the estimation strategy follows 
below.  
3.4.1 Propensity Score Matching  
Experimental evaluation, in which assignment to treatment (for example  participation in the 
modern certification) is random, has increasingly been encouraged and used in evaluating 
interventions because of its statistical advantages in identifying program impacts (Ravallion, 
2000; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Although random assignment is an extraordinarily valuable 
tool for evaluation, it is not always feasible to implement it. Not only is it costly to obtain 
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cooperation of implementers of the intervention and study subjects, but a random assignment 
design must be developed and implemented prior to the start of the intervention (Becker and I 
chino, 2002).  
 
This paper focuses on a specific nonexperimental evaluation method known as Propensity-score 
matching (PSM). PSM uses information from a pool of units that do not have second level 
certificate in the intervention to identify what would have happened to certify household’s 
outcome (tenure security perception, decision to invest and amount of investment decision and 
level of productivity) in the absence of the certification. By comparing how outcomes differ for 
households having second level land holding certificates relative to observationally similar 
noncertified, it is possible to estimate the effects of the intervention.  
 
 (A) Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) 
Conditional independence states that given a set of observable covariates X that are not affected 
by treatment; potential outcomes Y (where Y is the outcome indicator variables of tenure security, 
investment and land productivity) are independent of treatment assignment T. If (Y1, T) represents 
outcomes for participants and (Y0, C) outcomes for nonparticipants, Conditional independence 
implies: 
                                        (Y0, Y1) ⊥ T | X                           (7)                                                                 
Matching households based on observed covariates might not be desirable or even feasible when 
the dimensions of the covariates are many. To overcome the curse of dimensionality, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) displayed that, for non-randomized observations, outcome and treatment are 
conditionally independent given the propensity score, P(x), which is the conditional probability of 
receiving treatment given pre-treatment characteristics:  
                                    (Y0, Y1) ⊥ T | P(x)                       (7a) 
 A balancing condition needs to be satisfied for propensity score matching. The balancing 
condition shows the conditional independence of participation in terms of control variables given 
the propensity score:  
                                         T ⊥ X | P(x)                  (7b) 
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Alternatively, the balancing condition indicates that for individuals with the same propensity 
score assignment to treatment is random. Thus, if the balancing condition is satisfied, 
observations having the same propensity score will have the same distribution of observable and 
unobservable characteristics irrespective of treatment. This implies that with the help of the 
propensity score, treatment is virtually randomized and, as a result, treatment and control group 
members will on average be observationally identical (Becker and I chino, 2002).  
(B) Assumption of Common Support 
A second assumption is the common support or overlap condition: 0 < P (Ti = 1|Xi) < 1. This 
condition ensures that treatment observations have comparison observations “nearby” in the 
propensity score distribution (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). Specifically, the 
effectiveness of PSM also depends on having a large and roughly equal number of participant and 
nonparticipant observations so that a substantial region of common support can be found. For 
estimating the ATT, this assumption can be relaxed to P (Ti = 1|Xi) < 1. 
 
Treatment units will therefore have to be similar to non treatment units in terms of observed 
characteristics unaffected by participation; thus, some non treatment units may have to be 
dropped to ensure comparability. However, sometimes a nonrandom subset of the treatment 
sample may have to be dropped if similar comparison units do not exist (Ravallion 2008).  
 
Once the propensity score is known and the balancing assumption is met, impact of the program 
or ATT can be estimated on the continuous outcome variables.  Estimating the propensity score 
involves decision on two choices; what model to be used for the estimation and what variables 
should be included in this model. Due to the complexity of estimation procedure of probit model 
than the logit model, logit is widely used (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). To capture this 
advantage, the logit model will be uses for estimating the propensity score in this study. 
 
According to Gujarati (2004), in estimating the logit model, the dependent variable is 
participation (the household is from the certified village in this case) which takes a value of 1 if 
the household participated in a program and 0 otherwise. The logit model is mathematically 
formulated as follows:  
                               		P୧ 	= 	 ୣౖ౟ଵାୣౖ౟                     (8) 
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Where,	 ௜ܲ is the probability of participating in the parcel-based second level land holding 
certificate program,                             Z୧ = 	β0	 + ∑ β୧X୧                    (8a) 
        Where
,                 i= 1, 2, 3, - --, n  
               β0= intercept         and   β1=regression coefficients to be estimated  
														 ௜ܺ=pre intervention characteristic
The probability that a household belongs to the non participant group is:  
Pi	 = 	 ଵ
ଵାୣౖ౟
     (8b) 
Finally, by taking the natural log of the above equation the log of odds ratio can be written as: 
 
																					ܮ௜ = lnቀ
௉೔
ଵି௉೔
ቁ= Lnቀ݁ା∑ ఉ೔௑೔
೙
ೕసభ ቁ = ܼ௜ = β0 +∑ ߚ௜ ௜ܺ௡௝ୀଵ          (8c) 
Where, ܮ௜ is log of the odds ratio in favour of participation in the program which is not only linear 
in	 ௝ܺ௜ 	but also linear in the parameters according to matching theory (Rosenbaum and Robin, 
1983; Bryson et al., 2002; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003) 
 
In relation to which variable to include the important point is selecting which variables to include 
in the model and/or which to collect data on.  Heckman et al., (1997) show that omitting 
important variables can seriously increase bias in the resulting estimates.  In fact, only those 
variables that influence both participation and outcome should be included.  It is not always clear 
what these variables should be, however, careful judgment is required.  Ideally, economic and 
social theory should provide some guidance in determining important variables. The effect of 
household’s participation in the certificate on a given outcome (Y) is specified as:  
																																						Z୧ = Y୧(T୧= 1) - Y୧(T୧= 0)               (9) 
Where Zi is treatment effect (effect due to certificates), Yi is the outcome indicator (tenure 
security, decision to invest and level of investment and productivity level) on household i, Ti is 
whether household i have certificate for his plot or not. Nonetheless, since Yi (Ti=1) and Yi (Ti = 
0) cannot be observed for the same household simultaneously, estimating individual treatment 
effect Ti is impossible and one has to shift to estimating the average treatment effects of the 
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population than the individual one. The most commonly used average treatment effect estimation 
is the ‘average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) which is specified as: 
                                ATT = E (Y1i-Y0i│ Ti =1)              (9a) 
                              = E [Y1i│Ti = 1] - E [Y0i│Ti =1]                          (9b) 
Since the counterfactual mean for those being treated, E [Y0i│Ti =1] is not observed, there is a 
need to choose a proper substitute for it to estimate ATT. Though it might be thought that using 
the mean outcome of the untreated individuals, E [Y0i│Ti =0] as a substitute to the counterfactual. 
Using the propensity score to deal with selection bias, equation above is thus modified as follows 
as stated in Becker and I chino, (2000) 
              ATT    = E (E (Y1i   – Y0i | Ti = 1, P (Xi)))                  (9c) 
             = E [E (Y1i | Ti = 1, P (Xi)) – E (Y0i | Ti = 0, P (Xi)) | Ti = 1]      (9d) 
The sample equivalence is given by: ATT = 1 nൗ ∑ [(Yଵ୧|T୧୬୧ୀଵ = 1, P(X୧)) − (Y଴୧|T୧ = 0, P(X୧))|T୧ = 1]                (9e) 
Estimation of ATT using PSM involves three basic steps: computing the propensity score, 
matching on the basis of propensity score, and obtaining the treatment effect as a difference of the 
mean outcomes of participants and non-participants from the matched observations if necessary. 
For the consistence and robustness of results, the study will try to apply four different methods of 
matching. (Nearest Neighbor (NN), Radius matching (RM), Stratification and interval 
matching(SM) and Kernel matching (KM)) 
3.4.2 Land Tenure Security Impact Model 
Perceived tenure security is defined as the degree of confidence held by people over their land 
claim or land right (Dekker 2003; Kanji, Cotula et al. 2005; Gelder, 2009). The determinants for 
perceived security are fear for eviction (land taking), possibilities of cultivating the same field 
after five year (certainty) in this case. Fear of eviction is the strongest determinant for perceived 
security. Certainty indicates that the perception of the owner of the plot to cultivate the same field 
after five years. To estimate the program impacts on perceived tenure security equation (4), this 
research tries to use two main tenure security indicators (representatives) Ti. The first one is 
household perception level about the plot that he have, whether the household i has a confidence 
(feel certain) to cultivate the same field after 5 years (1=if certain; 0=not). Lead us to adopt a 
probit specification. 
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           					 ௜ܶ= ଴+ ଵC  + ଶ ܺ+ଷW + v																						(10) 
Where T is  tenure security indicator of household i and C is the dummy variable of interest 1 if 
the household have parcel based second level land holding certificates, 0 otherwise (alternative 
certificate variable (the predicted certificate derived from linear probability model or the actual 
certificate values) will be used as robust estimator). X and W is vector of household and plot level 
characteristics respectively. 
 
Another indicator about tenure security is the fear of eviction (land taking). This indicates 
whether the household fear for land grab due to any administration intervention either to 
redistribute the land equally to the new generation or to the peoples who can use this plot more 
efficiently. This is common in Raya Azebo woreda due to it is high investment potential area and 
land is fixed asset and peoples need for that are increasing from time to time. We used the same 
specification like the certainty model described above.   
            3.4.3 Investment Impact Model  
 For the agricultural investment variable, respondents were asked whether they had made any 
major capital investments in their land and the amount of investment (intensity) if any in the last 
two years. Two different possible types of invest was reported. One with little tenure-security but 
large productivity impacts (henceforth labeled as soil conservation and terracing) and one with 
high tenure security but limited productivity impact (tree planting). Furthermore, the dependent 
variables used in the study are classified as adoption decision and intensity of adoption (how 
much) of soil conservation practices and stone terracing. Intensity of use is measured as the 
number of meters per tsimdi of terraces or soil bunds constructed. 
3.4.3.1 Soil and Water Conservation and Stone Terrace Investment Models 
Information on whether such investment was undertaken (decision to invest) and how much to 
invest (intensity) investment was elicited directly from respondents. It can be argued that such 
type of decision are not necessarily made jointly(Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003).The decision 
to adopt may precede the decision on the intensity of use and, the impacts of certificate for each 
decision may be different, as assumed in the present case. This lead the researcher to adopt 
‘double hurdle’ model in which, the dependent variable for the first hurdle of soil conservation 
investment take the value of 1 if the plot receives any type of soil or water conservation 
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investment (bound) or if household spent some amount of hours working on such investment 
during the past 18 months 0 other wise, leading us to adopt a probit specification.  
For plots receives any type of soil and water conservation, the respondent were asked how much 
was invested (m/tsimdi) in the last 18 months leading as to adopt truncated regression model in 
the second hurdle. The same specification was used for the decision and intensity of stone terrace. 
Alternative models with the actual and predicted certificate variables or instrumental variable 
probit specification were run to compare the results.  
To understand the impact of parcel based second level landholding certificate in both probability 
of adoption and intensity of adoption, it was necessary to go beyond the typical binary dependent 
variable methods applied to cross-sectional surveys on technology adoption (Feder et al., 1992). 
3.4.2.2 Tree Planting Investment Models 
Deininger and Jin (2006) show that in Ethiopia, households that had just experienced land 
redistribution were more likely to invest in tree planting (a security enhancement measure) than 
soil bound and terracing (productivity enhancement); however, households that expressed an 
expectation of future redistribution showed lower investment. We used a similar formulation as 
for the conservation investment models described above but the dependent variable “number of 
trees planted” is not strictly linear. It takes on the value of zero with a positive probability density 
at zero but is a continuous random variable over strictly positive values. For some households 
heads, an optimal choice is the corner solution of I =0. Therefore, the variable trees planted have a 
mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. This study is interested in the probability of a 
man planting trees given the ownership rights that he possesses Investment on tree. This leads the 
researcher to specified Tobit models for the number of trees planting on the plots. Also in this 
case will be uses data from household and plot level characteristics similarly as for the 
conservation investment models used above. 
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 3.4.2.3 The Double Hurdle Model and Variants 
a) The Tobit Model  
First, consider the linear specification as modeled in Moffatt (2003):  
ܫ௜
∗ = 	ߤܥ	 + ܺᇱ௜ߚ		 + 	 ݑ௜                         (11) 
ݑ௜~ܰ(0,ߪଶ)                                           (11a) 
Where ܫ௜
∗ is latent variable representing household i’s propensity to invest, Xi is a vector of 
household, plot and community characteristics relevant in explaining the intensity( extent) of 
investment  ߚ is a corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated, and ݑ௜ is a homoscedastic, 
normally distributed error term. Let ܫ௜	be the actual investment (e.g. length in meters). Since 
actual investment cannot be negative, the relationship between ܫ௜* and ܫ௜ is: 
ܫ௜=max (ܫ௜*, 0)                                (11b) 
This equation gives rise to the standard censored regression (“tobit”) model estimation of which is 
routinely available in econometric software package STATA. The log-likelihood function for the 
Tobit model is: 
ܮ݋݃ܮ = 	 ∑ 	݈݊ ቂ1 −   ቀ௑ᇲ೔ఉ
ఙ
ቁቃ଴ + 	∑ ݈݊ ቂଵఙ ߶ ቀூ೔ି௑ᇲ೔ఉఙ ቁቃା                           (11c) 
In which “0” indicates summation over the zero observations in the sample, while “+” indicates 
summation over positive observations.  Φ (.) and	߶ (.) are the standard normal cdf and pdf 
respectively.  
However the Tobit models have potential shortcomings due to the restrictive assumptions it 
makes (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). In particular, it assumes that all zero observations are, in 
fact, standard corner solutions and those households who do not adopt do so as a result of their 
economic circumstances. However, it is possible that some farm households would never state a 
positive amount as a matter of principle (It may be that they do not believe that taking care of the 
land is their responsibility, which is possible in Ethiopia where land is not privately owned, or it 
may be that they do not adopt because of their belief that, their adoption will unlikely make any 
real difference) or because they consider soil conservation investment or adoption of stone terrace 
as a bad Mekonnen et al., (2012). This is encouragement to this study to use the parametric 
generalized double hurdle model. 
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B) The Double Hurdle Model 
The decisions on whether to adopt and how much to adopt can be made jointly or separately. 
When the decisions are made jointly, the Tobit model is appropriate for analyzing the factors 
affecting the joint decision (Greene, 2000). This assumption has been the norm in previous 
research into the determinants of the intensity of soil conservation investments (Sureshwaran et 
al., 1996; Pender and Kerr, 1998). However, adoption and intensity of use decisions are not 
necessarily made jointly. The decision to adopt may precede the decision on the intensity of use, 
the impact of certificate on decision to invest and how much to invest may be different 
(Gebremehin et al, 2003).  In this case, it is more suitable to apply a ‘double hurdle’ model in 
which a probit regression on adoption (using all observations) is followed by a truncated 
regression on the non-zero observations (Cragg, 1971). 
The double hurdle model is designed to analyze instances of an event which may or may not take 
place and if it takes place, takes on continuous positive values. In the case impact of certificate on 
adoption of soil conservation practices (e.g. building terraces or bunds) and impacts of certificate  
on the intensity of use (how many meters per hectare of terracing or bunds) conditioning decision 
to adopt  follows. 
In the double-hurdle model, both hurdles have equations associated with them, incorporating the 
effects of adopter characteristics and circumstances. An explanatory variable may appear in both 
equations or in either of them, and a variable appearing in both equations may have opposite 
effects in the two equations. The double-hurdle model contains two equations the adoption 
equation and the equation on the level of adoption (Moffatt, 2005) 
																				݀௜
∗ = 	ܥ + ௜ܼ ᇱߙ	 + 	 ߦ௜                          (13) 
																				ܫ௜
∗∗ = 	ߤܥ	 + ܺᇱ௜ߚ		 + 	 ݑ௜                  (14) 
                                 ൬ߦ௜ݑ௜
൰ ~ N	ቂቀ00ቁ ቀ1 00 ߪଶቁቃ                           (15) 
 
Where ݀௜
∗ is a latent adoption variable that takes the value 1 if the household adopted land 
conservation investment, and 0 otherwise; Z is a vector of explanatory variables; and α  is a vector 
of parameters. I represent intensity of adoption and X is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is 
a vector of parameters.   C is policy variable of interest (1 if the household have parcel based 
certificate for his plot, 0 otherwise).  and ߤ are parameter of interest show impacts of the parcel 
36 
 
based second level land holding certificate on decision to invest and how much to invest 
(intensity) respectively. 
The first hurdle is then represented by: 
																										݀௜= 1    if    ݀௜
∗> 0                              (13a)         
																									݀௜= 0    if     ݀௜
∗ ≤ 0                             (13b) 
The second hurdle is designated as              ܫ௜∗ = max(ܫ௜∗∗, 0)     (14a) 
The observed variable ܫ௜ is finally determined by                 ܫ௜ = ݀௜ܫ௜∗   (14b) 
The log likely hood function for double hurdle model is: 
ܮ݋݃ܮ = 	 ∑ ݈݊ ቂ1 −(ܼ௜ᇱߙ)  ቀ௑ᇲ೔ఉఙ ቁቃ଴ + 	∑ ݈݊ ቂ(ܼᇱ௜ߙ) ଵఙ ߶ ቀூ೔ି௑ᇲ೔ఉఙ ቁቃା        (15) 
The double hurdle model (as originally proposed by Cragg 1971) is equivalent to a combination 
of truncated regression model and univariate probit model provided the assumption of 
independent between the error terms. Following Cragg (1971), the decision on adoption can be 
modeled as a probit regression (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Bekele and Mekonnen, 2012) 
ܨ(ܫ = 1/ܺ1,ܺ2)	= C (ܺᇱଵ, β)                                                     (16) 
Where C (.) is normal cumulative distribution function and X1, X2 are vectors of explanatory 
variables, not necessarily distinct. The decision on the intensity of use can be modeled as a 
regression truncated as zero: 
݂(ܫ/ܺ1,ܺ2) = 	 (ߨ)ିభమ	ߪିଵ	݁ݔ݌ ൜ି൫ூି௑మᇲఊ൯మ
ଶఙమ
ൠ X   ஼(௑ᇲభఉ)
஼(௑ᇲమఊ/ఙ)   for I > 0             (17) 
3.4.2.4 Test for Model Appropriateness 
Whether a Tobit or a double hurdle model is more appropriate can be determined by 
separately running the Tobit and the double hurdle models and then conducting a 
likelihood ratio test that compares the Tobit with the sum of the log likelihood 
functions of the probit and truncated regression models or the double hurdle model 
(Greene, 2000). 
3.4.3 Productivity Impact Models 
In addition to exploring the impact of certification on tenure security and investment, the 
researcher wants to assess the productivity impacts of certification and thus the broader economic 
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relevance of these issues. To do so we cannot be sure that land quality and basic household 
characteristics are the same for plots with and without certificate (Ghebru et al, 2008). A two- step 
approach was used to deal with this problem: (a) using nonparametric matching on observable 
plot characteristics to identify a sample that satisfies common support and estimated the impacts 
of the certificate on productivity and (b) using parametric regressions on the sample of plots that 
satisfies the common support requirement (Ho et al. 2007, Ghebru H. et al, 2008).  
 
The matched data of plots that were used in the productivity analysis included the plots planted 
with cereal crops with and with-out certificates that satisfies the common support requirement but 
excluding rented-in plots. The propensity score is contracted based on observable plot 
characteristics without including the endogenous investment variables through which the land 
certiﬁcation may have affected productivity. Then it is possible to imposes the common support 
requirement using appropriate matching methods (Becker and Ichino 2002; Dehejia and Wahba 
2002). This kind of data preprocessing reduces model dependence in the following parametric 
analysis (Ho et al. 2007).  
 
First, by using the propensity score matching approach and compare productivity per tsimdi on 
plots with and with-out certificates for the plots that met the common support requirements. Then 
it is possible to assess the impacts on land productivity of land certification directly and through 
the investment I* variables that possibly were affected by certification. I is dummy variable of 
investment type  (productivity enhancing investments such as soil conservation and stone terrace 
or security enhance investment such as tree planting). However, the study practically first 
estimate the reduced   form of the investment function that is, Equation (5). It then uses the 
generated residuals as explanatory variables in the second-stage equation, which is the equation 
explaining land productivity that is, Equation (18). This is done to test for the exogeneity of 
investment variable in Equation (18). 
 
         Y= ଴ + ଵC + ଶܫ∗ + ଷW + ku + ε                                          (18) 
The procedure establishes whether there is simultaneity bias using the criterion of a test of the 
significance of k, the coefficient of u (investment residual).  If k does not significantly differ from 
zero, then there is no simultaneity bias and vice versa.    
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Two alternative specifications for the dependent variable will be use; total value of output per 
tsimdi, and log of total value of output per tsimdi.  
3.5 Description of Variables Used in the Analysis  
The selection of explanatory variables that this studies is used is based on various related 
empirical works such as (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Ghebru et al., 2008; Hagos and 
Holden, 2006; Kabubo-Mariara, 2007; Brasselle et al., 2002; Deininger et al., 2007; Holden and 
Yohannes, 2002; Bekele and Mekonnen, 2012). In view of this the impacts of this program on 
tenure security, investment and productivity of the parametric estimation is viewed as a function 
of   vector of eight groups of variables (Socio –institutional factors, social capital variables, input, 
physical factors or plot level characteristics, house hold demographic characteristics,   market 
access variables, Interaction variables and site dummy) 
  
I. Impact indicator: - the impact indicator used in this study are:-  
Tenure security indicator: - this study tries to be use of two main tenure security indicators 
(representatives) Ti. The first one is household perception level about the plot that he have, 
whether the household has a confidence (feel certain) to cultivate the same field after 5 years 
(1=if certain; 0=not). Another indicator about tenure security is the fear of eviction (land taking) 
1= if fear for land taking, 0 otherwise. Lead us to adopt a probit specification 
 
Farm level investment: - For the agricultural investment variable, respondents will be asking 
whether they had made any major capital investments in their land and the amount of investment 
(intensity) if any in the last two years. Two different possible types of investments are expected to 
be reported. One with little tenure-security but large productivity impacts (henceforth labeled as 
soil conservation and terracing) and one with high tenure security but limited productivity impact 
(“tree planting”). Furthermore, the dependent variables used in the study are classified as adoption 
(invest or not invest) and intensity of investment (how much) of soil conservation practices and 
stone terrace constructed. Intensity of use measured as the number of meters per tsimdi (m/tsimdi) 
of terraces or bounds constructed.    
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Land productivity: - the impacts on land productivity of land certification directly and through 
the investment variables that possibly affect by certification. The log of value of all crop’s 
produced in his own plot is used as dependent variable. 
II. Treatment variable: the treatment variable used in this study is whether household have the 
modern parcel-based second level land holding certificate for his plot. it is binary response(1= if 
the household is from the certified village, 0 other wise)   
III. Independent variables: in this regard, the researcher reviewed carefully various literatures 
and theoretical backing to identify variables to be used to estimate the propensity score matching 
and to estimate the impacts of the program using parametric approach. To ensure that variables 
are not affected by participation in the program, they should either be fixed over time or measured 
before participation Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  These variables are believed to be time 
invariant control variables and are commonly used in, most impact literature. To minimize 
contamination with participation, variables that is before such as livestock holding, number of 
oxen owned and land holding size are used in the model.  
House hold demographic characteristics 
Age of the household head and Age square: - is one of the explanatory variables that are 
supposed to have an impact on out came variable. The effect of age of farmer on investment and 
productivity was anticipated to be either positive or negative but affects tenure security 
negatively; as age increases there is an experience effect which is productivity and investment 
increasing (potentially). 
 
On the other hand, as the farmers get older his managerial ability and physical capability are 
expected to decrease. Old aged farmers are also less receptive to new inputs and technologies, 
implying negative relationship between age and, investment and productivity. Older households 
to be more likely to invest in productivity enhance factors (soil conservation) than securities 
enhance factors if they are deciding to invest. In addition, older household heads where more 
likely to expect land loss (more insecure) this is due to administration measure may redistributed 
productive assets among the generation. To capture these different effects, both age and age 
square will be considered in the analysis. The empirical study made by Deininger et al. (2009) 
supports this argument.  
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Gender or sex of the house hold head: - is considered as one variable of the regression and it is 
entered as dummy variable in which 1 is assigned for male head household and 0 for female 
headed households. It is expected that male-headed households perform better than their counter 
part in investment and productivity since they are more able to mobilize labor and other factors of 
production for their plots within the family and women’s are most of the time do not carry on 
plowing by them. The practice is either they rent out their land for sharecropper or look for 
somebody/relative who does the plowing operation, which affects timely operation and/ or size of 
harvest and my not decide to invest to improve the plot as much to his own plot. The empirical 
studies made by Udry (1995), Goldstein and Udry (2005), and Holden et al. (2001) of gender 
specific issue related with this support this argument. 
On the other hand, women household might be worried about future land distribution and they are 
less secure than male headed households and then, would be more likely to engage in security 
enhancing factors such as tree planting because they initially were more tenure insecure and land 
certificates increased their tenure security relatively more.  
Literacy of household: - this is a discrete variable takes a value of 1 for literate households, 
which include both that can read write and those who achieved formal school. A value of 0 is 
assigned for illiterate households. Literacy of household members is hypothesized to have 
positive effect on decision and intensity of investment and better awareness and then more 
productive. 
 Dependency ratio: - is the ratio of working-age to total household members of the household 
members. The higher the number of children a household has, the lower the perceived tenure 
security. Having a lot of dependants is demanding in terms of labor hours spent taking care of 
them and this obviously implies less time spent monitoring parcels which expects lower level of 
investment and productivity. Therefore, it is hypothesized that this variable has positive effect on 
both out came variable negatively and significantly. 
Number of adult male and number of adult females: - is a continuous variable measured in 
number of family members of age [15-64] years. In principle, adults( labor force) is a key input in 
agriculture in general and decision to invest and amount of investment that led to enhance both 
productivity and tenure security in particular. Therefore, number of male/female adults of the 
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household head is hypothesized to positively affect tenure security, both types of investment and 
productivity. 
Livestock ownership in Tropical livestock unit (wealth):- is a continuous variable of number 
of livestock measured in TLU owned by each household. The variable is labeled TLU, and 
considered as wealth indictor. This variable measures the number of livestock owned weighted by 
the tropical livestock unit transformation standard.  Theoretically, livestock can support 
investment and productivity in two ways. First, livestock is sign of wealth it helps to purchase 
inputs such as fertilizer and to hired labor to improve the plot interims of investment. Second, 
they provide farmyard manure and compost for fertilizer and this lead to improve productivity of 
the plot. In this regard, livestock ownership has positive impact on investment on land and 
productivity. On the other hands, more specialization into livestock away from cropping may 
reduce focuses given to crop production and investment in plot which leads to negative 
relationship between livestock and physical sustainable land management practices. Most 
empirical results ensure this inverse relationship (Holden and Hailu, 2002; Aklilu, 2006; Abebaw 
et al., 2011) while some research results, for example (Fikru, 2009) shows a positive relationship 
between livestock and physical investment. Therefore, livestock ownership has a positive 
relationship with productivity and indecisive sign on soil bund construction and stone terrace. 
Number of oxen owned (oxen):- is a continuous variable measure in number. Most often, 
farmers who have one ox plow their fields by joining hands with others / peer. It could be 
envisaged that lack of adequate draught power leads to delay and poor land preparation, 
inefficient farm operations and late planting with a major depressing effect on yield. Therefore, 
number of oxen owned was hypothesized to have positive effect on productivity. 
Plot level characteristics 
Plot size: - is a continuous variable measured in tsimdi (traditional method of measuring size of 
land) and aggregating the size of different plots that the household has.  The effect of land size in 
investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, more land indicates greater wealth and capacity and 
should encourage investment on the other; more land may reduce the need to conserve land. A 
higher per-capita land endowment, relative to the village median lead to increase the perceived 
likelihood of land loss and reduce the expectation of gain, as that aims to distributed a limited 
amount of communal land as equitable among rural residents. 
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Distance of plots from homestead: - is a continuous variable measured in a minute of walk from 
homesteads.  Near plots get supervision and attention from family (Berhanu and Swinton, 2003; 
Wogayehu and Drake, 2003). It also raises time and the cost of carrying manure from the 
homestead.  In light of this, it is hypothesized to have negative effects of distance of plots from 
home stead to all types of investment and productivity.  
Slope of plots: - steepness of a plot initiates farmers to invest in soil and water conservation and 
stone terrace practices to protect their plots. Hence, there is a positive relationship between 
steepness of plots and in soil bund construction. Empirical evidences ensure this fact (Pender and 
Kerr, 1998; Aklilu 2006). Therefore, it is hypothesized to positively influence investment and 
productivity.  
Soil depth: - When soil depth is deep, farmers have little incentive to prevent soil loss and are 
unwilling to adopt conservation technologies, as there is little benefit from soil conservation. The 
empirical studies by (Pender and Kerr, 1998; Mbaga-Semgalawe and Folmer, 2000; Shively, 
2001) support this argument. 
Fertility status of plots: - plots with fertile soils that are expected to give high return will have 
higher marginal productivity loss.  In this regard, soil fertility status has positive relationship with 
investment in land practices (Berhanu and Swinton, 2003; Wogayehu and Drake, 2003). On the 
other hand, soil and water conservation covers fertile areas of a plot reducing cultivable areas 
which makes farmers reluctant to use SWC practices (Aklilu, 2006). Fertile soils are more 
productive than its counterpart. Therefore, it is hypothesized that soil fertility status has undecided 
effect on soil bund construction and positive relation with productivity.  
Input 
Modern Fertilizer use: - in this case value for fertilizer is considered to make the labialization of 
fertilizers comparable across household. To obtain this, the quantity of fertilizer used by the 
households is multiplied by the price of the fertilizer. In this case, DAP and UREA is the 
fertilizers used. It is hypothesized that amount of fertilizer used enhance productivity positively 
and significantly. 
 
Manure: - is a dummy variable takes value a value of 1 if a household participated in manure 
traditional or compost and it is expected to positively associate with productivity.  
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Improved seed use: - in this case value for seed is considered to make the labialization of 
improved seed comparable across household. To obtain this, the quantity of improved seed used 
by the households is multiplied by the price of the fertilizer. In and It is hypothesized that amount 
of fertilizer used enhance productivity positively and significantly. 
Endowment of soil and water conservation bound or stone terrace: - it is treated as a 
continuous variables, length of soil bound constricted or stone terrace constructed before the 
program is started. This past investment can affect current investment through the knowledge 
(learning from experience)   bout the advantage of such investment. It have also negative effect 
due to land size is limited and such investment may already invest in the past and have such 
investment in the plot. So this study has ambiguous sign on investment. But it is clear that 
productivity is high on plots with such types of investment. 
Endowment of tree planted: - it is continuous variable of number of young tree planted before 
the program is lunched. It may have positive effect on tenure security. Plots with large number of 
tree may have confidence to cultivate this land next future and never fear for land grab. This 
encourages farmers to invest more of soil bound and stone terrace and have better productivity 
also. 
Off –farm activity and social capital 
Off farm participation:-it is treated as a dummy variable which is measured as 1 if the 
household is involved in off/non-farm activities, 0 otherwise.  A study conducted in Ethiopia 
reveals that today access to supplementary non-farm source of income is a necessity rather than a 
luxury, because the core economic sources (farming and livestock) are not able to sustain the 
peasants on a stable basis (Desale,2008). Farm households carrying out these income generating 
activities always look for new income generating activities. This may lead to reduce concentration 
given to investment on land and improvement of land quality and reduce productivity. On the 
other extreme, the rural non-farm sector might contribute to improved farm productivity of 
peasant households, through its income effect, by relaxing their capital or liquidity constraint and 
allowing the purchase of inputs such as farm labor, seeds, fertilizer and pesticides (Woldehanna, 
2000). On the balance, the net effect of involvement in non-farm activities was hypothesized to be 
either positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitude of the two effects. 
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Remittances: - any national or international remittance expected to have positive effect on both 
decision to invest and how much to invest and productivity through the income effect. 
Socio-institutional factors 
Household head Perception pressure from community to conserve soil: - it is treated as a 
dummy variable which is measured as 1 if the household is involved in off/non-farm activities, 0 
otherwise. This increase both types of investment and have better productivity. Studies conducted 
by Gebremedhin et al., 2003 also support this argument.   
 
Public investment: - is a dummy variable take a value of 1, if one of household plots receives 
any soil or stone terrace investment. Public investment variable should both control for its direct 
impact at   plot level investment and its indirect crowding-in and crowding-out effects on private 
investment. Due to the substitution effect, public soil conservation campaign beneficiaries were 
expected to invest less in private investment and give less concentration to privet land. 
Development agents visit frequency: - is continuous variable measured in number of days own 
field visited by DA or household receive training related with and household visit to model 
farmers to take experience. Visit of development agent (access to extension services) has a 
positive influence on investment and land productivity because farmers who have access to 
extension services get training that enhance their knowledge. Studies show that access to 
extension services has a positive effect both on fertilizer use (Chilot, 2007; Maiangwa et al., 
2007) and on soil bund construction (Abebaw et al., 2011). Hence, it is hypothesized to have a 
positive sign on investment on land and land productivity in this study. 
Membership to farming cooperatives: - It is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
farmer is member to farmer’s cooperative, 0 otherwise. These farmers are more likely to get 
information related to farming activities over their counterparts and get farming equipments and 
modern input with reasonable price and around their home stated (Jean-Luc, 2006, Lakew, 1998).  
Hence, it is hypothesized that this variable raises both types of investment and productivity.    
Interaction variable: - We also include an interaction of a dummy that captures whether the 
household believes investing on land enhances tenure security with investment levels to 
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investigate whether believing investing on land enhances security and actually undertaking 
investments affects perceived tenure security. 
Site Dummy: - sustainable land management practices depend on the topography of area in 
consideration. In areas with steep slope, SWC practices such as soil and stone bunds are common 
than areas with flat features. The application of natural fertilizer also depends on the availability 
of livestock that provide manure.  
Table3.1 description of variables used to estimate PSM using logit model  
Dependent variable: household receive second level landholding certificates to his plot  
Variable Name    Description 
sexhh Sex of the household head, 1= male, 0= female 
agehh Age of household head 
educhh education 
adulthh Number of adult for the household 
own_land Own farm size in “Tsimdi”5 
plotdist Average distance from plot to homestead 
plot_age Plot age 
first_certi Dummy of household have first stage 
bak_type Soil type: Ba'ekel 
walk_type Soil type: Walka 
hut_type Soil type: Hutsa 
mek_type Soil type: Mekeyih 
slop1 Slope: Flat slope 
slop2 Slope: Moderate  slope 
slop3 Slope: steep slope 
sd_shallow Soil depth: Shallow 
sd_medium Soil depth: Medium 
sd_deep soil depth: Deep 
oxen_2003 Number of oxen for the household before 
tlu_2003 Tropical livestock unit for the household 
youngtree Number of young trees in the plot 
SWC_2003 length of soil bound before participation 
STC_2003 stone terrace constructed before certification 
Source: own survey, 2013 
                                                             
5 One tsimdi equivalent to  0.25 hectare  
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CHAPTER- FOUR 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter presents the main results and discussions of the study. Before we proceed to the 
detail analysis part, it is very indispensable to define and describe basic variables which are used 
for the analysis. To give a good picture about the program participants and non participants basic 
household and plot characteristics are presented in detailed based on their treatment categories.  
Next, the study presents and discusses the impacts of parcel based second level land holding 
certificates on tenure security, investment and land productivity of the matched respondents using 
the selected economic estimators.  
Our construction of the certification variable follows Deininger et al. (2009). The choice to 
construct the certification treatment variable at a village level as opposed to household or plot 
level is based on the fact that the program was implemented for 8 of the 18 villages in or before 
the year 2011/2. Defining certification at the household level would require that households 
within certified villages that did not receive certification were unaffected by the certification 
process. However, as the majority of households received certificates in the certified villages, 
there are likely to be spill-over effects. In addition, the households that did not receive certificates 
(we get 4 households who have the certificate but not in their hands because of random 
administration failures) were mainly excluded for exogenous reasons. Hence, households coded 
as non-certified in certified villages are mainly constituted by households waiting for their 
certificate. Treating these households as non-treated would contribute to bias due to measurement 
errors. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.1.1 Summary of variables used in the analysis  
Basic variables name description used in the analysis are provided in annex 1. To illustrate  the 
evaluation of key dependent variables annex 2  shows details of summary statistics for key 
variables used in the analysis based on treatment category for 116 and 163 households in treated 
and control villages respectively. While there is a bit difference in the household characteristics, 
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systematic differences at the household level encourage to the importance of controlling for 
household heterogeneity. 
 As can be seen from the Table 4.1 below 80 percent of the survey households are male headed 
and the remaining 20 percent are female headed. Similarly, Table 4.1 also indicated that 82 
percent and 77 percent of the non-certified and certified respondents are male headed 
respectively. Average age of full sample, Non-certified and certified households is 47.8, 46.8 and 
49 respectively. Non-certified households are better performing in education (22 percent are 
literate) as compare to certified households with only 20.7 percent literate. Literate in this case 
comprises of two categories, which includes both that can read and write as well as those who 
have achieved higher level of education (formal) such as being enrolled in primary and secondary 
schools. 
In terms of number of adult, the non-certified households have equivalent to 1.59 male and 1.54 
female adults (whose age are between 14 and 65) where as the certified respondents have 
equivalent to 1.5 male and 1.66 female adults. This shows that certified respondents have more 
female adult members where as Non-certified respondents have more male adults but both are not 
statistically significant. 
Table4.1Summary statistics for key household variables by treatment category  
Certificate  Sexhh Agehh Educhh Adumale Adufem Own_land Oxen tlu 
Non certified   .822   46.798 .221  1.588 1.540 5.503   1.564 4.922 
Certified  .775   49.293     .208        1.491   1.655 5.112   1.069   4.562 
Diff. 0.046 -2.495 0.139 0.976 -0.115 0.390 0.495*** 0.360 
t-test 0.954 -1.520 0.278 0.764 -0.967 1.120 3.466 0.358 
Full sample  .803   47.835 .215   1.548   1.588 5.340   1.358  4.773 
Source: Own survey data, 2013 
With regard to asset holding, the size of own land cultivated by non-certified respondents is little 
bit larger than that of the certified one cloth to 0.4 Tsimdi. Oxen holding, this is the only 
significant variable which is systematically different among certified and non-certified 
households. Certified households have cloth to 0.5 units of oxen lower than their counter part and 
it is statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. Regarding to indicators of wealth, 
such as  the amount of livestock holding,  certified respondents have around 4.56 tropical 
livestock unit where as non-certified respondents have 4.92 tropical livestock unit. 
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Attributes for the 229 and 289 plots in treated and control villages respectively; except in oxen 
holding there is no statistically significant difference among certified and non-certified 
households. Average numbers of parcels for certified and non-certified are 1.78 and 1.72, 
respectively. Similarly, the average distance of plot from homesteaded is 2.07 and 1.81 kilometers 
for control and treated households. The registered plot and non registered plots had been in 
possesses of current owner for similarly around 18 years. 
            Table4.2Plot level characteristics by treatment category. 
Variable name  Non-certified   With Certificate  Differences  T-test 
Number of parcel   1.72  1.78  -0.060 -0.805 
Average distance of plot (km) 2.07  1.81   0.264 1.418 
Number of years plot possessed  17  18.33  -1.403 -1.476 
Soil type:  Bake’akl .09 .08   0.008 0.247 
Soil type:   Walka .71 .65  0.0651 1.176 
Soil type:   Hutsa .18 .18 0.003 0.064 
Soil type:  Mekayh .26  .26  0.005 0.097 
Plot slope:  Flat  .89  .91  -0.024 -0.662 
Plot slope:  Moderate   .07 ..03   0.027 1.011 
Plot slope:  Steep  .13 .13   0.006 0.137 
Soil depth:  Shallow  .44 .41 0.060 0.606 
Soil depth:  Medium   .33  .33        0.004 0.064 
Soil depth:  Deep .53 .5 0.042 0.696 
             Source: Own survey data, 2013 
As far as plot characteristics are concerned, Table 4.2 describes details about soil type, slope and 
soil depth used as proxy variable for soil quality. Majority of the registered plots (65 percents) are 
Walka soil type followed by mekayh (26 percent), Husta (18 percent) and Ba’ekel  89 and 91 
percents of the register and non registered plots are Flat slope.  There is a far distribution of plots 
among different soil depth in both the treated villages and control villages.  
4.1.2 Overview of the Program Implementation in the Study Area 
The government of Ethiopia together with development partners has been undertaking field 
testing exercises to improve and update the previous land certification program. Tigray 
Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Agency (TEPLAUA) have been 
implementing Ethiopia Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) with financial 
support of USAID and technical assistance of TETRA TECH ARD in Raya Azebo and Tahtay 
Adyabo wereda of Tigray Regional State since January 2009. The parcel-based second level 
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landholding certificate was officially launched in Tigray in July, 2011 even if some households 
are receiving certificate before. Community-level data shows that the process was implemented in 
two woredas of Tigrai and total of 13,815 households (12,299 from Raya Azebo and the 
remaining 1516 households from Tahtay Adyabo) and 25,690 parcels receives certificate. Details 
of the registration program of the selected kebeles are presented in the following Table. 
 
Table4.3 key features of the land registration process in sample kebeles of Raya Azebo wereda  
Source: Tigray Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Agency (TEPLAUA), 2012  
Annex 3 shows in most locations public meetings were held before and during the certification 
process, land use committees (LACs) were publicly elected and represented most of the sub-
kebeles; and adjudication demarcation was carried out in the field in the presence of neighbors. 
The land certification was issued in the name of husband and wife if the land is possessed 
together (joint titling). 
Figure 2 sample map of landholder's parcel 
       Source: TEPLAUA, 2011 
kebele Parcel 
surveyed  
Certificate 
 prepared 
Certificate issued based on type Total  Certified Households   
Cultivated 
land  
Homest
ead 
Commun
al land  
others Male 
headed 
Female  
headed 
Total 
Wargba 4,717 4,690 3,035 998 35 4 4,072 1,532 824 2,356 
Tsegae 6,963 6,910 4,852 1,371 41 9 6,273 1,954 1,137 3,091 
Hawelti  6,799 6,466 4,061 1,834 42 60 5,997 2,275 1,416 3,691 
Total  18,479 18066 11948 4203 118 73 16342 5761 3377 9138 
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How and when each parcel of land was held is registered at field level; and upon completion of 
parcel registration, a card is given to the individual, which indicates that the land registration for 
the individual has been completed. The information on the card as stated in figure 2 above 
includes: the serial number, Wereda, Kebele, name of land holders (joint titling), maps with detail 
demarcation for each parcel, codes of parcels, registration date, different certificate received for 
each parcel homesteaded land and grand index card for holder, name of recorder and a notice to 
the land holder that he has to bring with him the card to claim for a book of holding.  
In addition to household certificates base line map was prepared for each certified tabia used as 
reference and as base for the implementation of the surviving, registration and certification 
programs. 
Figure 3 sample base map of tabia Wargba 
Source: TEPLAUA, 2011 
 
With almost 89 percent of the certified households and 73 percent of households from non 
certified group indicating that information meetings were organized before the start of registration 
and 66 and 52 percent respectively, household member had attend such meetings at least once. 
This is supported by the fact that almost 69 percent of households consider themselves to be well 
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informed about the program and 70 percents believe that the efforts made by the governments 
considered as good enough. 
Even if farmers are receiving the certificate the government of the region costing to this program 
which uses more advanced modern technologies including aerial photos, high resolution satellite 
imagery (HRSI), global positioning system (GPS) and well trained experts. The process is much 
more costly than the previous first stage land certification. A detailed payment norm of the 
country’s average standard is prepared as below:  
Table4.4 Cadastral serving, registration and certification payment Norm  
S.N Activity  Unit  Proposed payment 
norm (ETB)  
1 Surveying and related Parcel  29.10 
2 Registration related excluding kebele base map 
preparation  
Parcel/km 21.70 
3 Certification activity  Parcel  10.45 
Total   6 1.25 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 2012/13 
 
To put these figures into perspective, it is useful to compare them to the past low cost land 
certificate and other countries land titling. In Madagascar, where the official cost for titling on 
demand estimated amount to US$ 150 (Jacoby and Minten 2006), In Uganda, the cost of issuing 
certificates of customary is some US $ 40 per parcel. By all measures this parcel based second 
level land holding certificate can considered as still cheaper. Although low by international 
standards, the cost of the process is still above the level where, in line with households’ stated 
willingness to pay (the non certified households) of birr 54 even if 86 percent of households from 
non certified group strongly need this certificate, full cost recovery will not be possible. .  
4.1.3 Subjective Perceptions and Investment Impacts of Certificate  
Perceptions by sample households on impacts of certification are presented in Annex’s 3. About 
90 percent expect that compensation be paid for land that will be taken, out of this cloth to 91 
percent and 90 percent from the certified and non certified group respectively, expects that 
certification makes receipt of compensation. With similar percentage (68) of the certified and non 
certified households   perceive certification to increase incentives for investment in trees, soil and 
water conservation structures.  
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Majority of households (88%) expect certification improve women’s position (empowered 
women’s in decision making within the household) and tenure security. 83 percent of certified 
household and 82 percent of non certified household expects certificate make them more willing 
to rent out their land to strangers and most of them (86% of the certified and 82 of non certified) 
perceive that certificate make land market easy and secure.  
83 percent of the Non-certified households and 77.7 percent of certified household perceive tree 
planting enhance tenure security and majority of the households (76.65% and 73.21% non-
certified and certified respectively) have interest to plant tree in their plot if it is legally permitted. 
91.6 and 36.53 percent of non certified household 95.5 and 43.75 percent of household from 
certified group respectively, reflect their interest  on adoption of soil bound construction and stone 
terracing.  
 In relation to investment in improving the existing conservation, Most of the household from 
both groups (73%) improve the existing soil bound or stone terrace. Cloth 21 percent of 
respondents made nothing (response no change) for the existing bound. Majority of the 
households (93.75%, 92.81% of certified and Non-certified) believe investment on land (soil 
bound and stone terraces) enhance land productivity, which shows awareness towards the benefits 
of investment is not as much serious problem in the society. Similarly, 82 percent of Non-certified 
households and 76 percent of certified household plot, receive public investment. Though clearly 
encouraging, this positive assessment may be biased, and should be backed up with direct 
evidence on actual investment behavior.   
4.1.3.1 Tenure Type/ Documentation as a Measure of Tenure Security 
The incidence of documentation can be compared with the situations prior to the parcel based 
second level land holding certificates to determine whether tenure security has improved and 
remains improved as a result of the certificate. Prior to the program 84.6 percent of the 
respondents have the first stage certificate and the remaining 15.4 percent held no documentation, 
Out of this 28 % receives the new parcel land holding certificate for their plot. In addition, 42.4 
percent of households having the first stage certificate receive the second stage certificate. Taking 
land certification in the name of the owner as indicator of tenure security, this indicates an 
increase in formal or objective security from the first stage registered which is only in the name of 
the head and all parcels in one without clear demarcations to the second stage and more advanced 
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since it is parcel based with clear and scientific demarcations can be considered as better security 
improvements.    
                   Table4.5  Number of conversions from first stage to the second stage certificate  
Dummy of hh have first 
stage certificate  
Dummy of hh have PBSLLH certificate for his plot 
Non certified Certified Total  
No 31(72%) 12(28%) 43(15.4%) 
Yes 136(57.6%) 100(42.4%) 236(84.6%) 
Total  167(59.9%) 112(40.1%) 279(100%) 
                  Source: own survey, 2013 
The number of conversions from the first stage to second stage land holding certificate can also 
be used as an indicator of increased tenure security. 
4.1.3.2 Perception as a Measure of Tenure Security  
Perceptions of security were directly queried by asking how likely they can counterclaim for 
ownership of the parcel at hand.  The considerable households of the non certified respondents, 
46.4% percent felt secure enough to state that it was impossible for a counterclaim to challenge 
their claim as indicated in Table 4.7 below. Whereas, 83 percent of the respondents from the 
treated group can considered as secure enough since they can counterclaim for owner ship of the 
plot.  
Table4.6Households perception of tenure security 
Is there any improvement of tenure security enhancing measure taken place within the last 2 years? 
Worsen/reduced 7.78        1.79        5.38 
No change 50.90       24.11       40.14 
Improve 41.32       74.11       54.48 
           Source: own survey, 2013 
From the above one can easily says those certified households have better confidence on the 
ownership of the plot at hand even if it is difficult to claim this is because of certificate without 
confirming this result with the help of econometric investigations. Concerning to the change in 
Questions asked to sample household  Non-certified Certified Full sample 
How likely counterclaim for owner ship of the plot? 
Impossible 46.39       10.71       32.01 
unlikely 14.46        4.46 10.43 
likely 34.94       83.04 54.32 
No-change 4.22        1.79 3.24 
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tenure security, 41.3 and 74.1 percent of the households from the control and treated respectively, 
believes that there is tenure security improvement in the last two years. Whereas majority of the 
respondents from the control group (cloth to 58%) assumes tenure security enhancing measures 
either reduced or no change taken place in the last two years.  
4.1.4 Average Input Use by Treatment Category  
To farther shade light on the treatment category, the researcher analyzed average input use in 
production which probably affects productivity. Starting with average own land holding (farm 
size) there is some difference between the certified and non certified households (cloth to 0.4 
tsimdi). Besides land being a major input in agriculture, plot characteristics (soil quality and 
slope) has to be considered in productivity. For this data there is no considerable difference in 
labor usage (average of 36.7 Labor Day) and tropical livestock unit, which is 4.92 and 4.56 units 
for certified and non certified households respectively(see annex 3 for details). 
Certified households have used fertilizer and improved seed that is worth of 906.2 and 138.7 birr 
respectively. Similarly, households from Non-certified group has used fertilizer and improved 
seed which worth of 618.5 and 113.6 birr respectively. Similarly, 53 percent of the certified and 
cloth to 40 percent of Non-certified households use manure for their plot (see Annex 3 for detail).  
4.1.5 Outcome variables by Treatment Category  
Level of the outcome variables among different treatment category, as described in Table 4.8 
below, provide a first check of our hypotheses. Plot ownership indicator, asking land owners 
whether they were fear for  his holding at hand may take/grab by the government at any time, 71 
percent of non treated households and 12 percent from the treated household’s fears there holding 
may take by the government at any time. This shows the non certified household loses their 
confidence (feel in secured) as compare to the certified one. And the difference is statistically 
significant at 1percent level of significance. Similarly, taking the degree of confidence as measure 
of tenure security, also points to significantly higher level of tenure insecurity in the control group 
(64 percent) as compared to the treatment group (22 percent) of the households in the survey. 
With regard to land related investment, as depicted in Table 4.8, the number of tree seedlings (tree 
planted in the last two years) higher in control group (92.88) than the treated households (61.95). 
But this lacks statistical significance. That is insecure household invest more in tenure security 
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enhancing factors (tree planting) as compared to household under the treated village even if it 
needs deep empirical investigation which were stated in the econometric part below. But the 
standard deviation is more than two times larger than the mean shows there is great variation 
among the invested households.  
Table4.7 Outcome variables by Treatment Category  
Source: Own survey data, 2013 
Our data also contain information on whether households undertook new land-related investment, 
mainly on terracing and bounding, during the last 18 months as well as the intensity of such 
investment if any of household on his plot. This shows majority of the households from treated 
group have significantly adopt soil bound as compared to the control group. 62 percent of the 
household from the control group and 89 percent from treated group adopt soil bound in the last 
18 months and it is statistically significant and consistent to the hypotheses that certificate 
enhance decision to adopt new technology such as soil bound. There is no significant difference 
in intensity of soil bound constructed structure in the control and treated group. The mean 
intensity (length) of land soil bound conservation structure 165.69 meters in the control group and 
152.80 in the treated group plot. This is far less than the average requirement of 700 meters per 
hectare of stone terrace or soil bounds to conserve hectare of land from soil erosion effectively on 
typical sloped area in the north Ethiopia, as estimated by Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003) even 
if such type of investment may get in touch with through time. 
Household level indicator  Non -Certified  certified  Diff.  t-test  
 Mean  Std. Dev mean Std. Dev 
Tuner security indicators (household level)      
Fear his holding may take  by gov’t at any time  .72    .45        .12     .33     .60***     12.1513 
Certain to cultivate the same field after five 
years  
.26     .44    .86    .35    -.598 ***    -12.158 
Land related investment over the last 18 months (plot level) 
Tree seedlings 92.88     176.37     61.95     138.01     30.92**      1.5760 
Adopt soil bound in the last 18 month. .62     .49     .89     .32     -.27***     -5.2008 
Length of soil bound constructed in last 18 
months  
165.69     244.68    152.80    201.57     12.89      0.4657 
Adopt stone terraces in the last 18 months  .19     .39     .344    .477      -.15 ***     -2.9579 
Intensity of ST constructed in the last 18 
months  
11.15     81.43    14.15  149.86    -2.99      -0.3577 
Land  productivity indicator (plot level) 
Total value of output per ha  2852.4     7004.8     3746.3      6650.9     -893.89     -1.0727 
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Moreover, 19 and 34 percent of respondent households from the control group and the treated 
group respectively, have adopted new stone terrace in the last 18 months. This is statistically 
significant and consistent to the hypothesis even if it is far less than the number of households soil 
bound constructed stated above.  Similarly, plots of certified households receive 11.15 meters of 
stone terrace investment and in plots of non-certified households recives14.15 meters of stone 
terrace. Similar to the interpretation in the tree seedlings the standard deviation was very large 
which shows the variation of the intensity of stone terrace construction was too large.  
 
Total values of output produced per hectare, as stated above shows that yield appear to be higher 
on plots with certificate than on plots without certificate even if the difference is not very large.  
 
Though majority of the results are consistent to the hypothesis, this positive results may be biased 
and my lead as to incorrect conclusion, and need to further investigation with well specified 
parametric models to confirm this results. 
 
4.2 Estimation of the Propensity Score  
This part presents the results of logistic regression model employed to estimate the propensity 
scores for matching treatment households with control households. The dependent variable is 
binary indicating whether the household received the parcel based second level land holding 
certificate which takes value one if he receives (he is from the pilot or treated village) and 0 
otherwise. STATA version 11.0 was used for computing the propensity score matching. 
 
This study investigates whether program placement in tabia/village has any impact on 
nonparticipants the results (see annex 4) does not shows any spillover effects. 
 
Table 4.9 (and Annex 5) shows the estimation results of logit model. The common support option 
has been selected and the balancing property was satisfied. Thus, with availability data the region 
of common supports was [0.19059294, 0.76650343]. This implies that PSNP beneficiaries and 
non-PSNP beneficiaries whose propensity scores below 0.19059294 and above 0.76650343 were 
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discarded and balancing propensity also satisfied at this common support region.  The pseudo-R2 
value of the estimated model result is 0.0490 which is fairly low. This low pseudo-R2 value 
indicates that the allocation of the program has been fairly random (Pradhan and Rawlings, 2002). 
The result therefore,  suggests  that  treatment households do not have  diverse  characteristics  
over all  and  hence  obtaining  a good match between treatment and control households becomes 
easier.                                  
 
The estimated coefficients indicate that all household and plot level characteristics except own 
land size did not provide strong evidence for household to receive certificate. Households with 
higher land size have lower probability of receiving second certificate and it is statistically 
significant at 10 percent level of significance.  
    
To ensure that variables are not affected by participation in the program, they should either be 
fixed over time or measured before participation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  These variables 
are believed to be time invariant control variables and are commonly used in most impact 
literature. To minimize contamination with participation some variables such as livestock holding, 
number of oxen owned, length of soil bound constructed and stone terrace before the program 
started are used for the estimation.  
Since the program is pilot under specific villages introducing village dummy make the estimation 
results completely unmatched which shows village dummy as the perfect predictor of the 
program. The remaining pre treatment variables are also found to be statistically insignificant to 
affect households to receive the second level certificate.  
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Table4.8  Logit estimation for probability of participation in the certification program 
Source: Own survey data, 2013 
                                                 
                                                             
6 The year 2003 shows is Ethiopian calendar  
VARIABLES Coefficients Std. Err. P>|z| 
Sex of the household head, 1=male, 0= female -.2019937 .3425613 0.555 
Age of household head .013868 .0118475 0.242 
education of the household head, 1=literate, 0=illiterate .0539247 .3243889 0.868 
Number of adult male's for the household .0391765 .0904928 0.665 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" -.1160193* .05906 0.049 
Average distance from plot to homestead -.1106197 .0932755 0.236 
Number of years plot possessed .0151612 .0214275 0.479 
Dummy of household have first stage certificate for his plot .4622918 .4220351 0.273 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel -.0559994 .496848 0.910 
Soil type: Walka -.5356318 .3481641 0.124 
Soil type: Hutsa .0658319 .4606702 0.886 
Slope: Flat .7731895 .6507257 0.235 
Slope: steep .6729651 .62606 0.282 
Soil depth: Shallow -.4050932 .2998521 0.177 
soil depth:  Deep -.1374403 .2919623 0.638 
Number of oxen before participation(20036)  -.0380259 .1068069 0.722 
Tropical livestock unit in 2003 .0122561 .0160342 0.445 
Number of young trees (planted before program) -.0012474 .0012856 0.332 
Soil bound constricted still 2003 (meters) -.0003772 .0005992 0.529 
Stone terrace constricted before participation 2003 .0020384 .0023929 0.394 
Constant -.947692 .8823373 0.283 
LR chi2(21) 
Pseudo R2  
Observations  
         18.99 
0.0501 
279 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3 Parametric Estimation 
4.3.1 Tenure Security Impacts of Second Level Land Holding Certificates   
To test whether, as predicted, parcel based second level land holding certificate enhance 
perceived tenure security of farmers or not Table 4.10 presented results from probit estimation on 
different tenure security indicators. Approximate standard of the estimation results are reported in 
parentheses beneath the parameter estimate. 
In both case of specifications the treatment variable was strongly support our hypothesis. The 
result suggest that households from the treated villages had higher level of tenure security i.e 
perceives significantly less  fear of land taking  by the government or any other agents at any time 
and certain to cultivate the same field after five year. This is consistent to the one done by 
Deininger et al. (2009) on impacts of first level land certificate on tenure security in the same 
country. This also in line to the descriptive evidence that points majority of the households from 
the treated village has better perceived tenure security as compared to households from non 
treated villages.  
From this one can conclude that second level land holding certificate have significant role on 
building of the perception of tenure security and countries like Ethiopia with land redistribution 
experienced under successive governments and having proclamination that guarantees for every 
individual over the age of 18 years will have access to rural land if he/she desires to engage in 
agriculture needs continuous updates of registration and certification to enhance tenure security 
and efficient use of the scarce  resource. So it is possible to consider this second level land 
holding certificate have significant   rule in country like Ethiopia to enhance tenure security and 
this certification with the help of modern technologies can considered as appropriate policy 
direction.   
Another alternative way of estimation of the impacts of the parcel based second level land holding 
certificate on perceived tenure security was the instrumental variable probit approach. Since the 
endogenous variable (in case if certificate is endogenous) was discrete and the dependent variable 
was also binary the iv-probit approach can considered it as alternative estimator. In this case since 
village and certification are inseparable; village dummy was perfect predictor of the program. So, 
village dummy and year with certificate are used as relevant instrumental variables.  
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Table4.9 Impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificate on perceived tenure security: probit and 
instrumental variable probit estimation 
VARIABLES Probit Estimation  Iv-probit Estimation 
cert_after5 Fear land  grab  cert_after5 Fear of Eviction  
certi_type2 
 
2.064*** 
(0.221) 
-2.188*** 
(0.240) 
2.073*** 
(0.232) 
-2.200*** 
(0.248) 
Sex of the household head, 1=male, 0= 
female 
-0.299 
(0.270) 
0.433 
(0.285) 
-0.304 
(0.274) 
0.438 
(0.288) 
Age of household head 0.0852 
(0.0528) 
-0.111** 
(0.0546) 
0.0756 
(0.0522) 
-0.0981* 
(0.0534) 
Age  square of household head -0.00074 
(0.0005) 
0.000979* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
Education of the household head, 
1=literate, 0=illiterate 
-0.450* 
(0.239) 
0.567** 
(0.245) 
-0.421* 
(0.239) 
0.529** 
(0.243) 
Number of dependants for the household  0.0766 
(0.0680) 
-0.115* 
(0.0694) 
0.0607 
(0.0687) 
-0.0973 
(0.0696) 
Number of adult for the household -0.125* 
(0.0727) 
0.142* 
(0.0743) 
-0.122 
(0.0744) 
0.137* 
(0.0755) 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" -0.0275 
(0.0409) 
0.0180 
(0.0418) 
-0.00481 
(0.0379) 
-0.00886 
(0.0386) 
Plot-home distance  0.0358 
(0.0748) 
-0.0150 
(0.0762) 
0.0927 
(0.0664) 
-0.0814 
(0.0671) 
Number of years plot possessed -0.0151 
(0.0170) 
0.0166 
(0.0175) 
-0.0158 
(0.0171) 
0.0172 
(0.0175) 
Dummy of household have first stage 
certificate for his plot 
0.364 
(0.308) 
-0.351 
(0.313) 
0.261 
(0.306) 
-0.236 
(0.310) 
Number of oxen 0.0205 
(0.0919) 
-0.0256 
(0.0952) 
0.0163 
(0.0933) 
-0.0174 
(0.0959) 
Tropical livestock unit -0.0227* 
(0.0137) 
0.0258* 
(0.0143) 
-0.0238 
(0.0150) 
0.0272* 
(0.0162) 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel 1.419*** 
(0.405) 
-1.476*** 
(0.415) 
1.413*** 
(0.411) 
-1.472*** 
 (0.417) 
Soil type: Walka 0.568** 
(0.264) 
-0.587** 
(0.272) 
0.571** 
(0.270) 
-0.591** 
(0.277) 
Soil type: Hutsa 0.462 
(0.332) 
-0.510 
(0.342) 
0.436 
(0.332) 
-0.477 
(0.340) 
Slope: Flat 0.284 
(0.525) 
-0.360 
(0.552) 
0.190 
(0.512) 
-0.238 
(0.526) 
Slope: steep 0.996** 
(0.491) 
-1.260** 
(0.508) 
0.834* 
(0.482) 
-1.064** 
(0.491) 
Soil depth: Shallow -0.0349 
(0.223) 
0.128 
(0.230) 
-0.0289 
(0.225) 
0.113 
(0.232) 
Soil depth:  Deep 0.144 
(0.219) 
-0.115 
(0.225) 
0.173 
(0.220) 
-0.149 
(0.226) 
Young tree -0.000686 
(0.000969) 
0.000789 
(0.00101) 
-0.000819 
(0.000912) 
0.000886 
(0.000957) 
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Constant -3.359** 
(1.316) 
3.919*** 
(1.362) 
-3.076** 
(1.302) 
3.548*** 
(1.329) 
Log likelihood 
LR chi2(21)      
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
-117.63176 
145.79 
0.0000 
0.3826 
275 
-122.5701 
155.04 
0.0000 
0.4078 
275 
- 
93.23 
0.0000 
- 
279 
         - 
93.56 
0.0000 
           - 
       279 
Notes: the first dependent variable takes value 1 if the household is certain to cultivate the same field after five years, 
and o, otherwise. The second dependent variable is whether the household fear for land taking (fear of eviction) at 
any time =1 and 0, otherwise.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: own survey, 2013 
The results from instrumental variable probit estimation are quite similar to the above. But the 
standard errors of the instrumental variables are little bit big, shows the direct probit estimation 
was efficient. This similarity in coefficient of the variables shows the program (the treatment 
category) was random, bias is very small and tests have the desired size.  In terms of the 
explanatory variables in both the direct probit estimation and instrumental probit estimation are 
quite similar in both in magnitude and the direction of correlations 
Age exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with land security indicators, suggesting that life 
cycle affects households fear for land grab. This is consistent to the hypothesis and the signs are 
largely expected. It is also similar to finding obtained by Deininger et al. (2009) and consistent 
with that administration measures aim to redistribute productive resource among new generation 
since land is the basic resource for rural livelihood. The opposite is true for number of adult in the 
household on the fear for land grab specification. We haven’t strong interpretation for this result. 
Better educated household and household having better amount of tropical livestock unit (may 
considered as indicator of wealth) fear for land grab and are not certain to cultivate the same field 
after five years. This Suggests that educated households may leave the village for searching 
alternative jobs and lose their holding if they are disappeared from the village for more than two 
years and wealthier households may expect the system that aims redistribution of limited amount 
of communal land as equity as possible among rural residents.  
 Plot characteristics, good soil quality indicators among others, significantly and negatively 
affects for fear of land evection/taking and positively affects for certainty to cultivate the same 
field. This may be due to either the government officials are not good enough on separating soil 
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quality or land distribution and taking are focuses on the uncomfortable but not owned by anyone. 
This is attributable to the policy direction of the government focusing land distribution for the 
youth under the rural youth package implemented in past six to seven years. Households with 
steep slope plot perceives significantly better secure as comper to households with medium slope 
type. Since steep slope is not as much comfortable for agriculture as comper to the other slope no 
one may need to take land from this rather than the holders need themselves requires another land. 
4.3.2 Impacts of second level certificate on investment on land 
The first step of the analysis of impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificate on 
investment consisted of testing the Tobit model against the alternative of Double-Hurdle model. 
The appropriateness of the Tobit versus the double hurdle can be tested with a likelihood ratio 
test. The likelihood ratio statistic is calculated as presented in the original Cragg’s, (1971) model 
as: 
LR = -2[lnLFTobit- (lnLFprobit+lnLFtruncreg)] 
Where, LF represents the maximized log likelihood function values for the model type indicated 
in the subscript, each of which is estimated independently. The null hypothesis is that the Tobit 
model is appropriate specification. If the calculated likelihood ratio statistics exceeds the critical 
chi-square with number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables(X) 
the Tobit is rejected in favor of the double hurdle model.  
The results of the formal Tobit and double hurdle as indicated in Table 4.10 below represent the 
overwhelming evidence of the superiority of the double hurdle model. Based on the log-
likelihood values of the two models estimated, the LR test results suggest the rejection of the 
Tobit model. That is, the test statistic Γ=215.25 for soil bound and 186.05 for the stone terrace 
exceeds the critical value of the χ2(25) =44.31distribution. For good measure, Akaike's 
Information Criterion (AIC) is included as alternative model selection criterion in addition to log-
likelihood ratio tests. The model with the lowest AIC is preferred. Both confirm superiority of the 
double-hurdle specification over Tobit model. This suggests that the decision to adoption and 
intensity of adoption (how much to invest) are separate at least for this data set. It also indicates 
there are variables that affects adoption decision but not affect the intensity of adoption and vice 
versa.  Even variables that affect decision equation may affect intensity of investment but in 
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different magnitude or directions. This encourages the researcher to focuses on the double hurdle 
model. So result from the Tobit model is not reported in the analysis.  
Table4.10 Test for comparison of Tobit with Double-Hurdle model  
 
Diagnostic test type 
              Soil Bound             Stone Terrace  
Tobit   Double-Hurdle model   Tobit   Double-Hurdle model   
Probit, D Truncated 
regression 
Y(Y>0) 
Probit, D Truncated 
regression 
Y(Y>0) 
Wald  x2(25) 214.01 158.08 38.58 74.98 43.08 80.73 
Prob>x2  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.0407** 0.00*** 0.013** 0.00*** 
LOG-L  -1378.7676 -46.577 -1224.56 -496.9908 -126.958 -277.01 
AIC (-LOG-L+k/N) 5.104 0.260 4.54 1.899 0.552 1.098 
Number of observations (N) 275 275 210 275 275 70 
X2-test: Double hurdle vs. Tobit  Γ =215.25 > χ2(25) =44.31 Γ = 186.0456 > χ2(25) =44.31 
X2-test:***statistically significant at 1% level ** at 5% level of significance , k = number of parameters 
Source: own survey, 2013 
4.3.2.1 Certificate Verses Adoption Decision  
The second Hypothesis of study states that parcel based second level land holding certificate 
enhance investment such as soil conservation bound. To test the hypothesis the double hurdle 
model (probit specification for adoption decision and alternative truncated regressions on the 
actual zeros and predicted zeros from probit regression) and alternative Tobit specification are 
run. But the likelihood ratio test of model appropriates rejects the Tobit model in favour of the 
double hurdle model (see result of the test in Table 10).  This encourages the research to 
separately estimate adoption decision and intensity of adoption.  
The results from the double hurdle model are presented in Table 4.11 below. The Table reports 
the estimates of the coefficients from robust standard errors of probit model on adoption decision. 
The pseudo-R square, the chi-square test results and likelihood ratio test are also presented at the 
bottom of the Table. The likelihood ratio shows that the model is a good fit overall. The pseudo 
R-square also shows that the regression explains 70.4 percent (which is large for cross-sectional 
data set) of the soil bound and 18.6 percent of the stone terrace of the total variation in the 
dependent variable.  
64 
 
Since the interest of this study was to check the impacts of the certificate on decision to invest, we 
retain all possible alternative estimation strategies which are pass the appropriate tests. 
Results consistently suggest that the second level land holding certificate pointed to statistically 
significant and economically meaningful impacts on decision to adopt soil conservation bound 
and stone terrace. It is significant at least 1 percent for the soil conservation bound and at 5 
percent for the terrace model, which provides strong evidence of a positive effect of certification 
on investment. The marginal effect indicates that,  the treated households has had 8.5 percent 
more probability of investing soil bound and 12.6 percent more probability of investing stone 
terrace as compared to the households from the control village. Empirical evidence insures this 
fact Ghebru et al. (2008) and Deininger et al. (2011) 
In line with findings by Kabubo (2010) age has negatively and significantly associated with 
decision to invest soil bound. Same but insignificant effects also observed for adoption of stone 
terrace. The marginal effect for literate household indicates that literate households has 14.84 
more likely to invest stone terrace as compare to illiterate households, but have no significant role 
in decision to adopt soil bound construction. Number of parcels for the household have negative 
and significant (at 10 percent) effects on decision to invest. The marginal effect shows that, as the 
number of parcel for the household increases by one the probability of adoption was decreased by 
9 percent.  The propensity to undertake investment was significantly higher in plots possessed for 
larger period of time than in plots with lower age, old age plots can be considered as indicator of 
secured plot. 
Steepness of the parcel has negative effects on the decision to construct conservation structures, 
with flat slope parcels being less likely to have investments relative to those with a moderate 
slope, which is consistent with Nyangena (2007),  Zikhali (2008) and Gebremedihn and Swinton 
(2003).this suggests as the extreme slopes households less likely to invest in steep slope may be 
due to less economic benefits and less likely to invest in flat slope due to more secure slope from 
soil erosions and flood. 
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Table4.11Impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificate on decision to adopt soil bound and stone 
terrace: probit estimation 
VARIABLES Adoption  Soil Bound   Adoption Stone Terraces  
         Coefficient  
(robust standard error) 
Marginal 
effect  
        Coefficient  
 (robust standard error) 
Marginal 
effect 
certi_type2 0.988(0.373)*** .0857 0.407(0.195)** .1266 
Sex of the household head, 
1=male, 0= female 
0.707(0.420)* .0932 -0.105(0.230) -.0327 
Age of household head -0.035(0.014)** -.0034 -0.006(0.009) -.0017 
Education of the household head, 
1=literate, 0=illiterate 
-0.656(0.424) -.0834 0.449(0.219)** .1484 
Log of number of adult males 0.085(0.388) .0077 -0.210(0.265) -.0641 
Log of number of adult female  -0.049(0.473) -.0045 0.038(0.270) .0115 
Number of dependants for the hh. -0.013(0.104) -.0012 -0.036(0.075) -.0111 
Tropical livestock unit -0.007(0.019) -.0007 0.009(0.009) 0027 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" 0.047(0.061) .0043 0.030(0.042) .0092 
Number of parcels -0.260(0.193) -.0237 -0.296(0.179)* -.0904 
Plot-home distance 0.138(0.117) .0126 0.065(0.065)        .0199 
Number of years plot possessed 0.046(0.023)** .0044 0.022(0.015) .0068 
Dummy of household have first 
stage certificate for his plot 
-0.592(0.422) -.0384 0.222(0.304) .0637 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel 0.996(0.761) .0465 -0.216(0.366) -.0613 
Soil type: Walka 0.646(0.468) .0738 0.041(0.231) .0125 
Soil type: Hutsa 0.505(0.470) .0355 0.175(0.297) .0555 
Slope: Flat -1.319(0.622)** -.0543 0.430(0.425) .1138 
Slope: steep -1.438(0.629)** -.2904 -0.116(0.398) -.0343 
Soil depth: Shallow 1.177(0.369)*** .1043 0.483(0.204)** .1503 
Soil depth:  Deep -0.777(0.338)** -.0735 -0.255(0.208) -.0777 
Dummy of Public investment 0.947(0.367)*** .0570 0.106(0.223) .0331 
Number of contact/visits  0.268(0.0819)*** .0245 0.027(0.044) .0083 
iner_invPro 3.292(0.350)*** .6838 0.113(0.215) .0339 
SWC_2003 0.003(0.001)*** .0003 0.013(0.006)**        .0038 
Young tree -0.002(0.001) -.0001 -0.001(0.001)        -.0001 
Constant -0.348(1.090)  -1.572(0.717)**  
Wald chi2(25) 158.08 - 43.08 - 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 - 0.013 - 
Pseudo R2 0.709 - 0.1862 - 
   Pseudo likelihood -46.577 - -126.958 - 
Observations 275 275 275 275 
Source: own survey, 2013             robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Taking perceived soil depth and soil type as an indicator of soil quality or degree of fertility, 
shallow soil depth are more likely to adopt soil conservation bound and stone terrace. This can be 
interpreted as, plots with shallow soil depth has 10.4 percent and 15 percent more probability to 
receive soil bound and stone terrace construction respectively. This indicates that households 
adopts this technology more likely on the plots more vulnerability to soil erosion to control the 
plot from flood and related disasters. Similarly, parcels with deep soil depth are less likely to 
receive soil bound and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. Not 
surprisingly this finding also supports the finding of Zikhali (2008).  Plots received public 
investment also had more likelihood of adopting soil bound as compared to the plots without 
public investments. This is consistent with the finding of Ghebru (2008).   
The results also show that, households that invest on their land establish and/or enhance land 
productivity. Specifically, those who believe investing on land enhance land productivity, more 
likely to invest in soil conservation and statistically significant at the extreme level. Existing SWC 
/ST assets on a plot are positively correlated with the probability of making new investments. 
This implies that additional investment is more likely to be made on plots with past soil 
conservation/stone terrace improvements. This may be due to understanding the benefits from 
such types of investment. Households contact with extension workers and visit different better 
performing farmers are more likely to adopt soil conservation bound in their plot.  
4.3.2.2 Impacts of Certificate on Intensity of Investment  
Third hypothesis states certificate may not have significant role on intensity of investment. In 
other words, other variables rather than certificates enhance intensity of investment conditioned 
that investment is made. To test this hypothesis the second stage of the double hurdle model, 
truncated regression model on the actual zeros and the predicted zeros from the probit regression 
was run on those who pass the first hurdle to measure intensity of adoption among adopters.   
The results for the intensity of soil conservation bound and stone terrace are presented in table 
4.12 below. The ancillary statistic/sigma which estimates standard error of the regression in the 
truncated regression was significant. 
The variable that affects adoption decision also affects for the intensity of adoption in different 
directions. The second level land holding certificate affects both intensity of investment of soil 
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bound and stone terrace negatively and significantly. Which is beyond the expected which 
indicate that decision to invest is higher in the certified households but among the household who 
pass the first hurdle (those who already invest) the intensity of investment is higher in the non 
certified households. The result that certificate had negative and significant effects on intensity of 
investment, suggests that even if the likely hood of adopting soil and water conservation bound 
and stone terrace is higher for the certified households, the intensity of investment is larger in the 
households from the non certified group conditioned that investment is taken place. So certificate 
affects decision to adopt and intensity of adoption in different directions, which is beyond the 
expectation. The adverse effects of the certificate on intensity of investments need deep 
investigation with more robust methods such as panel data.  
Taking household characteristics in to consideration, Age has negatively and significantly 
associated with intensity of investment on the truncated regression with the actual zero 
specification of soil bound and in all specifications of the stone terrace. Younger households may 
have more energy to engage in labor intensive conservation practices but decrease as age 
increases, which is consistent to the finding done by Kabubo (2010). Male headed households 
invest less amount of investment in both stone terrace and soil bound. It is statistically significant 
in both specification of stone terrace. This is unexpected but this may be either due to majority of 
the female headed households are from the non certified households or since women are worried 
about future land distribution and they are less secure than male and then, would be more likely to 
engage in medium level security enhancing factors such as stone terrace.  
Another surprising result related with was the relationship with intensity of investment and 
dependency ratio. Dependency ratio have significant and positive role on intensity of investment 
which is unexpected. But this may indicate as there is high level of child labor which is very 
common in third world countries like Ethiopia.  The effect on intensity of investment of stone 
terrace was negative, which indicates, having a lot of dependants is demanding in terms of labor 
hours spent taking care of them and this obviously implies less time spent monitoring parcels 
which expects lower level of investment and productivity in addition to this investment type 
needs matured age. Although the signs of the coefficient estimates are consistent with our 
expectations, there is no compelling statistical support for this hypothesis. 
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Table4.12impacts of certificate on intensity of use of stone terrace and soil bound: Truncated regression 
Variables Intensity of soil bound  
( truncated regression) 
 Intensity of Stone Terrace  
(Truncated Regression)  
Actual  non-zero values 
(Asymmetric standard 
error) 
Predicted non-zero values 
from probit (Asymmetric 
standard error) 
Actual  non-zero 
values (asymmetric 
standard error) 
Predicted non-zero values 
from probit (asymmetric 
standard error) 
certi_type2 -312.5(108.7)*** -306.9(107.5)*** -354.9(184.7)* -363.2(188.4)* 
sexhh -203.5(125.7) -215.8(125.5)* -265.5(138.2)* -263.1(138.1)* 
agehh -9.778(4.905)** -8.301(4.853)* 6.141(4.782) 6.102(4.853) 
educhh -105.7(117.3) -127.1(119.1) 117.6(123.3) 117.9(125.3) 
logadumalha -222.4(150.7) -207.3(148.6) -2.084(175.0) -6.579(177.4) 
logadufemha -95.37(145.3) -83.41(143.5) -112.1(117.2) -110.5(117.2) 
depratio -4.805(37.07) -1.497(36.77) 63.66(35.33)* 64.02(35.50)* 
tlu -0.319(5.317) -0.193(5.269) -2.748(10.28) -3.881(11.25) 
own_land -18.56(24.01) -16.97(23.95) -72.58(31.40)** -73.73(31.97)** 
no_parcel 161.7(82.66)* 179.6(83.06)** 256.7(82.97)*** 259.2(83.86)*** 
plotdist -41.95(34.87) -36.65(34.07) -131.8(76.26)* -135.6(78.04)* 
plot_age 27.08(9.414)*** 24.41(9.160)*** -7.461(12.13) -7.924(12.31) 
first_certi -50.68(143.7) -37.99(142.5) -91.53(228.3) -88.88(230.5) 
bak_type -4.449(154.0) -23.37(152.6) -320.1(297.2) -322.3(298.2) 
walk_type 44.80(121.6) 34.31(120.5) 26.18(143.0) 25.68(145.5) 
hut_type -605.1(206.0)*** -667.6(213.9)*** -503.5(416.7) -513.0(425.5) 
slop1 -546.3(261.4)** -640.1(272.4)** 484.3(540.9) 471.0(550.0) 
slop3 -107.9(221.4) -166.0(228.1) 433.8(494.3) 429.3(504.0) 
sd_shallow 127.2(102.7) 116.5(101.6) 281.0(150.4)* 281.1(151.8)* 
sd_deep 6.576(98.99) 0.347(98.10) -60.93(121.8) -57.04(123.3) 
public_inv 228.7(122.5)* 209.4(120.1)* 148.4(165.4) 155.7(169.2) 
extecona 66.60(23.43)*** 61.17(22.91)*** 6.525(35.30) 5.857(35.90) 
iner_invPro 186.8(161.7) 159.2(159.6) 204.6(166.6) 207.5(168.1) 
SWC_2003 1.306(0.233)*** 1.298(0.231)***   
youngtree 1.127(0.397)*** 1.287(0.407)*** -1.972(2.651) -1.983(2.699) 
STC_2003   2.153(0.678)*** 2.176(0.693)*** 
Constant 105.2(407.5) 176.8(411.5) -766.7(616.9) -740.4(625.9) 
Sigma 309.7(39.51)*** 307.9(39.16)*** 89.18(19.81)*** 88.76(19.83)*** 
Wald chi2(25) 38.17 38.19 80.73 95.31 
Prob>chi2 0.045 0.044 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood  -1224.56 -1223.53 -277.01 -329.74 
Observations 210 201 70 70 
Source: own survey, 2013                Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In line to the finding done by Gebremedihn and Swinton (2003), own cultivated land size has 
negatively associated with intensity of investment and consistent result in both specifications of 
both investment type, but it lacks the statistical significance in the soil bound model. This 
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indicates as land size increase intensity of investment at lesser proportion. This is consistent to the 
hypothesis that more land may reduce the need to conserve land. Reverse effect is also observed 
on the number of parcels for the households. Households having large number of parcels 
(fragmented plot) has had less probability of adoption investment but invests more meters 
conditioned that investment decision is made. This is consistently significant in all specifications 
of the truncated model. 
Annex eight and nine in show the intensity of soil bound and stone terrace (level) investment 
using the kernel density graph of plots with and without certificate of the matched plots. A two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions  for intensity of 
investment for soil bound and stone terrace was highly Significant (P=0.000 and 0.04, 
respectively) indicating that the distributions were different. This supports the finding of certified 
and non certified households have significant difference in intensity of investment conditioned 
that investment is made.  
 
 Distance from homesteaded to plot was also negatively associated with intensity of investment 
but only significant in the stone terrace model. This indicate the opportunity cost of investing in 
such distance plot may be high due to the issue of security (plots at far distance from the 
homesteaded are where frequent land redistribution and may catching to large scale investors 
often occurs) and the transaction cost of traveling to plot (which already found in the tenure 
security part that, distance plots are less secured as compare to home stead plot) in addition to the 
time the owner lost traveling. This is consistent to past litterateurs, near plots get supervision from 
family (see Gebremedihn and Swinton, 2003; Wogayehu and Drake, 2003 and Kabubo, 2007). 
The intensity of undertake investment of soil bound was significantly higher in plots possessed 
for larger period of time than in plots with lower age, which can be considered as indicator of 
secured plot. Plot with hutsa type of slope receives lower investment in terms of investment as 
comper to mekayh soil type. It is also statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. 
Which suggests that, plots with less fertile soils (hutsa type consider as poor soil quality as 
compared to other type) that are expected to give low return(high opportunity cost of investing) 
and have lower marginal productivity loss of not investing more.  
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Plots with flat slope have significantly lower level of soil bound construction as comper to plots 
with moderate slope. It is consistent to the expectation and significant at 5 percent level of 
significance. This may be due to lower economic benefits of investing in flat slope as compare to 
the opportunity cost of the area or size of plot lost for this purpose. But plots with steep slope also 
have the same correlation with intensity of investment as flat slope but not significant, may be due 
to higher opportunity cost of investing such investment in steep slope type plot. This shows such 
type of investment take into consideration the relevance (economic gain from investing) and the 
opportunity cost of investing such investment in decision to invest how much meters.  
Taking soil depth in to consideration, shallow soil depth have positive and significant role on 
intensity of investing stone terrace. A plot with shallow soil depth receives 281 meters more stone 
terrace than plot with moderate slope. This indicates, when soil depth is shallow, farmers have 
higher incentive to prevent soil loss and are willing to adopt large intensity of conservation 
technologies, as there is significant benefit from soil conservation. The empirical studies by 
(Pender and Kerr, 1998 and Shively, 1999) support this argument. 
Public investment received plots and intensity of investment have also positive correlation in both 
investment types. It is also significant at 10 percent level of significance in case of intensity of 
soil bound construction. Households’ receiving advice from the extension workers and visits are 
performing average of more than 61 meters of soil bound on his own plot. It is statistically 
significant at least at 1 percent level of significance.  
Past investment also encourages households to invest more. This may be come as a result of the 
well understanding of productivity benefits of soil conservation bound and stone terrace 
construction from past experiences. Plots with trees planted before the program participation 
which can be considered as better tenure security invests more soil bound but less stone terrace. 
Which indicates soil bound conservation is more of productivity enhancing factor and need more 
security to invest more and statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance as compare to 
stone terrace (some researchers in the literature considered stone terrace as security enhancing 
factors). 
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4.3.2.3 Impacts of Certificate on Tree Growing on Private Plot  
Table 4.13 shows impacts of this parcel based second level landholding certificate on investment 
in tenure security enhancing factor (visible investment). The results were presented as numbers of 
tree seedlings using Tobit model with actual certificate variable, year with certificate and different 
predicted certificate variables separately to compare the results. The rationale behind for using 
year with certificate as alternative was the nature of the program. The second level land holding 
certificates took place in the study area in a fairly short period of time. The investment 
enhancement effect that may have accrued due to the land certification that has reduced plot level 
tenure insecurity is not likely to appear immediately after receiving land certificates, the 
perceptions of stronger tenure security must sink in first  and then gradually they will start to 
affect plot level behavioral decisions such as tree planting. To capture this gradual effect, we used 
the time period (in years) that the individual households have possessed their land certificates. 
This captures also the variation in timing of allocation of certificates among the certified 
households to critically identify the impacts.  
We hypothesized that investment on land (visible investments like tree planting) is higher on plots 
without certificates to enhance tenure security than with certificates. Table 4.13 shows that the 
actual certificate variable, year with certificate and different specification of predicted certificate 
variable via number of tree seedlings are tested. The certificate variable in both specifications had 
no significant effect on number of tree seedlings planted in private plot. Although the signs of the 
coefficient estimates are consistent with our expectations, there is no compelling statistical 
support for this hypothesis. This may be due to the program is recent and such types of 
investments  needs time to decide in addition to restrictions in tree plants, especially eucalyptus 
trees, on arable land. We lack statistically significant evidence to accept the alternative hypothesis 
of more trees in non certified plots.  
 
In addition to certificate variables, other variables also affect households to plant more tree plants. 
The result suggests that age of the household head affects tree planting negatively. It is also 
statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. Households with more number of parcels 
are plant more tree as compared to lower number of parcels. This may be due to diversification of 
households to some of the parcels to tree and the other for crop production.  
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Table4.13Impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificates on tree seedlings using Tobit model with 
different certificate variables  
VARIABLES Tobit  
 year with 
certificate  
Tobit  
Actual 
certificate  
Tobit  
predicted 
certi1 
Tobit  
predicted 
certi2 
Year with certificate  -41.10    
 (29.01)    
Actual certificate use for his plot  -65.78   
  (53.50)   
certi1   -82.00  
   (57.43)  
certi2    -82.16 
    (57.42) 
Sex of the household head, 1=male, 0= 
female 
27.34 31.66 28.70 28.49 
(73.06) (73.19) (72.99) (72.99) 
Age of household head -4.922** -4.951** -4.830* -4.838* 
(2.459) (2.469) (2.463) (2.464) 
Education of the household head, 1=literate, 
0=illiterate 
25.18 22.26 23.08 23.12 
(60.27) (60.46) (60.29) (60.29) 
logadumalha -8.202 -6.338 -5.628 -5.597 
(67.85) (68.01) (67.75) (67.74) 
logadufemha 91.59 87.09 87.91 87.77 
(71.88) (72.02) (71.69) (71.68) 
logtluha -8.248 -8.581 -9.087 -9.078 
(32.54) (32.72) (32.61) (32.60) 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" 1.809 1.859 1.767 1.765 
(12.60) (12.69) (12.61) (12.61) 
Number of years plot possessed -0.905 -1.252 -1.324 -1.322 
(4.108) (4.102) (4.101) (4.100) 
Number of parcel  104.6** 108.4** 104.9** 104.9** 
(42.99) (43.17) (42.99) (42.98) 
Average distance from plot to homestead -34.05* -34.86* -34.96* -34.97* 
(18.34) (18.41) (18.34) (18.34) 
Dummy of household have first stage 
certificate  
70.66 76.75 77.12 77.26 
(77.35) (77.75) (77.47) (77.47) 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel 99.32 96.53 95.94 96.01 
(91.75) (92.13) (91.84) (91.82) 
Soil type: Walka 80.00 77.39 74.43 74.38 
(67.16) (67.65) (67.64) (67.63) 
Soil type: Hutsa -50.52 -51.90 -53.22 -53.09 
(90.51) (90.58) (90.50) (90.48) 
Slope: Flat -253.6** -259.7** -255.5** -255.4** 
(119.1) (119.1) (119.0) (119.0) 
Slope: Steep -122.3 -126.5 -122.0 -122.1 
(119.1) (119.2) (119.1) (119.1) 
Soil depth: Shallow 72.24 72.49 70.65 70.60 
(57.37) (57.57) (57.46) (57.46) 
Soil depth:  Deep -26.24 -27.28 -26.94 -26.98 
(56.76) (56.88) (56.75) (56.74) 
Interaction variable  185.0*** 185.9*** 184.9*** 185.0*** 
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(56.02) (56.28) (56.01) (56.00) 
Number of Young tree 0.628*** 0.620*** 0.627*** 0.626*** 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.210) (0.210) 
Number of Natural tree 0.830*** 0.839*** 0.830*** 0.829*** 
 (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) 
Number of contacts with DA and visits   34.10*** 33.88*** 34.18*** 34.14*** 
(12.59) (12.70) (12.60) (12.59) 
Constant -108.6 -105.9 -96.67 -96.02 
 (199.7) (200.7) (200.4) (200.4) 
Sigma  310.8*** 311.7*** 310.8*** 310.8*** 
(25.77) (25.84) (25.76) (25.76) 
LR chi2(23) 66.87 66.37 88.78 60.48 
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -743.482 -743.733 -761.392 -761.382 
Pseudo R2 0.0430 0.0427 0.0382 0.0382 
Observations 275 275 279 279 
Source: own survey, 2013                Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In line to the finding of Mekonnen et al. (2009) in the same region on the impacts of first stage 
certificate on tree planting and Lunduka (2008) from Malawi, Distance from plot to home also 
affects tree planting negatively and significantly. This may be due to risk of theft, tenure 
insecurity and high cost of monitoring treatments. Plot with flat slope invest less amount of tree as 
compared to plots with medium slope. This is significant and negative suggests that flat slope 
may not be economically feasible since it is comfortable for crop production and farmers in the 
study area plant significantly less number of tree as compared to plots with medium slope type. 
The interaction variable of those households perceives tree planting enhance tenure security and 
plant tree invest more. It is significant at 5 percent level of significance. This suggests of the 
households who plants tree majority perceives tree planting enhance tenure security.  
The other driving forces for the intensity of tree planting are number of young trees (tree plants 
before the program introduce), which affects households to plant more tree and it is strongly 
significant at the extreme level. This indicates that, even though a plot has trees planted before 
households who have experience on tree planting need to invests more tree since they knows the 
benefits. This is due to the economic benefits of tree planting which is consistent to the finding of 
Holden et al. (2003) and Jabber and Pender (2000) which says tree planting especially Eucalyptus 
may be the most profitable crop to grow for rural households in Ethiopia. The role of local norms 
and attitudes towards tree planting may differ from the rules stated by the law also. Similar 
finding which is consistent to that of Mekonnen et al. (2011), contacted with development agents 
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and visited also encourage farmers to invest more tree as comper to those not contact and visits 
and to those contacted less. This may be the results of knowledge share and advice received from 
experts and well experienced farmers.  
The number of natural trees on the plot was used as explanatory variable by assuming it have 
crowding in (that is it would not be necessary for a household to plant trees when the plot already 
has natural tree) or crowding out effects (may encourage farmers to plant more since they can 
understand well about the benefits from tree or the plot may not comfortable for crop since tree 
exists around that). Amazingly, the variable is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent 
level of significance which is consistent to the one found by Lunduka (2008) in Malawi. This 
indicates that the more natural trees in own plot, the higher the probability of planting trees. From 
this one can conclude that, even though a plot has natural trees, a household needs to plant its own 
trees that it can show to claim ownership of the land.  
4.3.4 Productivity Impacts of Certificate  
To test the hypothesis that, whether second level land holding certificate enhance productivity  or 
not this  study approached using non-parametric matching and parametric OLS models and 
integrated this by estimating parametrically on the matched sample. Different instrumental 
variable estimation methods are also reported to check the robustness of the results. To match the 
program participants with non participants, the propensity score presented in Table 4.10 are used. 
Table 4.14 presents results computed from the non parametric estimation. The columns we are 
interested in to evaluate the impact indicators are labeled as ATT and t-value. Land productivity 
in value term is converted in to log form. The results from the table show that land productivity 
on plots with certificate is higher than on plots without certificate except in the reduce matching 
but not significant. Shows there is no significant difference of productivity among plots with 
certificate and without certificate. This may came due to two reasons; the first one is Raya Azebo 
wereda was highly affected by drought for the last two years and the program is also recent and 
investment on land to enhance land productivity need time observe.  
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Table4.0.14 ATT estimation results of different matching methods of log of yield per hectare of plots with and without 
certificate bootstrapped standard errors  
Matching method No. Treated  No. Control  ATT Std.Err t-value  
Stratification 116 159 0.979 0.548 1.785* 
Nearest neighbor  116 72 0.836 0.790 1.058 
Radius  112 153 0.515 0.624 0.825 
Kernel  116 159 0.821 0.534 1.537 
   Source own survey, 2013 
The yield distribution for plots with and without a certificate was presented in Figure 4.3 below. 
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions of yield per hectare 
was not Significant (P=0. 681) indicating that the distributions were similar. Which was 
consistent to the non parametric estimation of certificate have positive but not significant 
association with productivity. 
Figure 4 Kernel density graph of log of yield per hectare for plots with and without certiﬁcation (matched sample) 
Source: own survey, 2013 
 
Next we approached the analysis using different alternative specifications of parametric 
regression models results of the parametric estimation presents in Table 4.15 containing the actual 
certificate variable, year with certificate variable and an alternative instrumental estimation of the 
certificate.  
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Our instrumental variable estimation of impacts of certificate on productivity follows Ghebru et 
al. (2008) with little modifications to check the results with different specifications.  The results 
are summarized in Table 4.15 below, shows the second stage land holding certificate has had a 
significant and positive impact on land productivity in all specifications except in the last residual 
certificate, which is positive but not significant. This may indicate that the residual certificate 
variable failed to predict well. The direct OLS estimation (on the matched households)  and 
instrumental estimation(on the full sample)  give us very cloth results in terms of magnitude, sign 
and level of significance, this may be considered as evidence of the certification program is 
random, which means plot and household level characteristics does not matters for participation.  
Table4.15 productivity impacts of second level land holding certificate  
VARIABLES OLS(Actual 
certificate)a 
IV(Actual 
certificate)b 
OLS  predicted 
certificate c 
OLS on predicted 
certificated  
IV regression  
(Certificate residual)e 
certi_type2 0.917** 1.046**    
 (0.464) (0.458)    
certi1   1.147**   
   (0.507)   
certi2    1.036**  
    (0.477)  
Rcerti3     -0.839 
     (1.854) 
Sex of the household head, 1= 
male, 0= female 
0.918 0.973* 0.964* 0.964* 0.864 
(0.575) (0.547) (0.575) (0.576) (0.580) 
Age of household head -0.0388* -0.0415** -0.0411** -0.0412** -0.0381* 
(0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0203) 
Education of the household 
head, 1=literate, 0=illiterate 
0.226 0.295 0.299 0.295 0.250 
(0.534) (0.504) (0.530) (0.531) (0.535) 
Number of adult male's for the 
household 
0.280 0.269 0.267 0.269 0.252 
(0.221) (0.209) (0.220) (0.220) (0.222) 
Number of adult female for the 
household 
-0.149 -0.145 -0.149 -0.146 -0.150 
(0.230) (0.219) (0.231) (0.231) (0.233) 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" 0.585 0.377 0.385 0.376 0.295 
(0.390) (0.342) (0.360) (0.360) (0.361) 
Average distance from plot to 
homestead 
0.00295 -0.156 -0.155 -0.158 -0.175 
(0.163) (0.136) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) 
Number of years plot possessed 0.0240 0.0320 0.0312 0.0318 0.0337 
(0.0357) (0.0338) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0359) 
Dummy of household have first 
stage certificate 
0.594 0.733 0.722 0.731 0.779 
(0.693) (0.652) (0.686) (0.686) (0.692) 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel 0.585 0.510 0.508 0.503 0.483 
(0.836) (0.790) (0.831) (0.831) (0.839) 
Soil type: Walka 0.178 0.124 0.131 0.121 0.00742 
(0.577) (0.547) (0.576) (0.576) (0.579) 
Soil type: Hutsa 0.767 0.654 0.671 0.660 0.592 
(0.738) (0.695) (0.731) (0.732) (0.738) 
Slope: Flat -1.652 -1.393 -1.396 -1.382 -1.141 
(1.054) (0.985) (1.036) (1.037) (1.040) 
Slope: Steep -1.003 -0.678 -0.697 -0.673 -0.429 
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(1.022) (0.964) (1.014) (1.015) (1.017) 
Soil depth: Shallow -0.871* -0.982** -0.977** -0.980** -1.026** 
(0.494) (0.468) (0.492) (0.492) (0.496) 
Soil depth:  Deep 0.943* 0.815* 0.810* 0.812* 0.793 
(0.486) (0.457) (0.481) (0.481) (0.486) 
Number of oxen for the 
household 
0.391* 0.469** 0.478** 0.468** 0.387** 
(0.200) (0.187) (0.197) (0.196) (0.195) 
Tropical livestock unit for the 
household 
-0.0297 -0.0265 -0.0271 -0.0267 -0.0236 
(0.0274) (0.0260) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0276) 
Remittance received 1.301** 1.349** 1.313** 1.349** 1.418** 
(0.633) (0.601) (0.633) (0.633) (0.638) 
Number of contacts with DA 
and visits   
-0.143 -0.183* -0.170 -0.173 -0.105 
(0.116) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) 
Cooperative Members  4.021*** 4.096*** 4.097*** 4.101*** 4.006*** 
(0.468) (0.440) (0.462) (0.463) (0.465) 
FFW participate 0.0147 -0.0980 -0.111 -0.119 -0.0896 
(0.488) (0.460) (0.484) (0.485) (0.490) 
Dummy manure use for plot, 
1=yes, 0=otherwise 
0.968** 0.937** 0.959** 0.936** 1.012** 
(0.459) (0.436) (0.458) (0.459) (0.462) 
Dummy Public investment 
received plot, 1=Yes, 0=No 
0.963* 1.140** 1.126** 1.140** 1.188** 
(0.542) (0.512) (0.539) (0.539) (0.544) 
Fertilizer used in value 
(Ethiopian Birr) 
-0.00034 -0.00035 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.00026 
(0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00027) (0.0003) (0.00027) 
Improved seed used in value 
(ETB) 
-0.00064 -0.0005 -0.000581 -0.0005 -0.0006 
(0.00078) (0.00075) (0.0008) (0.00079) (0.0008) 
Constant 1.527 1.637 1.580 1.637 1.885 
(1.479) (1.384) (1.458) (1.457) (1.466) 
F(25, 251) 6.17 6.15 6.19 6.17 5.90 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 275 279 279 279 279 
R-squared 0.403 0.397 0.400 0.399 0.388 
Note:  a   OLS estimation using actual certificate variable on the matched households  
            b  Standard IV estimation using  year with certificate and village dummy as instruments (full sample) 
            c two stage estimation(predict certificate from  observable household characteristics using the linear probability 
model  then using this predicted  certificate   in estimation of the outcome equation). 
           d   same as model in c but predict certificate from both plot and household characteristics 
           e   the residual =the actual certificate – predicted certificate from model d(time invariant household and plot 
characteristics ) used as weak instrument  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: own survey, 2013 
 
Overall, the above result confirms that certified households have significant gains from 
certification in terms of productivity. This is consistent to descriptive part and with the finding by 
Bezabih et al. (2012) in Amhara region in Ethiopia, Ghebru et al. (2008) in north Ethiopia and by 
Deininger et al. (2011) in Amhara region of Ethiopia. 
 
The positive and significant (except OLS) coefficient for sex of the household head indicates that 
male headed households are operating optimally as comper to their counterparts. The lower 
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productivity of females also indicates that female headed households may lack the necessary 
factors of production to work their farms efficiently. Other variable that were consistently 
significant and with negative sign, is age of the household head, which shows older households 
are less productive. Litterateurs related with also supports this finding (see Mintewab Bezabih and 
Stein Holden, 2010; Lopez, 1997) 
Of the plot characteristic, soil depth used as proxy for soil fertility, is important determinant of 
productivity. Deep soil type, which can be considered as fertile soil, have positive and significant 
correlation with yield whereas, plots with shallow soil depth associated with lower yields. The 
number of oxen for the household is positive determinant of productivity. This may be due to land 
size in Raya Azebo was larger as compared to the other parts of Tigray and large number of oxen 
may be relevant to cultivate plot on time and the increase productivity in one hand and the income 
received through renting oxen, which is common in Raya Azebo, which may have positive impact 
with productivity through income effect. This is also consistent to the one done by Mintewab 
Bezabih and Stein Holden (2010).   
Other variable that was consistently significant with positive sign was plots with public 
investment. This indicates plots that receives public investment have better productivity level as 
compared to plots without public investment, suggests that investment such as soil bound or stone 
terraces have significant role on fostering land productivity.  
 
The positive coefficients for the input variable manure shows that plots that use manure are more 
productive as compared to plot that does not use manure. This is expected and supports the 
finding done by Bezabih et al. (2012). Households who receive national and international 
remittance also performed better productivity. This is significant at 5 percent level of significance. 
Similar effect was observed from cooperative members. That household who was members of the 
farmer’s association/cooperative performs better productivity as compared to their counterparts. 
This may be due to members are receiving different agricultural equipment, modern inputs and 
technical supports easily, nearest to their home stated with fair price which enhances productivity.  
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Finally we run the productivity model by incorporating the all specifications of investment 
equation to test the indirect impacts of certificate through this investment variable. Here two stage 
estimation, LPM in the first stage model since the coefficients of the predicted residuals from the 
first stage estimation are used. The other right hand variables includes plot and household 
characteristics and first stage models with and without certification are check. The predicted 
residuals from the different specifications of the regressions are included as explanatory variable 
in second stage estimation to check the simultaneity of the investment variables. Results shows 
that all the predicted residuals investment variables except in stone terrace which shows 
statistically significant which are an indication of no problem of simultaneity. Results of all 
investment variables and only the exogenous soil bound and tree seedlings investment variables 
with and without certificate are reported in the annex (9).  
 
Investment variable in all specifications are not statistically significant except the endogenous 
stone terrace even after controlling for endogeneity of investment. The residual generated from 
the first-stage investment equation is also not significantly different from zero except the residual 
from the stone terrace estimation. These results imply that investments on farmlands appear not to 
enhance tenure security in Tigray and that the reverse causation of tenure security impacting on 
investment seems non-existent.   
 
With these specifications certificate variable remained insignificant even if it is positive except in 
the specification where certificate variable are excluded in the first stage estimation. The 
parameter values for the certification variable were not only insignificant but also reduced in both 
specifications of these models indicating that some of the positive effect from the certification on 
land productivity may have come through these investment variables. The additional effect from 
certification may have been in terms of more use of variable inputs on plots with certificate which 
is beyond the scope of the study. Result details are in annex 9. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion  
This study tried to explore the impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificate on 
tenure security, investment and land productivity in Tigrai, northern Ethiopia. 
The government of Ethiopia together with development partners has been undertaking field 
testing exercises to improve and update the previous land certification program in Raya Azebo 
and Tahtay Adyabo wereda of Tigray Regional State since January 2009.  Community-level data 
shows that total of 13,815 households (12,299 from Raya Azebo and the remaining 1516 
households from Tahtay Adyabo) and 25,690 parcels receive the second stage certificate. 
The Land certification in Tigray/Ethiopia was different from land title programs that have been 
implemented in many other countries. The rights that are provided by the Ethiopian land 
certificates are much more restrictive as the land is still state property, the right to sell or 
mortgage land is prohibited by law and the right to rent out the land is no more than three 
consecutive year’s duration only and applies to maximum half of the farm size. The user right 
may also be withdrawn from households migrating for more than two years and from households 
that fail to cultivate the land. Still, it appears that these land certificates have contributed to 
enhance the tenure security of households and this appears to have stimulated certain types of 
investment and land productivity. 
Based on the empirical evidence emanating from this study, the following conclusion can be 
extracted and summarized as follows: 
Our result shows that, respondents were clearer as to whether certification would protect them 
against future land redistribution or land taking by local government or in the course of urban 
expansion and agricultural investment. 86% of respondents were eager to get their certificates 
quickly so as to be able to use them in court and thus bolster the case for getting compensation. 
Similarly, 88% of the respondents perceives certificate improve women’s position and tenure 
security, 82 % of respondents perceived that certificate make land market easy and secure. 
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Considerable households of the non certified respondents, 46.4% percent state that it was 
impossible for a counterclaim to challenge their claim. Whereas, 83 percent of the respondents 
from the treated group can considered as secure enough since they can counterclaim for owner 
ship of the plot. 
In relation to investment in improving the existing conservation, Most of the household from both 
groups (73%) improve the existing soil bound or stone terrace. Majority of the households believe 
investment on land (soil bound and stone terraces) enhance land productivity. 62 percent of the 
household from the control group and 89 percent from treated group adopt soil bound in the last 
18 months and it is statistically significant and consistent to the hypotheses. Moreover, 19 and 34 
percent of respondent households from the control group and the treated group respectively, have 
adopted new stone terrace in the last 18 months. There is no significant difference in intensity of 
soil bound and stone terrace constructed structure in the control and treated group similarly, 82 
percent of Non-certified households and 76 percent of certified household plot, receive public 
investment. 83 percent of the Non-certified households and 77.7 percent of certified household 
perceive tree planting enhance tenure security and majority of the households have shown their 
interest to plant tree in their plot even if it is legally prohibited.  
Total values of output produced per hectare, shows that yield appear to be higher on plots with 
certificate than on plots without certificate even if the difference is not very large. 
The results from the econometric estimation suggest that second level land holding certificate is 
meant to enhance perceived tenure security. This is consistent to the literatures done on impacts 
of first stage land certificate on tenure security in different parts of Ethiopia and in line to the 
descriptive evidence that points majority of the households from the treated village have better 
perceived tenure security as compared to households from non-treated villages. From this one can 
conclude that second level land holding certificate have significant role on building of the 
perception of tenure security in countries like Ethiopia with land redistribution experienced under 
successive governments and having proclamination that guarantees for every individual over the 
age of 18 years will have access to rural land if he/she desires to engage.  
Using a double hurdle model, this estimates adoption decision and intensity of adoption 
separately. Since the alternative Tobit model rejected in favour of the double hurdle model, we 
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found that, second level land holding certificate pointed to statistically significant impacts on 
decision to adopt soil conservation bound and stone terrace. the treated households has had 8.5 
percent more likely to investing soil bound and 12.6 percent more likely to investing stone terrace 
as compared to the households from the control village. This finding also supports the finding 
done by Ghebru et al. (2008) and Deininger et al. (2011). Surprisingly, the second level land 
holding certificate affects intensity of investment for both soil bound and stone terrace negatively 
and significantly, which indicate that decision to invest is higher in the certified households but 
among the household who pass the first hurdle (those who already invest) the intensity of 
investment is higher in the non certified households. 
The results of different alternative certificate variable via number of tree seedlings shows that, the 
certificate variable in both specifications had no significant effect on number of tree seedlings 
planted in private plot. Although the signs of the coefficient estimates are consistent with the 
expectation, there is no compelling statistical support for this hypothesis. This may be related to 
the law restrictions on tree planting on arable land, especially for eucalyptus in addition to the 
recentness of the program. 
Results from both parametric and non parametric estimation of productivity function indicates 
that the second level landholding certificate have had positive impact on land productivity in non 
parametric and all specifications of parametric except in the last residual certificate, which is 
positive but not significant. But in case of the non parametric estimation it lacks statistical 
significance in majority of the matching estimators, this may be due to matching drops 
respondents who are not matched to the treated households and may not be representative of the 
population. This may indicate that the residual certificate and the non parametric estimation failed 
to predict well. Overall, the parametric result confirms that certified households have significant 
gains from certification in terms of productivity. 
The results of this research not only will allow policymakers to make changes as individual 
programs evolve but also will provide lessons for countries like Ethiopia  that are struggling to 
make land policies more effective. 
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5.2 Recommendations  
Based on the finding of the study the following policy recommendations are given  
 The results from the probit regression of tenures security shows that second level land 
holding certificate have significant impact in households to feel certain to cultivate the same 
field in future and negative and significant impact for fear of land taking. It is also clear that 
these regions are working towards increased (rural) tenure security in an innovative way. The 
first phase is progressing so quickly, that it has already changed the land administration 
scenery in the region. And although some more attention should be given to the updating 
process started in some piloting to address over the region, develop better security among 
rural households of the region in particular and all over the country in general. 
 
 Results from the descriptive analysis and own observation indicates that the main 
determinant of insecurity are the memory of redistribution of land in the recent past as 
government continuously changes and the provision in the land laws that anyone aged 18 
years and above has a right to get rural land freely are the basic sources of land tenure 
insecurity and anxiety among the rural population.  Clear legislation in the regional 
proclamations that there will be no further forced redistribution of land and restriction of 
applicability of 18 years and above aged of free land in fully settled and utilized areas and 
fair valuation of land and lengthy and adequate compensation for land taken under the 
powers of eminent domain and for private investors, publicizing this widely will enhance 
tenure security much more effectively rather than land certification alone.  
 
 The Results in this study also demonstrates that, the second level land holding certificate 
pointed to statistically significant and economically meaningful impacts on decision to adopt 
soil conservation bound, stone terrace and land productivity.  We therefore, call for policy 
measures in the proposed regional rural land registration and surviving programme that will 
enhance tenure security to facilitate investment in agricultural lands since individuals are 
more likely to invest in land if their plot is registered and certified. Such policies should 
focus on establishing a more effective and efficient land registration and certification system 
that will remove the bottlenecks in the land investment and enhance individual tenure 
security. 
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 Results from the truncated estimation show also intensity of adoption was negatively 
associated with certificate. This may be due to other potential variables rather than 
certificates are important on intensity of investment. Thus, in line to certification processes 
rural developments policies should give attention to other potential determinants of intensity 
of investment, which are highlighted by the large number of statistically significant variables 
in the models, to achieve the dual objectives. Polices should aim not only on encouraging 
farmers decision to adopt but also encouraging on intensity of investment. 
 
 Furthermore, Tree growing was negatively but not statistically significant associated with 
certificate in Tigray and this may be related to the law restrictions on tree planting on arable 
land, especially for eucalyptus and the program is recent. Nevertheless, these restrictions 
have not been able to prevent the positive incentive of investment on tree planting in the non 
certified villages which shows the issue of insecurity is more sensitive than the laws behind 
the restrictions. There is also a reason to question the rationale of restricting such tree 
planting on very marginal arable land where production of annual crops is likely to be less 
sustainable than growing of trees and where tree production is much more profitable than 
crop production. So policies related with restriction of such investment should take in to 
consideration the comparative advantages of tree planting and should be flexible. 
 
 User fees, however minimal, should be introduced so that people value the certificates and 
the security they afford them. Perhaps, the willingness to pay in average was around 54 birr 
and payment norm prepared by the ministry of agriculture was 61 birr per parcel (which is 
around 162 birr per household) which is difficult to cover, but still partially offset the initial 
investment in land certification and recover the costs of maintaining the cadastre and make it 
sustainable over the long-term is better. 
 
 In general, this  study confirms  that tenure security and investment benefits are observed, 
especially as other factors, which allow such effects to materialize (e.g., household 
characteristics, and plot level characteristics), come into play, they can easily be undermined 
if the beneficiaries’ lose confidence in the value of the certificates. This is highlighted by the 
85 
 
large number of statistically significant variables in the models, each marginally contributing 
to tenure security and the overall decision to invest, as well as to the decision on how much 
to invest and land productivity. A lesson for policymakers is that major changes in tenure 
security, land conservation investments and land productivity will require attention to all 
these factors because no single factor can be used as a major policy leverage instrument. 
 
   Some of the variables such as land taking by the government whether for urban expansion, 
outside investors, or internal redistribution without land title certificates to determine 
compensation levels or award compensation could jeopardize the credibility of the 
certificates. On a more technical level, failure to keep registration of land titles up to date 
would have the same effect and can be directly influenced by government policies and 
programs. 
5.3 Issues for Further Research  
Additional research is needed to determine whether such programs have affected tenure security, 
investment and land productivity. 
Certification can potentially also affect productivity indirectly via effects on the use of modern 
input and manure. In other words, modern input use and manure may be correlated with the 
certification variables. This needs deep investigation and should be addressed in future research. 
It is, however, outside the scope of this paper 
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Annex 1. Description of variables used for regression analysis:  
variable name                   Description  
 certi_type2  Dummy of household have PBSLLH certificate for his plot 
 Certificate year  Year with certificate 
         Dependent variables 
Tenure  Security indicators  
 cert_after5  certain owner feels certain to cultivate the same field after 5 years, 1=Yes, 0= No 
 fear_lgrab  Dummy owner fear his land may taken by the gov't at any time 
Investment indicators  
 Treeseedlings  Number of tree planted after certification(last 18 months) 
 deci_invSWC  Dummy adopt soil bound 
 inte_swc  Density of soil bounds constructed (meters) 
 ST_adopt  Dummy adopt stone terrace 
 int_ST  Intensity Stone terrace constructed (meters) 
Productivity indicator  
 totvalha  total value of output per ha 
 logtotvalha  log of total value of output per ha own plot 
Household characteristics  
 sexhh  Sex of the household head, 1= male, 0= female 
 agehh  Age of household head 
 age2  Age square of household head 
 educhh  Education of the household head, 1=literate, 0=illiterate 
 adumale  Number of adult male's for the household 
 adufem  Number of adult female for the household 
 depratio  Dependence ratio 
 own_land  Own farm size in "Tsimdi" 
 oxen  Number of oxen for the household 
 tlu  Tropical livestock unit for the household 
plot level characteristics /factors  
 no_parcel  Number of parcels for the household 
 plotdist  Average distance from plot to homestead 
 plot_age  Plot age 
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 public_inv  Dummy of whether there has been public conservation on the plot 
 first_certi  Dummy of household have first stage certificate for his plot 
 bak_type  Soil type: Ba'ekel 
 walk_type  Soil type: Walka 
 hut_type  Soil type: Hutsa 
 mek_type  Soil type: Mekeyih 
 slop1  Slope: Flat slope 
 slop2  Slope: moderate slope 
 slop3  Slope: steep slope 
 sd_shallow  Soil depth: Shallow 
 sd_medium  Soil depth: Medium 
 sd_deep  soil depth: Deep 
Tenure security variables 
 ts_improv  Status of tenure security in the last 2 years, 1=Improve, 0=No change,  
 likely_coucliam  -1=Reduce plot, 1=impossible, 2=Unlikely, 3=likely 
 land_redi  Dummy Owner feel land redistribution taken next five years 
Interaction variables  
 intetree_TS  interaction variable 
 iner_invPro  interaction variable 
Socio –institutional   factors  
 extecona  Number of visits and community meeting called by DA hh attend   
 cooperative  Cooperative  member Dummy, 1= member,0= otherwise 
 ffw_parti  FFW participate dummy, 1= if benefiters, 0=otherwise  
Input variables  
 remittance  Remittance received  
 manure  Dummy manure use for plot, 1=yes, 0=otherwise  
 fertvalue  Fertilizer used in value (Ethiopian Birr)  
 seedvalue  Improved seed used in value (Ethiopian Birr) 
 naturaltree  Number of natural trees in the plot 
 youngtree  Number of young  trees in the plot 
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Annex 2. Overview of Variables Used In the Analysis with Basic Statistics 
               Variables Full sample  Non certified  Certified  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Treatment variable  .4157706 .49374 0 0 1 0 
Year with certificate .7221027 .916518 0 0 1.732471 .5156856 
owner feels certain to cultivate the same field after 5 
years, 1=Yes, 0=No  
.5125448 .5007408 .2638037 .4420522 .862069 .3463236 
Dummy owner fear his land may taken by the gov't at 
any time 
.4695341 .4999678 .7177914 .4514613 .1206897 .3271796 
Number of tree seedlings planted last 18 months 88.95341 201.9558 111.1288 238.1641 57.7931 130.4432 
Dummy adopt soil bound .7311828 .4441414 .6196319 .4869734 .887931 .3168198 
soil bounds constructed (meters) 160.3297 227.4547 165.6871 244.6787 152.8017 201.5741 
Dummy adopt stone terrace .2544803 .4363514 .190184 .3936557 .3448276 .4773741 
Stone terrace construction (meters) 12.39427 69.96553 11.14724 81.43362 14.14655 49.8656 
Total value yields per hectare (in Ethiopia birr) 3201.835 6866.349 2852.395 7004.793 3692.859 6665.974 
Log of value of output in hectare  4.180672 4.17859 4.001161 4.144456 4.432916 4.231171 
Sex of the household head, 1=male, 0= female .8028674 .3985482 .8220859 .383619 .7758621 .4188225 
Age of household head 47.83513 13.54136 46.79755 13.14833 49.2931 14.00249 
Age of household head square  2470.91 1403.044 2361.828 1349.727 2624.19 1466.915 
Education of household head dummy, 1 if hh can read 
and write or attended any formal school, 0, illiterate  
.2150538 .4115979 .2208589 .4161039 .2068966 .4068381 
Number of adult males for hh head 1.548387 1.05103 1.588957 1.004496 1.491379 1.11508 
Number of adult females for the hh head  1.587814 .981114 1.539877 .9178975 1.655172 1.064065 
Dependence ratio  2.288249 1.330594 2.229871 1.265886 2.370279 1.418074 
Own farm size in "Tsimdi" 5.340502 2.873942 5.503067 3.081955 5.112069 2.54873 
oxen Number of oxen for the household                  1.358423 1.199757 1.564417 1.257259 1.068966 1.052733 
 Tropical livestock unit for the household 4.772577 8.248836 4.922301 4.704747 4.56219 11.54253 
Number of parcels for the household 1.749104 .6187632 1.723926 .650625 1.784483 .5718929 
Average distance from plot to homestead 1.968871 1.533713 2.078563 1.657252 1.814734 1.332813 
Plot age  17.51075 7.874403 16.9274 7.841052 18.33046 7.881857 
Dummy of whether there has been public conservation .2007168 .4012564 .1717791 .3783507 .2413793 .4297763 
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on the plot 
 Dummy of household have first stage certificate  .8458781 .3617143 .8159509 .3887184 .887931 .3168198 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel .0824373 .275524 .0858896 .2810644 .0775862 .2686799 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel .6845878 .4655148 .7116564 .4543877 .6465517 .4801143 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel .1827957 .3871935 .1840491 .3887184 .1810345 .3867172 
Soil type:  Ba'ekel .2616487 .4403222 .2638037 .4420522 .2586207 .4397764 
Slope: Flat .8996416 .3010172 .8895706 .3143902 .9137931 .281887 
Slope: Medium  .0501792 .2187069 .0613497 .2407102 .0344828 .1832572 
Slope: Steep .1326165 .3397692 .1349693 .3427438 .1293103 .3369988 
Soil depth: Shallow. 4265233 .4954604 .4417178 .4981219 .4051724 .4930552 
Soil depth: medium .3297491 .4709667 .3312883 .472127 .3275862 .4713692 
Soil depth: deep .516129 .5006378 .5337423 .5003975 .4913793 .5020946 
Status of tenure last 2 years, 1=Improve, 0=No 
change,1=Reduce 
.4910394 .5989427 .3374233 .6108167 .7068966 .5110474 
Owner counterclaim about the ownership of the plot, 
1=impossible,      2=Unlikely,  3=likely , 4= not sure 
2.28777 .9556566 1.969136 .993287 2.732759 .6897732 
Dummy Owner perceive  land redistribution taken next 
five years 
.3763441 .4853385 .4355828 .4973611 .2931034 .4571603 
Interaction variable .2759857 .4478128 .3128834 .4650962 .2241379 .4188225 
Interaction variable .6666667 .4722516 .5460123 .4994127 .8362069 .3716933 
Number of visits and community meeting called by DA 
hh attend   
1.551971 2.075028 1.153374 1.712636 2.112069 2.394819 
Cooperative  member dummy, 1= member,0= otherwise .5125448 .5007408 .5276074 .5007757 .4913793 .5020946 
FFW participate  .311828 .4640724 .2760736 .4484313 .362069 .4826837 
Remittance received  .1469534 .3546957 .1165644 .3218894 .1896552 .393729 
Dummy manure use for plot, 1=yes, 0=otherwise  .4551971 .4988835 .398773 .4911548 .5344828 .5009736 
Fertilizer used in value (Ethiopian Birr)  738.0986 871.0875 618.4525 799.8521 906.222 940.3549 
Fertilizer used in value (Ethiopian Birr) 124.0394 284.1993 113.5951 267.9023 138.7155 306.2264 
Number of natural trees in the plot 18.10753 85.325 20.99387 89.09736 14.05172 79.92723 
Number of young  trees in the plot 29.09319 117.1335 34.71166 121.3151 21.19828 111.0286 
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Annex 3. Summery Statistics of Variables Used In the descriptive statistics 
Questions asked to sample household  Non-certified Certified Full sample 
How likely counterclaim for owner ship of the plot? 
Impossible 46.39       10.71       32.01 
unlikely 14.46        4.46 10.43 
likely 34.94       83.04 54.32 
No-change 4.22        1.79 3.24 
Is there any improvement of tenure security enhancing measure taken place within the last 2 years 
Worsen/reduced 7.78        1.79        5.38 
No change 50.90       24.11       40.14 
Improve 41.32       74.11       54.48 
Certain 35.93       87.50 56.63 
Do you feel that having a certificate will increase the possibility of obtaining compensation in case the land is 
taken? 
No 0.60        0.00 0.36 
Yes 89.22       91.07 89.96 
Not sure 10.18        8.93 9.68 
Do you believe that having a land certificate improves the tenure security of women? 
Yes 88.02       88.39 88.17 
No 11.98       11.61 11.83 
Does having a certificate make you more willing to rent out the land to strangers?  
No 17.96       16.96 17.56 
Yes 82.04       83.04 82.44 
Do you think that having land certificate make land market easy and secure? 1=Yes, 0=No 
No 17.96       13.39 16.13 
Yes 82.04       86.61 83.87 
What type of tenure arrangement do you prefer? 
Privet Ownership 20.36       25.89 22.58 
State Ownership 78.44       73.21 76.34 
No Idea 1.20        0.89 1.08 
Certificate reduce border conflict  
Yes it have 81.6 87.93 84.23 
I don’t think so 14.72 10.34 12.90 
Never 3.68 1.72 2.87 
Believe certificate reduce conflict related with in heritance  
Yes 95.71 95.69 95.7 
Never 4.29 4.31 4.30 
Interested in planting tree on any one of your plot. 
No  23.35       26.79       24.73       
Yes 76.65 73.21 75.27 
Believe certificate encourage to plant tree  
No   31.33       32.14       31.65 
Yes 68.67       67.86       68.35 
Think tree planting enhance tenure security 
No 16.17       22.32       18.64 
Yes 83.83       77.68      81.36 
Interested in adoption of soil bound constructed  in his plot  
No 8.38        4.46        6.81 
Yes 91.62       95.54       93.19 
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Are u interested in adoption of ST in any one of your plot. 
No 63.47       56.25      60.57 
Yes 36.53       43.75      39.43 
Is there any SWC bound or STC made before 18 months  
No 35.33       27.68       32.26 
Yes 64.67       72.32       67.74 
Made any improvement in the existing of SWC or STC in the last 18 months  
Worsen 5.39        5.36        5.38 
No change 20.96       21.43       21.15 
Improve 73.65       73.21       73.48 
Believe  investment on land enhance productivity  
Yes   7.19        6.25        6.81 
No 92.81       93.75       93.19 
Public investment  
Yes 82.04       76.79       79.93 
No 17.96       23.21       20.07 
You or a member of your family attend 
No   47.71             34.23       42.05 
Yes 52.29           65.77 57.95 
Number of meetings attend 1.131737   1.776786  
Annex-4 Measuring Spillover Effects of Program Placement 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     167 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   165) =    0.54 
       Model |    .1344642     1    .1344642           Prob > F      = 0.4620 
    Residual |  40.8236196   165  .247415877           R-squared     =  0.0033 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0028 
       Total |  40.9580838   166  .246735445           Root MSE      =  .49741 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   inv_type2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   progvillf |   .1855828   .2517377     0.74   0.462    -.3114595    .6826252 
       _cons |   .5644172   .0389601    14.49   0.000     .4874926    .6413418 
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Annex 5.Logit estimation for participation in the certification 
program 
pscore certi_type2 sexhh agehh educhh adulthh own_land plotdist plot_age 
first_certi bak_type walk_type hut_type slop1 slop2 slop3 sd_shallow sd_deep 
oxen_2003 tlu_2003 youngtree SWC_2003 STC_2003, pscore(ps13) blockid(blockf1) 
comsup numblo(5) level(0.001) logit  
 
****************************************************  
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score  
****************************************************  
The treatment is certi_type2 
      Dummy of 
  certificate  |       Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------+----------------------------------- 
No certificate |        163       58.42       58.42 
   Certificate |        116       41.58      100.00 
---------------+----------------------------------- 
         Total |        279      100.00 
Estimation of the propensity score  
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.41034 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -180.03865 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -179.9173 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -179.91711 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =     279 
                                                  LR chi2(20)     =     18.99 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5227 
Log likelihood = -179.91711                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0501 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 certi_type2 |     Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       sexhh |  -.2019937   .3425613    -0.59   0.555    -.8734016    .4694141 
       agehh |    .013868   .0118475     1.17   0.242    -.0093527    .0370887 
      educhh |   .0539247   .3243889     0.17   0.868    -.5818658    .6897152 
     adulthh |   .0391765   .0904928     0.43   0.665    -.1381861    .2165391 
    own_land |  -.1160193     .05906    -1.96   0.049    -.2317747   -.0002639 
    plotdist |  -.1106197   .0932755    -1.19   0.236    -.2934363    .0721968 
    plot_age |   .0151612   .0214275     0.71   0.479    -.0268359    .0571584 
 first_certi |   .4622918   .4220351     1.10   0.273    -.3648818    1.289466 
    bak_type |  -.0559994    .496848    -0.11   0.910    -1.029804    .9178049 
   walk_type |  -.5356318   .3481641    -1.54   0.124    -1.218021    .1467573 
    hut_type |   .0658319   .4606702     0.14   0.886    -.8370651    .9687289 
       slop1 |   .7731895   .6507257     1.19   0.235    -.5022094    2.048588 
       slop3 |   .6729651     .62606     1.07   0.282      -.55409     1.90002 
  sd_shallow |  -.4050932   .2998521    -1.35   0.177    -.9927926    .1826062 
     sd_deep |  -.1374403   .2919623    -0.47   0.638    -.7096759    .4347952 
   oxen_2003 |  -.0380259   .1068069    -0.36   0.722    -.2473635    .1713117 
    tlu_2003 |   .0122561   .0160342     0.76   0.445    -.0191702    .0436825 
   youngtree |  -.0012474   .0012856    -0.97   0.332     -.003767    .0012723 
    SWC_2003 |  -.0003772   .0005992    -0.63   0.529    -.0015516    .0007972 
    STC_2003 |   .0020384   .0023929     0.85   0.394    -.0026517    .0067285 
       _cons |   -.947692   .8823373    -1.07   0.283    -2.677041    .7816574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Note: the common support option has been selected  
The region of common support is [.19059294, .76650343] 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in region of common support 
 Estimated propensity score 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
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      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .1984121       .1905929 
 5%     .2290153       .1940486 
10%     .2671907       .1984121       Obs                 275 
25%     .3383497       .2027955        Sum of Wgt.         275 
 
50%      .408238                      Mean            .420558 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .1207908 
75%     .5026219       .7005928 
90%     .5838325       .7449281       Variance       .0145904 
95%      .623517       .7475521       Skewness         .32175 
99%     .7449281       .7665034       Kurtosis       2.615963 
 
 
******************************************************  
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks Use option detail if you 
want more detailed output  
******************************************************  
 
The final number of blocks is 5 
 
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not different for 
treated and controls in each blocks 
**********************************************************  
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score Use option detail if you 
want more detailed output  
**********************************************************  
The balancing property is satisfied  
 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated and the number of 
controls for each block  
 
           | Dummy of household 
           |     have PBSLLH 
  Inferior | certificate for his 
  of block |         plot 
of pscore  | No certif  Certifica |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
  .1905929 |         2          1 |         3  
        .2 |        83         42 |       125  
        .4 |        48         30 |        78  
        .5 |        16         32 |        48  
        .6 |        10         11 |        21  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       159        116 |       275  
 
Note: the common support option has been selected 
 
*******************************************  
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore  
*******************************************  
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Annex 6. Conversion factors used to estimate tropical livestock units (TLU)  
Livestock category Conversion Factor  
Camel 1.4 
Horse 1.1  
Ox 1  
Cow 1  
Woyfen (weaned male calf) 0.34  
Heifer 0.75  
Calf 0.25  
Donkey (adult) 0.7  
Donkey (young) 0.35  
Sheep (adult) 0.13  
Sheep (young) 0.06  
Goat (adult) 0.13  
Goat (young) 0.06  
Hen 0.013 
Source: Storck, et al., 1991  
Annex 7. ATT results of intensity of soil bound constructed  
Matching method No.  
Treated  
No.  
Control  
ATT Std.Err t-value  
Stratification 116 159 -3.153 27.592 -0.114 
Nearest neighbor  116 58 -78.750 59.186 -1.331 
Radius  112 153 -18.929 31.964 -0.592 
Kernel  116 159 -0.824 25.758 -0.032 
Annex 8.  ATT results of intensity terrace constructed: 
Matching method No.  
Treated  
No.  
Control  
ATT Std.Err t-value  
Stratification 116 159 0.231 11.181 0.021 
Nearest neighbor  116 58 1.724 16.832 0.102 
Radius  112 153 2.415 7.314 0.330 
Kernel  116 159 -2.948 12.948 -0.228 
102 
 
 
Annex 9 indirect impacts of certificate (through investment) on productivity with alternative options  
VARIABLES Two stage excluding 
endogenous stone terrace 
from first stage 
Two stage including 
certificate from the 
first stage 
Two stage excluding 
certificate from the first 
stage 
OLS on reduced 
form equation 
certi_type2 0.821 0.690 0.792* 0.917** 
 (0.503) (0.504) (0.467) (0.464) 
sexhh 1.050* 1.023* 1.026* 0.918 
 (0.589) (0.587) (0.589) (0.575) 
agehh -0.0369* -0.0546** -0.0557** -0.0388* 
 (0.0210) (0.0227) (0.0230) (0.0204) 
educhh 0.314 0.501 0.501 0.226 
 (0.537) (0.542) (0.542) (0.534) 
adumale 0.265 -0.0693 -0.0718 0.280 
 (0.221) (0.277) (0.277) (0.221) 
adufem -0.111 -0.0703 -0.0739 -0.149 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.234) (0.230) 
own_landha 0.514 0.798* 0.815* 0.585 
 (0.392) (0.414) (0.417) (0.390) 
plotdist -0.0856 0.0618 0.0674 0.00295 
 (0.187) (0.201) (0.200) (0.163) 
plot_age 0.0170 0.0154 0.0162 0.0240 
 (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0357) 
first_certi 0.720 0.673 0.662 0.594 
 (0.704) (0.701) (0.699) (0.693) 
inte_swc 0.00155 0.00146 0.00130  
 (0.00169) (0.00168) (0.00168)  
int_ST  0.0331** 0.0334**  
  (0.0165) (0.0164)  
Treeseedlings -0.00391 -0.00570 -0.00563  
 (0.00437) (0.00444) (0.00430)  
bak_type 0.835 1.220 1.224 0.585 
 (0.876) (0.892) (0.891) (0.836) 
walk_type 0.264 0.106 0.114 0.178 
 (0.584) (0.587) (0.590) (0.577) 
hut_type 0.967 1.333* 1.323* 0.767 
 (0.752) (0.770) (0.768) (0.738) 
slop1 -1.780 -2.009* -2.033* -1.652 
 (1.081) (1.082) (1.088) (1.054) 
slop3 -1.029 -0.903 -0.920 -1.003 
 (1.019) (1.016) (1.016) (1.022) 
sd_shallow -0.923* -1.174** -1.163** -0.871* 
 (0.498) (0.512) (0.513) (0.494) 
sd_deep 0.985** 1.472*** 1.478*** 0.943* 
 (0.487) (0.541) (0.541) (0.486) 
oxen 0.420** 0.413** 0.419** 0.391* 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.200) 
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tlu -0.0317 -0.0326 -0.0322 -0.0297 
 (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
remittance 1.204* 1.175* 1.164* 1.301** 
 (0.652) (0.649) (0.649) (0.633) 
extecona -0.129 -0.126 -0.130 -0.143 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.129) (0.116) 
cooperative 4.014*** 3.918*** 3.919*** 4.021*** 
 (0.469) (0.471) (0.471) (0.468) 
ffw_parti -0.100 -0.0829 -0.0744 0.0147 
 (0.497) (0.496) (0.494) (0.488) 
manure 0.991** 0.987** 0.989** 0.968** 
 (0.457) (0.456) (0.457) (0.459) 
public_inv 0.915* 0.994* 0.993* 0.963* 
 (0.541) (0.540) (0.540) (0.542) 
fertvalue -0.000339 -0.000299 -0.000298 -0.000337 
 (0.000272) (0.000272) (0.000272) (0.000272) 
seedvalue -0.000717 -0.000747 -0.000745 -0.000639 
 (0.000790) (0.000787) (0.000787) (0.000784) 
e1 -0.00136 -0.00131   
 (0.00208) (0.00208)   
e2  -0.0346**   
  (0.0168)   
e3 0.00100 0.00274   
 (0.00464) (0.00469)   
res_1   -0.00106  
   (0.00208)  
res_2   -0.0350**  
   (0.0167)  
res_3   0.00267  
   (0.00455)  
Constant 1.676 2.256 2.254 1.527 
 (1.550) (1.568) (1.552) (1.479) 
Observations 275 275 275 275 
R-squared 0.417 0.427 0.427 0.403 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Annex 10 Kernel density graph intensity of adoption of SWC and ST for plots with and without land certiﬁcation 
(matched sample)  
 A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions  for intensity of investment for soil bound and 
stone terrace was highly Significant (P=0.000 and 0.04, respectively) indicating that the distributions were different. 
 
Annex 11 sample of current land use of treated tabia (Wargba) 
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Annex 12.  Survey Instrument Used in This Study 
Assessing “Socio-Economic Impacts of Parcel Based Second Level Landholding Certificates: Evidence From Northern Ethiopia” 
Good morning/ afternoon. My name is ___________. We are doing a research to develop an academic study about the socio-economic 
impacts of parcel based second level land holding certificates. I would like to count on your cooperation to understand the socio-economic 
impacts of the program. 
        
 
Woreda _________________________________________ 
Tabia ____________________________________________ 
Kushet___________________________________________ 
Tibia’s distance from woreda market ________Tibia’s distance from woreda town ______ 
Tibia’s distance from asphalt road _________Tibia’s distance from gravel road _________  
Name of the interviewee: ___________________________________________ 
Interviewer____________________________________________________ 
Date of interview _______________________________________________ 
Checked by ___________________________________________________ 
Data entry by ___________________________________________________ 
Household ID code ______________________________________________ 
Parcel ID code/code of certificates _______________________________ 
Respondent gender _______ age _______ education __________ Religion______________ 
 
Questionnaire number: 
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Category I: Household Demographics  
A. Provide the details of each household member 
We would like to ask a few questions about all members of the household. Please include everybody who usually lives in the household (including servants etc)   
Me
mb
er 
ID 
1.Name of the household  member  2.Relations
hip to 
household 
head 
Code (a)  
3.Sex 
Male..... 1 
Female.... 0 
4.Age  5.Marital  
status 
Code (b)  
6.Education 
level 
 Code (d) 
7. Main occupation 
(what is the name 
of profession or 
activity? Code (c) 
8.Secon
dary 
activity 
(name) 
9. How many 
months did the 
name live here 
in the last 12 
months  
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
06          
07          
08          
09          
10          
 
(a)relationship with 
household  
1 Husband/Wife 
2 Partner/Cohabite 
3 Natural son/daughter 
4 Stepson/stepdaughter 
5.  Son-in-law/daughter-in-law 
6 Step-father/mother  
7  Half-brother/sister 
8  Step-brother/sister 
 
 
9 Brother/Sister-in-law 
10 Grand-parent 
11 Cousin 
12 Aunt/Uncle 
13 Niece/Nephew 
14 Other relative 
15 Employee 
16 Employer 
17 Other non-relative 
(b)martial stats  
1 Single and never married 
or never in a legally 
recognized civil 
partnership 
2 Married 
3 Widowed 
4 Separated but legally 
married 
5 Divorced 
6  too young to marred 
(C) occupation  
0 = none  
1=farming  
2=business  
3=laborer 
4=unemployed  
5=student  
6=child  
7= other (specify) 
_______________________ 
(d) education  
0 too young to attend (child) 
1-12  for those who attained formal school 
13 college diploma or technical/vocational level 
14 first degree  and above  
15 never attained any formal school but can read 
and write  
16 illiterate(never attend formal school and cannot 
read and write) 
17 other  
Specify................................. 
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Category II: Household Asset: land and livestock   
Section A: Own Land  
A.1 Total area of cultivated land that the household have ____________________ (tsimdi) 
A.2 How many parcels does the household have? _______________ 
1.Plot Name  2.Plot 
size  
3.Distan
ce from 
home to 
the plot 
4.When 
did you 
obtained 
this 
plot/age 
of the 
plot  
5.How 
did you 
acquire 
this plot  
6.Do you 
have the 
first stage  
land 
certificate 
(belbal) 
kiti’e 
7.Do 
you 
have 
the 
second 
stage  
land 
certific
ate 
8.If yes, 
when did 
you 
obtained 
this 
certificate 
(2nd   stage) 
9.What 
is the 
slope 
 of the 
plot  
10.What 
is the 
general 
texture/so
il type of 
the plot 
11.What 
is the 
general 
depth of 
the soil  
12.Soil 
quality 
(subjec
tive 
report) 
01            
02            
03            
04            
05            
    1=generated 
local leaders  
2=inherited 
3=rented  
4=farming as 
tenant   
Yes=1 
No=0 
Yes=1 
No=0 
 Flat=1 
 Foot 
hill=2  Mid 
hill=3 
Steep 
hill=4 
1=Ba’ekel 
 2= Walka 
3=Hutsa  
4= Mekeyih  
1=Shallow, 
2=Medium, 
3= Deep  
 
1=Fertile  
2=Medium 
3=Poor   
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B. Livestock ownership  
Can you tell me about your heard of livestock at present? 
Type of livestock  1.Number 
owned and 
present at 
home  
2.Number 
owned and 
present at 
home in 
summer 
2011(kremti 
2003) 
3.Did you buy any ...(...) during the last 
18 months 
 
4.Did you sell any ...(...) during the 
last 18 months 
5.During the 
last six months 
how many were 
born? 
a.Number 
bought  
b.Total 
purchased 
vale of all 
bought  
c.Financing 
of the 
purchase 
(code a) 
a.Number 
of sold (if 
none write 
0) 
b.Total 
sales 
values of 
all sold 
c.Reason
s for sold 
(code b) 
Young bulls/oxen          
Cows           
Heifer / Calves          
sheep          
Goats           
Horses/ Mules          
Camels           
Donkey           
Beehives           
poultry          
 
(a)Financing purpose                                                                                                    
Income from farm .......................1 
Other income ..............................2                        
Income from sale of livestock .....3 
Income from sale of asset ............4 
Saving ..........................................5 
Loan/gift from relative ..................6 
Other specify........................... 
(b)Reasons for sale
To help relatives ................................1 
To buy food.........................................2 
To buy other goods ............................3 
To buy seeds .......................................4 
To buy livestock .................................5 
To pay for labor ..................................6 
To repay loans ....................................7 
To pay tax ...........................................8 
To buy building material......................9 
To pay for health expense ..................10 
To pay for education expense .............11 
Other ..................................................12 
Specify.................................................
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C. Livestock yield   
Livestock 
product  
1.How much of the 
livestock product have you 
produced since the last 
four months (write “0” if 
product was not produced) 
2. How much of 
this product did 
the household use 
for consumption 
since the last four 
month? 
3. How much of this 
product did the 
household sell since 
the last four months? 
4. How much of this 
product did the 
household give to other 
HHs the last four 
months? 
5. How much of 
this product did 
the household 
currently have in 
storage? 
Milk (L)      
Butter(kg)       
Eggs (#)      
Hides/skins(#)      
Honey(kg)      
Other       
 
Category III: Land registration and certification process. 
A. Participation in the program and awareness creation. 
1. Were public information meetings held before the land registration program started? 1 yes, 0= no (if no go to Q-4) 
2. Did you or a member of your family attend any of these meeting? 1=Yes, 0=No (if no go to Q-4) 
3. How many of these meeting did you or a member of your family attended? ................... 
4. How do you evaluate the efforts made by government (woreda or regional level) to make you aware about the second stage 
land certification? 1= Good enough   2= Not enough at all        3= Difficult to explain         4= No response  
5. Is any one of your family or you member of the land administration committee? 1=Yes, 0=No
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Category IV: Issues Related to Tenure Security and Land 
Related Disputes  
1. Who will inherit this plot from you? 
1=Oldest son/daughter, 2=Oldest son, 3=Oldest daughter, 4=Youngest unmarried son/daughter, 
5=Unmarried son, 6=Unmarried daughter, 7=Favorite son, 8=Favorite daughter, 9=other family 
members, 10=the village, 11=don’t know, 12=other specify
2. Who can grab the land away from you?  
1 =Village Chief          2= Brother/in law /Sister/ in law             3=None     4=Owner         
5= government 6......Other (specify)....................................                                  
3. What measures do you take to ensure (that) NOT lose the plot?  
1=Plant tree                           2=fallow                             3= leave for grazing 
4=registered        5=none             6=other (specify).................................... 
4. Did you have the parcel based second level landholding certificate for your plot? 
1=Yes                                 0=No (Go to Q-6) 
5. If YES, in whose name was it? 
1= head                  2=joint (husband and wife)              3=both son and daughter  
4= joint plus list of family members               5=other (specify).................................... 
6. If No, why not?   1=Land registration was not held in our district  
2=I did not want the certificate,           3=I refused to get for the certificate, (go to Q-10)                 
4=I have not yet been given the certificate I should have, 
5= Did not submit photos yet,      6=Difficult to get photos,                       7=Expensive,                                                 
8=Other, specify _______________________________ 
7. If you refused to receive or NOT volunteer to get the certificate, what were the reasons?  
1=Certificate is only a piece of paper and has no value            2=Certificate does not 
provide tenure security 3=Certificate may cause me to have to pay more tax,   
 4=other, specify:  
8. If you don’t have a certificate, would you prefer to receive a new land certificate with a 
map of each of your plots, with clear identification of the location and size and shape of 
the plot?   1=Yes, 0=No 
9. If yes, how much would you maximum be willing to pay for it or how many man days are 
you maximum willingness to work for the kebele to obtain such certificate? 
10. Have you had any border conflicts on the plot? In the last 18 months?       1= Yes     0= No 
11. What type of conflict is common in your vicinity? 
1= Border disputes            2=Plot ownership              3= Inheritance dispute    
 4=Divorce disputes                       5=Other, specify......................... 
12. Where was this conflicts resolved?  
1=LAC           2=Village chief                         3=Byto (tabia Court)        
4=DA                          5=wereda court       6= Negotiation by old villagers  
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13. Are the borders of your plots clearly demarcated?  
1=yes, 0=no  
14. Is there any change in border disputes related to your land in the last 18 months?  
      1= less disputes              2= no difference,                         3= more disputes  
15. Do you think that the second level land registration had any effect on reduction of border 
disputes related?   1= yes it have           2= I don’t think so          3 =Never  
16. Only for Certified Respondents, How was land border conflict during the 
implementation of the program? 1= less disputes   2= no difference,         3= more disputes 
17. Does having a certificate protect you against encroachment on your land by neighbors?              
1=Less risk of encroachment,      0=No difference   
18. How do you evaluate the level of land dispute in the last 18 months in your community?  
1= worsened/ increase,     2= no change,  3= improve  
19. Are border disputes a great concern for you? 1= Yes,     0=No  
20. In your opinion what type of measures should be taken to mitigate land dispute? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________.  
21. Has the land registration and certification had any effect on the amount of inheritance 
disputes in your community?    
1=More inheritance disputes         2=No change            3=Less inheritance disputes   
22. Do you think that you will cultivate the same field after five year?   
            1= yes/ certain/ sure                           0= I do not think so (not)  
23. Do you think there will be any new land redistributions in your kebele within the next five 
years?                1=Yes,                      0=No 
24. Do you fear that your land is taken by the government at any time? 
            1= Yes, I fear       2. No I don’t fear           3= no response  
25. Is there any improvement of tenure security enhancing measure taken place within the last 
2 years about ownership of the land?  
     1=improve 0= no change -1= worsen or reduce. 
26. Do you believe that your holding right is secured as result of certificate of holding? 
   1=Yes,                        1=No,                       3= No response  
27. How likely you can counterclaim for ownership of the plot?  
1=Impossible           2= unlikely                 3= likely                    4= no change 
28. Do you feel that having a certificate will increase the possibility of obtaining 
compensation in case the land is taken? 1=Yes,    0=No,       2=Not sure 
29. Do you believe that having a land certificate improves the tenure security of women? 
1=Yes,               0=No,                 2=Not sure 
30. Do you believe that having land certificate will reduce the number of conflicts related to 
inheriting land to children? 1=Yes,         0=No,              2=Not sure 
112 
 
31. If your land were suddenly demanded for public purposes by the tabia, how much 
compensation, minimum, would you consider being a fair compensation for losing your 
land? __________birr 
32. If it became legal to sell land, would you consider sell the land if you got a good price?          
1=Yes,        0=No,              2=Only if I came in a desperate situation,   
33. If you were allowed to sell your land and are willing to sell it, how much would be the 
minimum acceptable price for you to sell it now? Price without value of your house and 
other buildings on your land (cultivated land only). _________birr  
34. Does having a certificate make you more willing to rent out the land to strangers?  
                      1=Yes,             0=No 
35. Do you think that having land certificate make land market easy and secure? 1=Yes, 0=No 
36. What type of tenure arrangement do you prefer? 
1=Privet Ownership      2=State Ownership         3= No Idea  
Category V: Gender Issues 
1. Have you been married before?    1= Yes,    0= No (Go to Q-4) 
2. If yes, what was the reason for the break?  1= divorce, 2= death of partner.  
3. If yes, how much land do you get after divorced? _________________________ tsimdi  
4. Do you have TDAR today? 1= Yes, 0= No 
5. In case of divorce today, how much of the land you and your wife/husband would get?   
______ 1= Equally shared with my spouse     2= Less than half appropriated to husband     
3= less than half appropriated to wife  4= I don’t know 
6. In case of divorced, what would females do with their land in your community? 1= share 
crop it   2= crop it themselves( with help of son)  3= rent it out for money, 4= other    
7. In case of the divorced, how many of the children are expected to stay with you? 1= all   
2=none of them 3= some of them (age and sex those with wife, indicate it in table A)  
        4=do not have children 5= don’t know  
8. Do you think that your wife or you (if the respondent is wife) have strong land right after 
the new land certification?                   1= Yes,     No = 0 
9. Is there any change in relation to ownership of plot?  1= Yes,     No = 0 
10. Do you agree with the following rules? 
i. Joint title of husband and wife? 1= Yes,  0= No  
ii. Equal sharing of land upon divorce? 1= Yes,  0= No 
iii. Only wife’s name on certificate, if second and third wife of polygamous men? 1= Yes, 0= No 
iv. Females should be allowed to plough the land? 1= Yes,  0= No 
11. How do you perceive the regulation that the wife also should have her name and picture 
on the certificate?  1=Indifferent (acceptable),    2=Good,            3=Bad 
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12. Does the wife’s name on the certificate, affect her power over the land?    
 1=Has no effect,     2=She has a stronger position in case of divorce or husband’s death,  
3=She involves more in land-related decisions within marriage (e.g. crop choice and 
input use),     4=She controls more of the income from production on the land,  
5=She is involved in land-renting decisions, 6=She does more work on the land,  
7=other, specify______________ 
13. Does it matter how much land you brought into marriage, for how much you get in case 
of divorce? 1=It does not matter, equal share always, 2=Only land obtained during 
marriage is shared equally, 3=Inherited land is kept by the individual, other land is shared 
equally, 4=You can keep land that has been allocated to you as an individual, 5=Other, 
specify 
14. Do your wife (you) get remittance from relatives that is earned in the last four months?               
1= Yes,  (  by whom? a=husband side b= wife c= both )      0=No (Go to Q-16) 
15. How much did you get remittance in the last four months? _____________ 
16. Can family members deny the (male) head of household to rent out their family land? 
1=Yes, if they want to, 2=Yes, but only the wife, 3=No 
17. Is there a Land Administration Committee in your Tabia? 1.Yes, 2=No, 3=Don’t know 
18. If yes to Q#17, did you participate in the election of the committee? 1=Yes, 0=No 
19. If yes to Q#17, is there a reservation for female members in the land administration 
committee? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
20. If yes to Q#19, what is the minimum number of female members that has to be placed in 
the land administration committee?   _________________ 
21. If yes to Q#19, are there female members in the current land committee of the Tabia?                
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
22. If yes to Q#19, are you a member of the land administration Committee? 1=Yes, 0=No 
23. Put the options below on who decides the following issues. 
                1=husband    2=husband and wife     3=wife    4= other___________ 
23.1 Daily household need  
23.2 Large household purchase   
23.3 Land rent out/share cropping  if needed  
23.4 Adoptions of modern input/fertilizer  
23.5 Improved seed adoption  
23.6 Left fellow     
23.7 Type of crop/seed selection   
23.8 Decisions on credit  
24. Perceived Family Background of wife (relative):__________ 1=poor 2=medium   3=rich    
25. Put your level of agreement on: ‘a husband is justified in beat his wife for each of the 
following reasons’: 0=no 1=yes 
a. if she burns the food;_______  
b. if she argues with him;__________ 
c.  if she goes out of the house without telling him; __________ 
d. if she neglects the children_____________ 
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26. Is there credit access reserved for women in your tabia? ______0=no    1=yes 
27.  Had the wife borrowed money from any institution in the last 2 years? __ 0=no  1=yes 
28. What was the amount of asset brought to marriage by the side of the wife? _______ birr, 
_________________ in kind.  
29. Who controls majority of the income of the household? 1=husband 2=wife 3=equal 4=other _ 
30. Who decides on the income of the household? 1=husband 2=wife 3=equal 4=other specify__  
31. Do you believe that you are equal with your spouse? 0=no   1=yes 
32. Do the community perceive equality of men and women? 0=no   1=yes 
33. Do women themselves perceive that they are equal with men? 0=no   1=yes  
34. Why______________________________________________________________________ 
Category VI: Investment on plot  
1) Are you interested in planting trees on any of your plots?    1= Yes, 0 =No   
2) Did you plant tree in your plot in the last 18 months?  1= Yes, 0 =No   
3) Does having the land certificate increase your incentive to plant tree? 1= Yes, 0 =No   
4) Do you think that tree planting enhance tenure security/reduce the probability of losing land?   
1= Yes,        0 =No   
5) Are you interested in adoption of SWC bound in your plot?  1= Yes, 0 =No 
6) Did you made any SWC bound in the last 18 months?   1= Yes, 0 =No   
7) Are you interested in adoption of STC in your plot?  1=Yes,   0=No 
8) Did you made any STC in any of your parcel in the last 18 months? 1=Yes,   0=No 
9) Is there any SWC bound or STC made before 18 months in your plot? 1= Yes, 0 =No   
10) Did you made improvements on your farm land for the existing SWC or STC to improve in 
the last 18 months? improve =1,  no change =0, worsened/reduce = -1 
11) Do you think that investment on plot (SWC and STC) enhance/improve productivity?  
                     1= Yes,                        0 =No   
12) Is there any public investment of SWC bound or ST construction made in any one of your 
parcel/plot in the past 18 months?      
              1= Yes, 0 =No (Go to the table) 
13) If yes please estimate the approximate total meters (how many in meters) of those 
investments in your own entire plot? _______ 
14) Is there any pressure from community to invest on your plot any type of investment?  1= 
Yes, 0 =No 
15) Reasons for investment on land (possible to answer more than one) 
  Improve soil quality = 1                                          Incentives given = 2 
  Advice from extension workers = 3                         Perceives Increase yield (productivity) = 4 
   Perceives Control soil erosion = 5                           Perceives Reduce probability of losing land = 6 
       Pressure from community =   7                   Other (Specify) ______________________ 
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  16. Investment on plot 
Plot 
name/ID 
1.Number of 
natural tree 
in plot(write 
0 if none) 
2.Number of 
young tree 
planted 
before 18 
months in 
plot  
3. If Q-1 is 
yes, Did you 
plant tree in 
your plot in 
the past 18 
months  
4. How 
many 
trees are 
there? 
Number  
 
5.Length of 
SWC bound 
constructed 
before 18 months 
in your 
plot(write 0 if 
none)  
6. Did you 
made any 
SWC 
bound in 
the last 18 
months  
7. How 
much 
(Intensity) 
in meter 
8. Length of  
ST 
constructed 
before 18 
months in 
your plot 
(write 0, if 
none) 
9. Did 
you 
invest 
any STC 
in the 
last 18 
months  
10. How 
much 
(meters)                      
01           
02           
03           
04           
05           
06           
   1= yes 
0=no 
  1= yes 
0=no 
  1= yes 
0=no 
 
 
Category VII: Input use  
The input questions refer to all crops as a whole.  
7.1 Total area of land cultivated during the last summer (2012)___________________________(in tsimdi) 
7.2 Total area of land cultivated during the last summer (2012) on which fertilizer was used___________________(in tsimdi) 
7.3 Total area of land covered by improved seed during the last summer (2012)___________________________(in tsimdi) 
 
 1. Did you use 
any manure from 
your household 
herd on your 
fields?  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
2. Did you purchase any 
fertilizer for use on your 
fields? 
3. Did you purchase any improved 
seed for use on your fields? 
4. Number of 
household visits 
and community 
meetings called 
by DA attained by 
the household 
members in the 
last 6 months. 
5.Did you 
apply and 
get loan  in 
the past 12 
months 
Yes = 
1(amount 
pls?) 
No  = 0 
6.Did you 
belongs to 
a farming 
organizati
ons(coope
rative  
Yes =1 
No = 0 
7.Partici
pates in 
off-farm 
income 
in the 
last 18 
months  
8.Receip
t national 
or 
internati
onal 
remittanc
e in the 
last 18 
months 
a.Yes
=1 
N = 0 
b.A
mo
unt  
c.Un
it   
d.Total 
value  
a.Yes=1 
No = 0 
b.Amoun
t  
c.Un
it  
d.Total 
value  
7.4
Tot
al  
 
 
             
 
7.5 Did you participate in food/cash for work activities in the last 18 months? Yes                                           No 
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The questions refer to all the land on which crops were harvested during the last season.  
 
Activity  1.plowing  2.Weeding  3.Harvesting  
7.6 How many days did you do 
this activity (labor cost) 
   
7.7 Oxen days     
                                                                                                                                                                  
7.8 Do you have irrigable land? 0=no 1=yes 
7.9 If your answer for the above question is yes, how much? ___________tsimdi     
Category VIII: Crop output and sales market  
For each crop harvested during the last season (kiremt 2004 E.C) can you answer the following questions? 
8.1 For permanent crops, mention the harvest during the period since the beginning of September 2004 E.C    
Plot name  1.Crop code(a) 
 
2.How much was you Harvest 
during the last (kiremt)  
 
3. Have you sold any 
part of this harvest? 
Yes.......1  
No ........0,next crop  
4.If  you sale any part of your harvest, answer 
questions on amount and revenue  
a. Amount  b. Unit (b) c. Total revenue (Birr) 
a. Quantity  b. Unit(b) 
01        
02        
03        
04        
05        
06        
(a) Crop code  
White teff .........................................1 
Black and mixed teff ....................2 
Barley ................................................3 
Wheat ...............................................4 
Karka’Eta ........................................ 5 
Maize .................................................6 
Sorghum ...........................................7 
Oats  ....................................................8 
Beans .................................................9 
Linseed ......... .................................10 
Groundnuts ....................................11 
Sesame 
.............................................12 
Pulses ...............................................13 
Lentils .............................................14 
Vegetables ( kosta, selata).......15 
Chat ..................................................16 
Banana, papaya, orange ............17 
Grass ..................................................18 
Geshu ................................................19 
Eucalyptus ...................................20 
Potatoes .............................................21 
Onion ..................................................22 
Tomato ................................................23 
Guava (zeytuna)...............................24 
Sugarcane...........................................25 
Zengada (lequa) .............................26 
Other ...................................................27 
Specify................................................. 
b)Quantity unit  
Kilogram ....................................1 
Quintal .........................................2 
Chiret/keshkesh...........................................3 
Loketa .........................................4 
Kafer ...........................................5 
Mishe ..........................................6 
Silicha ........................................7 
Bermil  ......................................8 
Litters ......................................9 
Ensira ......................................10 
Minelik ..................................11 
Shember ................................12 
Kubaya ..................................13 
Birchiko ................................14 
Gembo ..................................15 
Birr .........................................16 
Others ....................................17 
Specify ................................. 
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8.2 How do you evaluate the productivity of your farm lands in last two years? 
 
                    1= decrease 2=the same as before 3=shows increasing trend 4= difficult to explain 
8.3 Reasons for the above 
___________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
8.4 What other factors influence the productivity of your farm? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
CHECK LEST QUESTIONS  
Cadastral principles  
1) Is your cadastral system based on deeds registration or on title registration? 
            1= Deeds registration                         2= Title registration                    
            3= Other..............................               4= Specify_________________________ 
2) By law, is registration of land ownership compulsory or optional?  
1=Compulsory              2= Optional                               3=Others..................... 
3) If felt necessary, please, comment on the actual practice and the legal consequences. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_____________ 
Approach for the establishments of the cadastral records  
4) Are landowners required to register their properties systematically during the initial 
establishment of the cadastre or is registration sporadic, i.e. triggered only by specific actions 
(such as for example sale)? 
1=Systematic (regular)              2= Sporadic (irregular)                                  
3= Both                                    4=All properties are already registered             
5=Other.............................................................. 
5) What is the population of the wereda( one of the wereda) ______________ 
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6) Please estimate the approximate total number of smallest uniquely identified land units, often 
called “land parcels” in your wereda/ tabia( depending on the respondent) 
7) What the approximate total number is of registered in terms of house hold? 
8)  Please estimate the distribution between the smallest uniquely identified land units, often 
called, “land parcels”  
(i) That are legally registered and surveyed, --------------------- 
ii) That are legally occupied but not registered or surveyed, -------------------------------- 
(iii)  That is informally occupied without any legal title ------------------------------------ 
9) Total number of professional land surveyors, such as licensed surveyors active within the 
cadastre system? ______________________ 
10) Proportion of the time that these land surveyors commit for cadastral matters:___________ 
11) Total number of lawyers/solicitors  or equivalent active within the cadastral system:_______ 
12) Proportion of the time that these land surveyors commit for cadastral matters:___________ 
13)  Whose name would it be written in the second level land holding certificates name list as 
owner? 
 1= head                  2=joint (husband and wife)                 3=both son and daughter  
4= joint plus list of family members                5=other (specify).................................... 
14) What type of communication means do you use to disseminate information? 1= radio   2=TV  
3= news paper 4= conferences (#) if any please ________ 5= other (specify) 
15) Is there a statutory system of land registration which records rights in land, including 
ownership, in a public register? 
16) If there is, please list the main laws which govern land registration? 
17) Who is authorized to independently supervise or audit the operation of the Land 
Registration? 
18) Does the head of the Registration office have statutory powers to decide, from evidence and 
documentation provided, questions of land ownership, and the benefit and the burden of 
other rights affecting land - or is the Registry simply a place of record of legal facts and 
documents ? (please specify) 
19) Does the act of registration confer legal status on the rights in land? (The legal status is 
determined by lawyers who investigate and provide an opinion on the quality of the title) 
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20) Are the Land Rights that are registered guaranteed   by the State or by any other means 
(please specify)? 
21) Can an approved enquirer obtain a copy of any   register or map of a registered property?  
22) Is registered land related to a map indicating the extent and the boundaries of the property? 
23) Are boundaries determined precisely by   co-ordinates or are they determined by general 
Boundaries in relation to a topographic map?  Specify or choice one of the following way;          
                    1. By co-ordinates in the digital cadastral map  
                              2. By measured data in field sketches, or    
                              3. By representation in graphical map only.  
24) Which organization is responsible for maintaining   the survey and mapping of registered 
properties? Specify it at wereda, regional and national level please? 
25) Does the law or any regulation require that unique reference numbers are used for registered 
land? (Please specify). 
26) To what extent is the cost of maintaining the land   registration system financed by fees paid 
by customers or by the regional and federal government funding (indicate relative 
percentage)? Government funding ........%, Fees paid by customers  ........%, other means 
........% (please specify). 
27) Are fees set under the provisions of the law or regulations, (please indicate any legal 
provision that governs the setting of fees)?  
28) Does the law specify any formal relationship or co-ordination between the organizations   
responsible for registering land rights, cadastral survey and mapping, land valuation and land 
use?  (Please describe and how is responsible for each task) 
29)  Is it possible to obtain the welfare classification list of household in each tabia? 
(classification shows livelihood  poor, middle and relatively richer households) 
30) Number of land distribution taken please after 1991? ------------------------ 
31) Population density of each tabia? 
32) Number of households live in each tabia? 
33) Number of households who haven’t land in each tabia? 
34) Latitude of each tabia/wereda?  
35) Average rainfall in each tabia/woreda? 
36)  Level of productivity of each tabia? 
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Annex 13 sample picture at the time of data collection 
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Annex14. Sample pictures of the study site and certification activities  
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